When Is Responsiveness Partisan Bias?

2019 ◽  
pp. 265-292
Author(s):  
Jennifer Bussell

Chapter 10 evaluates the conditions under which politicians will allocate benefits in a contingent, versus noncontingent, manner. It shows that citizens living in areas that offered strong support to a politician in the last election are much more likely to receive spending from that politician’s constituency development fund (CDF). Drawing on data from the experiment, it then compares the behavior of politicians spending their CDF funds with responses to the experimental audit of responsiveness. This shows that, while patterns of electoral support predict behavior with regard to partisan targeting, they offer less explanatory value for understanding patterns of constituency service. Thus, the same factors cannot explain both partisan bias and constituency service, and the same individuals who engage in noncontingent individual assistance may also target group-based benefits in a largely partisan manner.

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Agerberg

Surveys show that citizens in all parts of the world have a strong distaste for corruption. At the same time, and contrary to the predictions of democratic theory, politicians involved in the most glaring abuse of public office often continue to receive electoral support. Using an original survey experiment conducted in Spain, this article explores a previously understudied aspect of this apparent paradox: the importance of viable and clean political alternatives. The results suggest that voters do punish political corruption when a clean alternative exists, even when the corrupt candidate is very appealing in other respects. However, when only given corrupt alternatives, respondents become much more likely to tolerate a candidate accused of corruption—even when given a convenient “no-choice” option. I discuss how these results can help us understand corruption voting and why some societies seem to be stuck in a high-corruption equilibrium.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 205316802094172
Author(s):  
Mia Costa ◽  
Trevor Briggs ◽  
Ajaipal Chahal ◽  
Jonathan Fried ◽  
Rijul Garg ◽  
...  

Influential theories of motivated reasoning, as well as real-world anecdotal examples, would suggest that voters do not always penalize legislators from their own party for alleged immoral behavior, such as sexual harassment. But very little empirical evidence exists on how voters react to sexual misconduct allegations, especially since the start of the #MeToo movement. We examine how partisanship and sexist attitudes shape individuals’ reactions to sexual harassment allegations about a politician. Using a pretest–posttest online experiment, we randomize both the party affiliation of the accused legislator as well as the severity of the allegations. Overall, we find some evidence of partisan bias, but that there may be a limit. Subjects were more forgiving of an accused co-partisan legislator than a legislator of the opposing party in their overall evaluation and their perceptions of punitive repercussions, but their levels of electoral support decreased just as much for co-partisans as they did for opposing partisans. Importantly, these reactions are strongly conditioned by sexism; as subjects’ levels of sexism increase, the otherwise large and negative effect of allegations on evaluations of favorability and electoral support disappears.


Author(s):  
Jennifer Bussell

This book provides a theoretical and empirical examination of constituency service in developing countries. The predominant view of distributive politics in “patronage democracies” emphasizes the partisan targeting of pork and clientelism. In contrast, this book demonstrates that high-level legislators in India and other contexts often provide direct, nonpartisan assistance to individual constituents. Under what conditions do they provide constituency service, rather than engage in partisan bias? The book shows that the uneven character of access to services at the local level—often because of biased allocation on the part of local intermediaries—generates demand for help from higher-level officials, and also creates incentives for those politicians to bypass intermediaries by providing direct assistance. It draws on elite and citizen surveys, interviews, qualitative shadowing, and experiments to explore the dynamics of both the demand for constituency service and its supply. The book’s findings highlight the potential for an underappreciated form of democratic accountability, one that is however rooted in the character of patronage-based politics.


1984 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 356-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory W. Fischer ◽  
Mark S. Kamlet

This article develops a new statistical model of trade-offs among defense, nondefense, and fiscal policy concerns as they are reflected in the presidential budgetary process. The Competing Aspiration Levels Model (CALM) builds on Crecine's (1971) “Great Identity” argument. Unlike most previous attempts to model presidential budgeting, CALM explicitly represents the interdependence of decisions about defense, nondefense, and total federal expenditures. CALM models this interdependence as the result of the interaction of minimal aspirations for defense and nondefense expenditures with a maximum acceptable level of expenditures from a fiscal policy standpoint. Statistical analyses of presidential budgets for the fiscal years from 1955 through 1980 provide strong support for the CALM formulation. Substantively, the results indicate that fiscal constraints on total expenditures have progressively weakened, that the maximum acceptable expenditure level has generally exceeded the minimal expenditure aspiration level, and that when a potential “fiscal surplus” has existed, the nondefense sector has been more successful in capturing a share of this surplus than the defense sector. In keeping with traditional incrementalist arguments, the results indicate that previous year expenditure levels provide a relatively secure “budgetary base” for both the defense and nondefense sectors. Both sectors tend to receive their minimal aspiration levels plus a share of whatever fiscal surplus exists. The analysis also indicates that the executive branch has not been as strong a direct force for budgetary growth as Congress.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110265
Author(s):  
Pedro Riera ◽  
Marco Pastor

An increasing literature has studied the recent growth of populist parties and the determinants of their electoral success. This article contributes to this body by addressing the question of whether cordon sanitaires or tainted coalitions are more effective at hindering the electoral success of populist parties. Building on the populist parties and cost of governing literatures, we hypothesize that populist parties suffer considerable loses at the ballot box when they join coalition governments as junior partners. Moreover, we test various mechanisms for this negative effect: poor economic conditions, the existence of parliamentary majorities, ideological extremism and low intra-cabinet conflict. Using data from ParlGov and Klüver and Spoon, we find strong support for the main hypothesis, and additional analyses suggest that when populists join coalitions as junior partners they lose extra electoral support if they are ideological extreme, there is low intra-cabinet conflict, or their coalition has a parliamentary majority.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Ditto ◽  
Brittany Liu ◽  
Cory J Clark ◽  
Sean Wojcik ◽  
Eric Chen ◽  
...  

