Reasons, Perceptual Grounds, and Normative Explanation

2020 ◽  
pp. 72-86
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Internal Reasons ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
External Reasons

Reasons come in many forms. There are reasons to believe, for believing, for which one believes, and why one believes; and some are internal reasons we have, others external reasons we lack. This chapter clarifies how we have normative reasons for beliefs in virtue of certain experiential states that ground those reasons: these states, including sense-experiences and hedonic experiences, are the kinds that ground the rationality of beliefs or the desirability of acts. Normative reasons, practical as well as theoretical, are themselves grounded in certain experiential elements, including perceptions as a central kind. Normative reasons for belief are unified by their explanatory scope: they can explain propositional justification—roughly, justification that at least permits our properly believing propositions adequately supported by our experience. These normative explanations parallel causal explanations that hold between the experiential elements, such as perceptions, that ground the reasons and the doxastically justified beliefs that reflect those experiences.

The Real Problem With Internalism About Reasons

2002 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Talbot Brewer
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Real Problem ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Past ◽  
Motivational States ◽  
Internal Reasons ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
External Reasons ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Over the past two decades, moral philosophers have been engaged in a seemingly interminable debate about the role of internal and external reasons in practical reasoning. The rough distinction between these two sorts of reasons is this: internal reasons apply to particular agents in virtue of their relation to that agent's desires, preferences, or other motivational states, while external reasons are normative for particular agents quite independently of their relation to the subjective motivational states of these agents.

scholarly journals Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Conclusive Evidence ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Plausible Assumption ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Epistemic Trust ◽  
Conceptual Connection ◽  
Epistemic Blame

AbstractThe normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism.

Halal food standard implementation: are Malaysian firms proactive or reactive?

2018 ◽  
Vol 120 (6) ◽  
pp. 1330-1343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Syazwan Ab Talib ◽  
Thoo Ai Chin
Keyword(s):  
Structural Equation ◽  
Manufacturing Industry ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Internal Factors ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Internal Reasons ◽  
Food Standard ◽  
Operational Improvement ◽  
Halal Food ◽  
External Reasons

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the reasons behind halal food standard (HFS) implementation among food manufacturers in Malaysia. Additionally, it examines whether firms in the Malaysian food manufacturing industry are proactive or reactive in implementing HFS. Design/methodology/approach A field survey was conducted in 210 halal-certified food manufacturers. A partial least squares structural equation modeling technique was used to examine the relationships between the reasons and implementation of HFS. Findings The empirical assessments revealed that organization’s commitment, operational improvement and marketing functions are the internal reasons. Meanwhile, government intervention and consumer pressure are the external reasons to implement HFS. Findings also indicated that Malaysian food manufacturers are proactive in implementing HFS. Practical implications The knowledge from this research could encourage non-certified firms to implement HFS and entices halal-certified firms to remain certified. It guides managers toward adopting a better strategy, particularly in prioritizing the internal factors and resources for a more sustainable and positive implication. Originality/value This research is among the few studies that scrutinized the rationale behind the rapid growth of halal food industry. It argues that the pursuit of HFS is not solely a religious obligation, but it is also driven by safety, quality and marketing motives.

scholarly journals Epistemic Instrumentalism, Permissibility, and Reasons for Belief

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen
Keyword(s):  
Instrumental Rationality ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Wide Scope ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Epistemic Instrumentalism

Epistemic instrumentalists seek to understand the normativity of epistemic norms on the model of practical instrumental norms governing the relation between aims and means. Non-instrumentalists often object that this commits instrumentalists to implausible epistemic assessments. This chapter argues that this objection presupposes an implausibly strong interpretation of epistemic norms. Once we realize that epistemic norms should be understood in terms of permissibility rather than obligation, and that evidence only occasionally provides normative reasons for belief, an instrumentalist account becomes available that delivers the correct epistemic verdicts. On this account, epistemic permissibility can be understood on the model of the wide-scope instrumental norm for instrumental rationality, while normative evidential reasons for belief can be understood in terms of instrumental transmission.

scholarly journals What drives Web 2.0 adoption in South African civil society organisations

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kiru Pillay ◽  
Manoj S. Maharaj
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Web 2.0 ◽  
South African ◽  
Civil Society Organisations ◽  
Internal Reasons ◽  
Media Services ◽  
American Elections ◽  
The Impact ◽  
External Reasons

