From Competition to Conspiracy

Author(s):  
Alison Games

For twenty years, the Dutch and English East India Companies cooperated and competed throughout the Indian Ocean in search of dominance in the spice trade. Conflicts over nutmeg and cloves in Banda and the Moluccas were especially deadly for Europeans and non-Europeans alike. The two companies were constrained in their actions in the Indian Ocean by the nations’ historical ties in Europe and by decisions made by their employers, which ultimately forced them into partnership in 1619 in the wake of overt conflict. That new partnership placed the English in a secondary position. A new type of conflict erupted, one centered on conspiracies. To further trust, the companies required traders to live together in shared houses in the clove-trading posts on Ambon, but the scheme backfired and their intimacy was their undoing.

Author(s):  
Nathan Marvin ◽  
Blake Smith

France was a latecomer to the Indian Ocean among European powers. After some tentative and short-lived initiatives by private merchants, the first French East India Company was founded in 1664 by a French monarchy eager to catch up with England and the Netherlands, which had founded companies of their own at the beginning of the 17th century. Competing with the English and Dutch to replace the Portuguese as the preeminent European power in the Indian Ocean, France gradually established a network of colonial holdings that included the island colonies of the Mascarenes in the southwestern Indian Ocean (Réunion and Mauritius) as well as a network of trading posts along the shores of the Indian subcontinent. Plans to expand this colonial empire to Madagascar, however, met with repeated failure. Established as a regional power by the middle of the 18th century, France would be reduced by the century’s end to the role of a spectator of Britain’s rising hegemony. Nevertheless, France held on to some of its Indian Ocean territories, including Réunion and Pondicherry in South Asia. These outposts of French imperialism would inspire nostalgia, regret, and new colonial ambitions among metropolitan observers, and they would become sites of cultural hybridity and exchange. Indeed, while France’s empire in the Indian Ocean is often overshadowed by the emergence of British dominance in the 19th century, or by the intensity of French investment in the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean was a key area of French military, diplomatic, economic, and cultural interest in the 17th and 18th centuries, and beyond.


1969 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. R. Boxer

No reputable historian nowadays maintains that the Portuguese 16th- century thalassocracy in the Indian Ocean was always and everywhere completely effective. In particular, it is widely accepted that there was a marked if erratic revival in the Red Sea spice-trade shortly after the first Turkish occupation of Aden in 1538, though much work remains to be done on the causes and effects of this development. The Portuguese reactions to the rise of Atjeh have been studied chiefly in connection with the frequent fighting in the Straits of Malacca; and the economic side of the struggle has been less considered. The connection of Atjeh with the revival of the Red Sea spice-trade has been insufficiently stressed; though Mrs. Meilink-Roelofsz and Dr. V. Magalhaes Godinho have some relevant observations on this point in their recent and well documented works (Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago, 1500–1630, The Hague, 1962, pp. 142–46; Os Descobrimentos e a Economia Mundial, Vol. II, Lisboa, 1967, pp. 111–171). The purpose of this paper is to amplify the facts and figures which they give there, in the hope that someone with the necessary linguistic qualifications will be incited to make complementary researches in the relevant Indonesian, Arabian, or Turkish sources.


2021 ◽  
pp. 206-221
Author(s):  
James F. Hancock

Abstract Opens on a summary about the Medieval European knowledge of the Spice Trade, the chapter also show how Portugal dominated Europe in terms of trade and invasion in the fifteenth century. It goes on with the summary of Portuguese invasion of Africa through the Treaty of Tordesillas and the navigation of Vasco de Gama in the Atlantic coast. After de Gama's navigation, the Portuguese conquest of India began which led to the Portuguese-Mamluk Naval war and established Portuguese sea power in the Indian Ocean. Lastly, the chapter gives a brief summary of the other Portuguese navigations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 65-79
Author(s):  
James F. Hancock

Abstract This chapter highlights the ocean transport and trade routes that facilitated the spice trade in the Indian ocean. This chapter consists of twelve subchapters which are Central Role of Rivers, Persian Gulf Routes, The Red Sea and Beyond, Early Indonesian Seafarers, Royal Road of the First Persian Empire, Persian and Greek Explorations, Arab Stranglehold on Egyptian Trade, War Elephants and Red Sea Travel, the way to India, The Roman Sea, Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, and lastly, Rome's Breathtaking International Trade Network.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 959-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Du ◽  
Wenju Cai ◽  
Yanling Wu

Abstract The tropical Indian Ocean dipole/zonal mode (IOD) is phase locked with the austral winter and spring seasons. This study describes three types of the IOD in terms of their peak time and duration. In particular, the authors focus on a new type that develops in May–June and matures in July–August, which is distinctively different from the canonical IOD, which may develop later and peak in September–November or persist from June to November. Such “unseasonable” IOD events are only observed since the mid-1970s, a period after which the tropical Indian Ocean has a closer relationship with the Pacific Ocean. The unseasonable IOD is an intrinsic mode of the Indian Ocean and occurs without an ensuing El Niño. A change in winds along the equator is identified as a major forcing. The wind change is in turn related to a weakening Walker circulation in the Indian Ocean sector in austral winter, which is in part forced by the rapid Indian Ocean warming. Thus, although the occurrence of the unseasonable IOD may be partially influenced by oceanic variability, the authors’ results suggest an influence from the Indian Ocean warming. This suggestion, however, awaits further investigation using fully coupled climate models.


