Religious Sectarianism and Political Pragmatism

2018 ◽  
pp. 265-282
Author(s):  
Stéphane Lacroix

The Salafi movement in Egypt illustrates that the dynamics of sectarianism are fluid and sometimes contradictory. Over the last five years, the Salafi party, Hizb al-Nour, has taken a pragmatic, flexible approach to politics, but maintained its intransigent religious stances. While the party has made several political concessions and decisions that go against the Salafi doctrine, it considered them necessary to protect the “interest of the Da‘wa” and hold its position of influence among society—justifications that the Salafi Da‘wa, the religious organization behind Hizb al-Nour, has largely accepted despite some internal conflict. Arguably, in contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb al-Nour does not behave like an Islamist party, at least in its current form; for Salafis, politics is just a means to an end. The party’s recent stances, especially during the military takeover in July 2013 and in its aftermath, can best be explained by analyzing Hizb al-Nour not as an Islamist party, but as the lobbying arm of a religious organization. The paradox of the party’s extreme political pragmatism and its rigidity and sectarianism at the doctrinal level seems sustainable and likely to remain.

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Wilmot

Prior to the 2011 Arab uprisings, Islamist parties in most Arab states had been systematically prevented from exercising any meaningful authority in government. Following President Hosni Mubarak's ousting from power in 2011, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) established a political party – the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) – and formally entered mainstream politics, providing a rare opportunity to examine the role of an Islamist party in the context of democratic transition. Contrary to concerns that the MB might use Egypt's political opening to install an undemocratic regime, the movement instead committed itself to electoral politics and consistently adhered to the framework for political transition. An analysis of the MB's political trajectory during the 2011–13 timeframe reveals that the movement endeavoured to protect Egypt's democratic transition against the encroachment of the military and the judiciary. Despite the FJP's efforts, sustained interference by non-elected institutions brought Egypt's democratic experiment to a premature end. This course of events confirms that an Islamist movement is capable of fully committing to politics, but also indicates that political commitment alone is insufficient to ensure a successful transition to democratic governance.


2019 ◽  
pp. 133-160
Author(s):  
Marina ◽  
David Ottaway

This chapter recounts the stages of the 2011 uprising in Egypt, from the fall of one military dictator to the rise of another. The upheaval ended three decades of sclerotic rule under Hosni Mubarak, and ushered in a brief period of democracy that saw the Muslim Brotherhood triumph in parliamentary and presidential elections for the first time in Egyptian history.After a year of tumultuous rule, Islamic President Mohammed Morsi was ousted in a military coup d’état in 2013thanks to the connivance of self-proclaimed democratic secularists. The new military dictator, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, has set about uprooting all traces of Islamist presence in the country and eliminating all civil society activism as well. His goal has been to turn Egypt back fifty years to restore the military state established by Gamal Abdel Nasser, and imitate his pursuit of costly mega-projects to solve the country’s crushing economic and social problems.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maher Hamoud

In July 2013, a widely celebrated military coup took place in Egypt – only two and a half years after the 2011 Revolution. This article investigates the hegemonic power of the private press owned by Egypt’s business elite during the coup period. In the context of this research objective, this study answers the question of “how did Egypt’s private press provide popular support to the 2013 military coup?” through following a critical approach and conducting framing analysis of news headlines in a period of 112 days. This article examines the popular privately-owned newspapers al-Masry al-Youm and al-Watan as the main case studies. Findings show that Egypt’s business elite engaged in significant news framing in support of the 2013 military coup - for the purpose of maintaining their hegemonic position in the country. They particularly used the frame of “fear” (of the Muslim Brotherhood, potential violence and political chaos) and the frame of “promotion” by portraying the military as a saviour.    


Author(s):  
N. Lutsenko

The article examines the origins of political Islam in the Middle East and the terminological aspect of the problem. The stages of the formation of the Egyptian Islamic organization Muslim Brotherhood were clarified and its key ideological tenets were established. The political and socio-economic circumstances in which the organization was formed are outlined. Attention is drawn to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the military and economic presence in Egypt of the United Kingdom, which consolidated political Islamic parties. The process of transforming the Muslim Brotherhood from a "group of like-minded people" into a political party is considered. The political and legal ideas of the founder of the organization Hasan al-Banna are covered. which became the main strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood. The situation of the organization in the 30's and 40's was analyzed during the attempt of Nazi Germany to turn the Brothers into their own puppet. The article reveals the role in the organization of its ideologist Said Qutb. His main ideas and views, which formed the basis of the radical Muslim Brotherhood branch, are analyzed. The link between the radicalism of the organization and the ultra-conservative trend of Islam - "Salafism" - was noted. The connection of the Muslim Brotherhood with the Free Officers organization, which came to power in Egypt in 1952, has been disclosed. It was stated that the Brothers supported General Gamal Nasser in the struggle for power, which allowed them to take part in the parliamentary elections. It is stated that the Brothers' criticism of the policies of Gamal Nasser and Anwar Sadat on Israel led to a ban of the organization's activities in Egypt. It has been established that under the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, the "Brothers" tried to enter parliament in other parties. The place and role of the organization during the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, which led the Muslim Brotherhood to power, were examined. The main reasons for the failure of the organization are indicated.