Both liberals and conservatives accuse their political opponents of partisan bias, but is there empirical evidence that one side of the political aisle is indeed more biased than the other? To address this question, we meta-analyzed the results of 51 experimental studies, involving over 18,000 participants, that examined one form of partisan bias— the tendency to evaluate otherwise identical information more favorably when it supports one’s political beliefs or allegiances than when it challenges those beliefs or allegiances. Two hypotheses based on previous literature were tested: an asymmetry hypothesis (predicting greater partisan bias in conservatives than in liberals) and a symmetry hypothesis (predicting equal levels of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives). Mean overall partisan bias was robust (r = .245), and there was strong support for the symmetry hypothesis: Liberals (r = .235) and conservatives (r = .255) showed no difference in mean levels of bias across studies. Moderator analyses reveal this pattern to be consistent across a number of different methodological variations and political topics. Implications of the current findings for the ongoing ideological symmetry debate and the role of partisan bias in scientific discourse and political conflict are discussed.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (11) ◽  
pp. e0259949
Author(s):  
Olga Perski ◽  
Claire Stevens ◽  
Robert West ◽  
Lion Shahab

Background Improving adherence to self-protective behaviours is a public health priority. We aimed to assess the potential effectiveness and ease of use of an online version of the Risk Acceptance Ladder (RAL) in promoting help-seeking for cigarette smoking, excessive alcohol consumption, insufficient physical activity, or low fruit and vegetable consumption. Methods 843 UK adults were recruited, of whom 602 engaged in at least one risky behaviour. Those with no immediate plans to change (n = 171) completed a behaviour specific RAL. Participants were randomised to one of two conditions; a short message congruent (on-target, n = 73) or incongruent (off-target, n = 98) with their RAL response. Performance of the RAL was assessed by participants’ ability to select an applicable RAL item and reported ease of use of the RAL. Effectiveness was assessed by whether or not participants clicked a link to receive information about changing their target behaviour. Results Two thirds (68.9%, 95% CI = 61.8%-75.3%) of participants were able to select an applicable RAL item that corresponded to what they believed would need to change in order to alter their target behaviour, with 64.9% (95% CI = 57.5%-71.7%) reporting that it was easy to select one option. Compared with the off-target group, participants allocated to the on-target group had greater odds of clicking on the link to receive information (31.5% vs 19.4%; OR = 2.07, 95% CI = 1.01–4.26). Conclusion The Risk Acceptance Ladder may have utility as a tool for tailoring messages to prompt initial steps to engaging in self-protective behaviours.


2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Hrycak

A gender analytic perspective is used to explore the outcomes of the 2010 Ukrainian presidential elections. Gender differences within the Tymoshenko and Yanukovych electorates are assessed at the regional level through exit poll data. Comparisons to the outcome of the 2004 presidential election show that the 2010 elections exhibited very different gendered patterns of electoral support. The exit polls suggest that Tymoshenko lost due to “gender bias”—she failed to receive the support of a substantial number of men who voted for Yushchenko in 2004. Meanwhile, Yanukovych achieved victory despite a substantial decline in support among female voters.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-154
Author(s):  
Maj Nygaard-Christensen ◽  
Bagga Bjerge

This paper examines the emergence of ‘socially marginalized Greenlanders’ as a distinct target category in Danish welfare policy and practice. It builds on analysis of policies targeting Greenlandic minorities in Denmark and interviews with welfare professionals in charge of implementing these. The paper shows how Greenlandic minorities are represented as characterized by markers of difference viewed to set them apart from other socially marginalized citizens. These relate to 1) structural differences that impact on the ability to receive and benefit from welfare services, 2) to the perceived cultural origins of the problems that socially marginalised Greenlanders face, and, finally, 3) to the excessive social problems associated in policies and by professionals with an upbringing in Greenland. The paper shows how policies and welfare professionals both reject and continuously resort to the notion of the target group as distinct from other socially marginalized citizens. In continuation of this, the analysis further shows how ambivalences and contradictions are not so much found between the levels of policy and practice, as other studies of policy implementation processes have demonstrated, as they are inherent within all policy and considerations about how to understand the target group they articulate.


Author(s):  
Jennifer Bussell

The introduction to the book presents an overview of the puzzle constituency service presents to our understanding of distributive politics in patronage democracies. It then offers an overview of the book’s argument for why citizens demand assistance from their high-level representatives—individuals with substantially large constituencies such that they cannot know most of their voters personally—and why these politicians respond to such requests in a largely nonpartisan and noncontingent manner. The chapter places this constituency service conceptually within nonprogrammatic politics, alongside more well-studied forms of allocation: clientelism and partisan bias. It then offers an outline of the book’s contents and contributions, including a summary of the data sources used throughout the text.


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