Toward a Theory of the A Priori
Self-evident propositions are important in their own right and crucial for the a priori in general. They are here shown to be justifiedly believable and knowable on the basis of adequately understanding them. Such understanding is multidimensional, and its adequacy in relation to a self-evident proposition, p, is explicable only on the basis of at least these cognitive variables, each of which is illustrated in appropriate relations to p: recognitional range regarding applications of p; the sense of rejectability of purported equivalents; explicative capacity; logical comprehension; confirmational sensitivity; discriminative acuity; translational capacity; readiness to meet objections to p; and, considerability (a kind of contemplatability needed to get p appropriately “in mind”). The account of adequate understanding also helps in explicating understanding in empirical cases, even propositions perceptually believed. The self-evident is shown to differ from the obvious, and thereby as neither necessarily compelling conviction nor limited to formal or other non-substantive truths.