Author(s):  
A. Korotaev ◽  
L. Isaev

The authors analyze roots, causes and implications of both major political events that took place in Egypt in the last three years, namely the Tahrir Revolution of 2011 and what they call the Counterrevolution of 2013. Focus of the article is on the role of the military and the Islamists. The young educated democrats of middle class who initiated the revolution in 2011 under the slogans of combatting autocratic and corrupt government were joined by the poverty-stricken population of Cairo, by the desolate and unemployed and – what was especially important – by the Muslim Brotherhood. This combination of forces proved too strong for the army and government, Mubarak had to resign. But the urban poor who played a decisive role in the victory of the revolution had always been under a very strong influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, so it was inevitable that free and fair elections would bring the Islamists to power. Moursi became President. The Islamists, however, made a number of grave mistakes while in power, and the old elites, both economic and military/bureaucratic, did their best to sabotage the government policy. At last the army (supported by the Egyptian economic elites) came on top, so both the Muslim Brothers and the young secular democrats have lost.


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 76-85
Author(s):  
Mahmoud Ayash ◽  
Ayman Khamis ◽  
Ihab Awais

The political frame to the Egyptian newspapers has played a key role in drawing the image of Hamas within the media content published on Al-Ahram, Al-Ahram, Al-Masry Al-Youm, and Horya and Adalah. Where the image of Hamas in the newspaper Al-Ahram is largely neutral, reflecting the position of the Egyptian authorities, which was represented by the Military Council for 6 months and the presidency of President Mohamed Morsi 6 months other, while the coverage of the newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm was very hostile to Hamas and the apparent efforts of the contact person to A negative image of Hamas, based on the negative position adopted by the private sector financed by the newspaper, which belongs to the majority of the liberal movement against the Islamic movement in general, and the newspaper of Horya and Adalah has worked absolutely to paint a positive image of Hamas, This is due to the intellectual connection between the Muslim Brotherhood, which is affiliated with the newspaper and Hamas. The study recommends in light of the results of the study, the media should focus on the issues of Palestine, including Hamas, as the issue of Palestine is of paramount importance in the present and future of the whole nation, as well as media officials inside Hamas and its spokesmen, In order to ensure a satisfactory presence of the Palestinian narrative to confront deliberate misrepresentation of the Palestinians.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 300-321
Author(s):  
Joel W. Abdelmoez

Abstract In July 2013, after months of protest, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, was ousted by the Egyptian armed forces. The Muslim Brotherhood, who supported Morsi, took to the streets, chanting and singing against the ousting, which they termed a military coup, while supporters of Sisi, who viewed it as a revolution, began producing songs to show their allegiance to the military leadership. While abundant research has been conducted on the role of oppositional and revolutionary music in Egypt since 2011, relatively little has been done on the widely popular pro-military music sometimes known as watani music. Watani songs are a genre of patriotic music made by popular artists to show their allegiance to the Egyptian armed forces. In this paper I examine the surge of watani songs and trace their history back to the Nasser era, thereby showing a continuity in style as well as content. I further argue that there are connections between nationalism and gender constructions, as the national project comes with obligations for men to offer their bodies to the cause. This obligation is aided by constructions about ‘male bravery’ and ‘courage’ that are designed to make men believe that military service is somehow essential to masculinity. Watani music, whether commissioned or not, fits well with this mythology of military men. It forms an ideological undercurrent, supports the narrative that it is necessary for patriotic military men to bravely safeguard the nation against its enemies.


Author(s):  
Ozan O. Varol

This chapter contrasts the February 2011 coup in Egypt against Hosni Mubarak with the July 2013 coup against Mohamed Morsi. Although the two coups were of different kinds—one deposed a dictator and the other a democratically elected leader—the motivations of the coup leaders were similar. In both cases the military took advantage of popular uprisings to depose leaders who threatened its interests. The Muslim Brotherhood, the once humble partner of the Egyptian military, had turned into an ambitious and opportunistic opponent. It was positioned to pose a significant threat to the military, as demonstrated by Morsi’s purge of the military’s senior leadership with impunity. In response the military took advantage of the massive uprising against Morsi and deposed him.


Author(s):  
Walter Armbrust

This chapter assesses the most important period in the revolution, namely the last three months of 2011. By that time the revolutionary forces—those that stayed mobilized or that remobilized periodically throughout the year—had articulated a series of demands that went far beyond the ubiquitous but vague “bread, freedom, and social justice” slogan. They included the cleansing of institutions from Mubarakist elements, greater autonomy and political freedom within universities and al-Azhar, independent labor unions, the cessation of military trials for civilians, unambiguous civilian rule, and redress for those killed or injured by the security forces. None of this had anything to do with an institutionally nurtured “democratic transition” that occupied the attention of political scientists; none of it was acknowledged by institutions or powerful public figures, who never deviated from the line that the revolution was incoherent, and merely the product of a few feckless youths. Hence, chants at demonstrations of “down with military rule” were heard by March, but it was a series of massacres and street battles beginning in October and lasting until early February of 2012 that brought anti-SCAF (Supreme Council for the Armed Forces) sentiment much more openly into the mainstream than anyone could have dreamed, given the deeply institutionalized reverence for the military in Egyptian public culture. At that point, the military had little choice but to push ahead with elections that it knew would result in a transfer of power to the Muslim Brotherhood.


Author(s):  
Joel Gordon

This chapter examines how the relations between the military junta and its allies, particularly communists and the Muslim Brotherhood, deteriorated. The Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL), the largest and least doctrinaire communist movement in Egypt, and Muslim Brotherhood had collaborated with the Free Officers and played significant supporting roles in their coup. The officers were thus confronted with two crucial questions: First, what debt, if any, did they owe their allies? Second, what ideological influence would these movements exert on the course of social and political reform? The chapter shows that the Free Officers gradually distanced themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood and abruptly turned on the communists. It considers the Command Council of the Revolution's (CCR) decision to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood as well as its campaign against communism. It argues that the CCR's relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and the communist movements were influenced more by power politics than by ideology.


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