Epilogue

2021 ◽  
pp. 199-208
Author(s):  
Brian Masaru Hayashi

Each of the three Asian American suspects were considered and then dismissed as the Trojan Horse within the OSS. The suspicion that the double agent was someone with a short family history in the United States was proven incorrect. Instead, the foreign agent inside the OSS was one whose family heritage traced back to the American Revolutionary War and whose ancestor signed the Declaration of Independence. Yet blame for the intelligence leakage to a foreign power ultimately rests on the FBI, the State Department, and the director of the OSS itself for their inadequacies in securing classified documents and ineptitude at counterintelligence.

1971 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Grieb

The militarycoup d'étatwhich installed General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez as President of El Salvador during December 1931 created a crisis involving the 1923 Washington Treaties. By the terms of these accords, the Central American nadons had pledged to withhold recognition from governments seizing power through force in any of the isthmian republics. Although not a signatory of the treaty, the United States based its recognition policy on this principle. Through this means the State Department had attempted to impose some stability in Central America, by discouraging revolts. With the co-operation of the isthmian governments, United States diplomats endeavored to bring pressure to bear on the leaders of any uprising, to deny them the fruits of their victory, and thus reduce the constant series ofcoupsandcounter-coupsthat normally characterized Central American politics.


2006 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tania Quintaneiro

Durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, os Estados Unidos valeram-se das Listas Negras para eliminar as redes comerciais e as empresas vinculadas aos países do Eixo que atuavam nas repúblicas americanas. Este artigo analisa a política de guerra econômica aplicada no Brasil, especificamente com relação às cooperativas dos imigrantes japoneses, e a estratégia do governo Vargas para lidar com as pressões exercidas pelas autoridades do Departamento de Estado norte-americano. Abstract During World War II, the United States used the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals as an instrument to eliminate the commercial networks and the companies associated to Axis countries operating in the American Republics. This article analyses the policy of economic warfare applied in Brazil, specifically in relation to the cooperatives of Japanese immigrants and the strategy of the Vargas government to deal with the pressures exercised by the State Department. Palavras-chave: Brasil. Imigrantes japoneses. Listas Negras. Key words: Brazil. Japanese immigrants. Proclaimed Lists.


1997 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 71-74

Good afternoon. I am very pleased to welcome Vice Premier Qian Qichen to the State Department. We are meeting again, so soon after my February trip to Beijing, and I think that that indicates the high importance that the United States and China attach to our bilateral relationship.


1977 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 593-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Pletcher

A hundred years ago the United States had one of the worst depressions in its history. The disastrous drop in wages, prices, and output threw the mid-1870s into deep gloom and made the Centennial celebrations of 1876 seem to many persons no more than a bad joke. In subsequent years no one found a permanent cure for depressions, but during the late 1870s and 1880s a conviction developed that the Federal government must do more to aid American foreign trade. Thereafter the State Department cooperated increasingly with American business to expand the nation’s influence abroad.


Author(s):  
Tetiana Klynina

The article is devoted to one of the United States Secretaries of State, Edward Stettinius, a political figure who is well known and ambiguous in American society and less well known in Ukraine. The author first reports on E. Stettinius’ emergence as a financier and a person involved in American business, and emphasizes that the victories in the business have attracted the attention of political circles in Washington and the White House. It is stated that with the outbreak of World War II, the United States introduced a land-lease program, administered at the request of Washington by Edward Stettinius. Following his successful experience in conducting a land-lease, US President Franklin Roosevelt began to think of involving E. Stettinius in leadership positions at the State Department, which could not cope with his functions due to the challenges of wartime. In addition, F. Roosevelt’s «personal diplomacy» and distrust of «foggy bottom» workers contributed to the decline in the authority and importance of the State Department in shaping the country’s foreign policy. It was for this purpose – to streamline the activities of the State Department and to put things in order inside of the structure – F. Roosevelt appointed E. Stettinius to the post of Deputy Secretary of State, and after the next fourth victory in the presidential election, he replaced then Secretary of State Cordell Hull. It is emphasized that E. Stettinius «correctly» understood his place in the issues of forming the foreign policy of the country. He did not interfere with F. Roosevelt’s «personal diplomacy», but at the same time he was always close and put his ideas into practice (as an example, the creation of the UN). And while the president was shaping the course of the country, he, E. Stettinius, was shaping the course for reorganizing the State Department.


Worldview ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-14
Author(s):  
Robert Conway

U.S. policies can play a major part in influencing change in South Africa, but before this can occur there is much faulty thinking to correct. Traditional academic commentary on the matter prescribes for the U.S. the role of honest broker; indeed, the State Department often categorizes its own role in such terms. This is a myth that must be exploded immediately. The United States has too much at stake in the area; it can't pretend to be neutral or play the role of a third party mediator. It is a major partner.


Author(s):  
Joseph Heller

This chapter shows the change in America’s attitude towards Israel, from opposition to de jure recognition of Israel’s military capabilities for the west during ther Korean war. While in 1948 secretary of state General Marshall warned against an enduring conflict with the Arabs, Truman recognized it de facto. However, the state department continued to treart Israel as a liability. Henry Byroade claimed that Israel should not be the homeland of the Jewish people. Israel was left outside of strategic western alliances because it was assumed that its membership might push the Arabs towards the Soviet Union. The notion that Truman’s administration was pro-Israel is a myth. Although Truman himself was sympathetic, the State Department and the Pentagon did not consider Israel an asset.


Worldview ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 21 (9) ◽  
pp. 35-36
Author(s):  
Tinley Nyandak Akar

A few months ago President Carter's human rights stature took a dive when the Department of State rejected the requests of a group of American citizens to have “Tibet,” instead of China, listed as their birthplace on their U.S. passports. The decision came on the heels of an announcement that Zbigniew Brzezinski would be visiting China a few weeks later.Despite the president's repeated assertions about his impartial application of human rights to all nations, the administration has been silent when it comes to human rights violations by the People's Republic of China. Evidently Washington does not want to offend Peking and thus lets China dictate, at least indirectly, an internal policy decision of the United States. The action by the State Department regarding American citizens of Tibetan origin has carried this unequal application of human rights principles to an absurd degree.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 184-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Allen

This article uses recently declassified archival documents to reassess public opinion in the United States regarding East-West détente. When Henry Kissinger was U.S. secretary of state during the Nixon and Ford administrations, he made dozens of speeches intended to educate the public in what he considered the proper methods of diplomacy. By analyzing those “heartland” speeches using recently released documents, the article shows that Kissinger and the State Department tried much harder to create a foreign policy consensus behind détente and realism than previously understood. Despite these efforts, Kissinger's message was lost on the public. The article provides the first extended analysis of a series of fact-finding “town meetings” held by the State Department in five locations across the United States—meetings that revealed how badly Kissinger had failed. By February 1976, all those involved in U.S. foreign policymaking—Kissinger's opponents, his advisers, and the wider public—desired a greater role for moral values in foreign policy.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document