2006 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giancarlo Casale

AbstractFollowing the Ottoman conquest of Egypt and the Levant in 1516-17, administrators of the empire began to experiment with several innovative strategies to increase the total volume of the spice trade between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, and to maximize the state's share of its revenues. These became progressively more sophisticated over time, until by the end of the 1560s a comprehensive infrastructure was in place, including a rationalized empire-wide tax regime for regulating private trade, a network of "imperial factors" who bought spices for the sultan in overseas emporiums, and an annual convoy of spice galleys that shipped cargoes of state-owned pepper from the Yemen to the markets of Egypt and Istanbul. All of this, combined with natural advantages of geography and the goodwill of Muslim traders in the Indian Ocean, enabled the Ottomans to mount a formidable challenge to the "pepper monopoly" of the Portuguese Estado da India. À la suite de la conquête ottomane de l'Égypte et du Levant en 1516-17, les administrateurs de l'empire commencèrent à mettre en application diverses stratégies novatrices dans le but d'augmenter le volume total du commerce des épices entre l'océan Indien et la Méditerranée et de maximiser la part de l'État dans ses revenus. Ces stratégies se perfectionnèrent avec le temps et vers la fin des années 1560 une infrastructure complète était en place, incluant un régime fiscal repensé à l'échelle de l'empire afin de réglementer le commerce privé, un réseau de "facteurs impériaux" achetant des épices pour le compte du sultan dans les comptoirs d'outremer et un convoi annuel de galères transportant du Yémen aux marchés de l'Égypte et d'Istanbul des cargaisons de poivre appartenant à l'État. Grâce à tous ces éléments, de même qu'à leurs avantages géographiques naturels et à la disposition favorable des marchands musulmans dans l'océan Indien, les Ottomans purent présenter un défi de taille au "monopole sur le poivre" de l'Estado da India portugais.


1961 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl J. Pelzer

The two administrative units of Sumatra with which this paper is concerned are East Sumatra, stretching along the Strait of Malacca, and North Tapanuli, extending from the mountainous interior around Lake Toba to the Indian Ocean.At the beginning of the nineteenth century, East Sumatra and Tapanuli (except for a small number of Indian-Ocean settlements and trading posts in the latter) were completely outside of the political sphere of interest of European powers. The Treaty of London of 1824, however, delineated Malaya as a British sphere of interest and Sumatra as a Dutch sphere. But it was nearly another forty years before the Dutch turned their attention to East Sumatra and North Tapanuli. In the forward movement which then began, planters and Christian missionaries played highly significant and critical roles; in the pioneer decades they were actually either ahead of the flag or were overshadowing the colonial government officials.


2021 ◽  
pp. 264-277
Author(s):  
James F. Hancock

Abstract When the Dutch and English first entered the Indian Ocean, the primary goal of both nations was to gain a monopoly in the spice trade. To do this, they had to militarily push out the Portuguese and prevent the other from gaining a foothold. Ultimately, the VOC came out the big Winner taking control of the clove, nutmeg and mace trade of the Moluccas. It also took a considerable portion of the Indonesian pepper trade by force, but not all. With the loss of the Spice Islands, the British shifted their attention to India and its pepper, saltpetre, cotton and indigo. The VOC also turned its eyes to India, but with far less lasting impact. To gain their foothold in India the English and Dutch were faced with two significant challenges: they would need to gain the favour of the Mughals who now controlled most of North India and they would have to push back the Portuguese who were well entrenched along the west coast. The Mughals had left the Portuguese ports mostly alone, preferring to trade with them rather than fight.


Itinerario ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-79
Author(s):  
Giancarlo Casale

The middle decades of the sixteenth century witnessed one of the most dramatic and unexpected transformations in the history of long-distance intercontinental commerce: the revival of the transit spice trade through the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, following a period of nearly fifty years during which it had been redirected almost in its entirety through the Portuguese-controlled route around the Cape of Good Hope. And yet, while modern scholars have been aware of this sea change in global commerce for generations, the reasons behind it still remain a subject of debate. Numerous explanations have been proposed, ranging from changes in the international demand for spices to corruption within the Portuguese administration. Until now, however, none has taken into account what may be the most important factor of all: the rising power of Ottoman corsairs, whose predatory raids against Portuguese targets were instrumental in subverting the Estado da India's system for controlling trade in the western Indian Ocean.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document