Background: The impact and consequences of social media adoption on society are only just being realised and studied in detail; consequently, there is no universal agreement as to the reasons for the adoption of these services. Even understanding why some social media services are popular remains to some extent elusive. The practical use of Web 2.0 does not provide any answers either with, for example, a noticeable difference in the way social media was strategically used by Barack Obama and Mitch Romney in the lead-up to the 2009 American elections. However, recent studies that have focused on social media adoption within specific sectors have begun to shed some light on these emerging adoption patterns; two studies in particular are illustrative: a 2012 study on the newspaper sector and a study on social media adoption and e-government.Objectives: This study investigates why South African civil society organisations (CSOs) adopt Web 2.0 services and the perceived and actual benefits of such adoption.Method: A survey questionnaire was sent to 1712 South African CSOs listed in the Prodder database to explore why certain social media services were adopted and the perceived benefits thereof.Results: Internal reasons for the adoption of social media services by South African CSOs coalesce around organisational visibility and access to information. External reasons focus on organisations needing to become more relevant and more connected to like-minded organisations and initiatives.Conclusion: The pervasiveness of Web 2.0 technologies makes it inevitable that CSOs will have to restructure themselves to remain relevant.

scholarly journals Reasons for Belief and Normativity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathrin Glüer ◽  
Åsa Wikforss
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Internal Connection

In this chapter, we critically examine the most important extant ways of understanding and motivating the idea that reasons for belief are normative. First, we examine the proposal that the distinction between explanatory and so-called normative reasons that is commonly drawn in moral philosophy can be rather straightforwardly applied to reasons for belief, and that reasons for belief are essentially normative precisely when they are normative reasons. In the course of this investigation, we explore the very nature of the reasons-for-belief relation, as well as the ontology of such reasons. Second, we examine the idea that the normativity derives from the internal connection between reasons for belief and epistemic justification, distinguishing between two distinct normativist accounts of justification, a weaker and a stronger one. We argue that neither line of argument is compelling. Pending further arguments, we conclude that normativism about reasons for belief is not supported.

Minding the Gap: Bernard Williams and David Hume on Living an Ethical Life

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 615-638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Sagar
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Ethical Life ◽  
Ethical Practices ◽  
Internal Reasons ◽  
External Reasons

Bernard Williams is frequently supposed to be an ethical Humean, due especially to his work on ‘internal’ reasons. In fact Williams’s work after his famous article ‘Internal and External Reasons’ constitutes a profound shift away from Hume’s ethical outlook. Whereas Hume offered a reconciling project whereby our ethical practices could be self-validating without reference to external justificatory foundations, Williams’s later work was increasingly skeptical of any such possibility. I conclude by suggesting reasons for thinking Williams was correct, a finding which should be of concern for anybody engaged in the study of ethics.

scholarly journals On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Significant Advance ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Orthodox View

I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S’s having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S’s belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification.

scholarly journals Clusterization of reasons for bankruptcy of enterprises

2013 ◽  
pp. 72-82
Author(s):  
Lukas Giriūnas ◽  
Jonas Mackevičius ◽  
Romualdas Valkauskas
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
External Environment ◽  
Scientific Research ◽  
The State ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Internal Reasons ◽  
State And Society ◽  
External Causes ◽  
The Right ◽  
External Reasons

Bankruptcies of enterprises are among the most common events in the market economy. They cause a lot of negative effects not only for the company and its employees, but also for other companies and institutions, the state and society. Although the researchers have examined the reasons for bankruptcy, there is no list of the signs clearly indicating the likelihood of bankruptcy. Or such list is impossible due to the fact that causes of bankruptcy are related to the complex and constantly changing external environment of the company. That is why various features are only the symptoms pointing to the fact that the company is in danger of going bankrupt. It should be mentioned that some signs indicate that the company may face a number of difficulties, including bankruptcy, if the company’s management will not take appropriate action to eliminate causes of bankruptcy or to adjust to them. Reasons for bankruptcy can be divided into: 1) internal, 2) external. External reasons are such reasons that cannot be affected by company’s executives because they do not depend on the executives’ will. Internal reasons are such reasons that depend on the company’s executives and their level of professionalism, initiative, and ability to lead and to make the right decisions. In order to take the lowest risk, company’s analysts should monitor and investigate all internal and external causes. As it has been already mentioned, there are many internal and external reasons for companies’ bankruptcy but it is not clear which are the most important ones. To answer this question the authors of this article, on the basis of Lithuanian and foreign scientific research, have compiled a theoretical list and the tree of the internal and external causes of bankruptcy. The tree and its components are improved with clusters of reasons for bankruptcy of enterprises.

Justified Belief, Reasons, and Evidence

2019 ◽  
pp. 23-42
Author(s):  
Alan Millar
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Motivating Reasons ◽  
The Subject

Normative reasons for belief—reasons to believe something—are constituted by truths or facts. Such reasons are distinguished from motivating reasons for belief, that is, reasons for which a subject believes something. These are constituted by considerations that the subject treats as reasons to believe. One has a justified belief, in the sense of a well-founded belief, only if the considerations that constitute one’s motivating reason are truths that one knows. Evidence-based knowledge that P is explicated in terms truths or facts that provide an adequate reason to believe that P. It is argued that not all knowledge is evidence-based, and suggested that we need to make sense of the idea that evidence adequate for knowledge is clinching evidence. The discussion addresses a problem raised by Jennifer Hornsby about the distinction between normative and motivating reasons.

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