Qatar and the Gulf Crisis

Author(s):  
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

Qatar and the Gulf Crisis examines the attempt by four states – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt – to isolate and blockade Qatar. The book explores in detail the policy responses taken in Qatar since early-2017 by a small state, cut off by its neighbors and subject to a regional power-play designed to appeal to the baser instincts of a U.S. presidency that had taken office lacking any real sense of a foreign policy and vulnerable, in its first months, to unprecedented attempts by foreign powers to influence American domestic and national security interests. The blockade of Qatar was launched fifty years to the day since Israel launched a surprise attack on the Egyptian Air Force at the start the Six-Day War. Just as that war came to define regional politics across the Middle East for a generation so the blockade of Qatar has developed into the most serious rupture in the Gulf since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and has become a similarly era-defining event for the region. Qatar and the Gulf Crisis examines how and why Qatar was able to beat back a blockade that was supposed to split the country and force it into a position of submission to the would-be regional hegemony of Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi (in the UAE).

Subject Eritrea and regional geopolitics Significance Hoping to mitigate its international isolation, Eritrea has over recent years aggressively pursued new alliances with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), adding to its older but no less vital links with Egypt. However, shifting regional alignments in the wake of the 2017 Gulf crisis have placed Asmara squarely in the middle of some of the Arab world’s most serious political rifts, and greatly exacerbated tensions with its neighbours, with serious repercussions that the ruling People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) will find it difficult to navigate. Impacts Access to eastern Sudan will be curtailed for some time, creating economic challenges for the PFDJ. Eritrean opposition forces may secure increased external support, although, except for Ethiopia, most channels will remain covert. Qatar’s withdrawal from the disputed border with Djibouti will complicate Eritrea’s lobbying for an end to the UN arms embargo.


Significance Egypt has started to take delivery of an array of weapons systems, including advanced fighter aircraft and naval vessels, from Russia and France. These orders supplement equipment from the United States, which has been Egypt’s main source of weapons since the 1978 Camp David Accords. Amid an acute economic crisis, Cairo’s military procurement spree raises questions about regime motives. Impacts The rapidity of the military build-up may mean that the army will be unable to man the advanced weapons systems with qualified operators. Egypt is purchasing much of the military hardware on credit, which could further the decline of the struggling Egyptian economy. Egypt could use its newly acquired hardware to vie for regional power and influence with Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates.


Subject Sudan's foreign relations. Significance As aftershocks from the Gulf crisis ripple across the Horn of Africa, Sudan appears to be playing a dangerous strategic game. Recent months have seen Sudan seek deals with Turkey and Qatar, as well as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), even as these extra-regional powers are locked in a fractious rivalry that is playing out in Africa as a contest for influence. Impacts Even with external support, Sudan’s economic crisis is unlikely to ease quickly. Economic tensions may explode into a new wave of popular anti-government protests. Mismanagement and corruption will remain serious obstacles to wider investment and business in Sudan.


Subject Oman-Iran relations Significance Oman is the only Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member that maintains formal relations with all states in the region, including Iran, which has fallen out with the two most powerful GCC states, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Oman’s diplomatic channel to Tehran enables it to play the role of mediator between the United States and its Arab allies on the one side and Iran on the other. Indeed, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called Sultan Qaboos on May 16 to discuss alleged Iranian threats. Impacts An outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Iran would leave Oman isolated from other GCC states. Oman would reap economic benefits as a transshipment centre for Gulf states if Saudi Arabia and the UAE fight with Iran. A worsening Gulf crisis would increase smuggling between Iran and Oman, with Tehran eager to keep supplying Huthi rebels in Yemen.


Oryx ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Vigne ◽  
Esmond Bradley Martin

The authors visited Yemen on behalf of WWF International in April 1992 to find out what had been happening to the rhino horn trade since their last visit to the country during the Gulf Crisis in November 1990. From 1985 to 1990, Yemen's rhino horn imports had decreased very sharply compared with the 1970s and early 1980s. From August 1990 to March 1992, however, a considerable increase in imports occurred, with just over 750 kg of rhino horn being brought into Yemen. The reason for the increase was not a rise in the wholesale price of rhino horn – this is still half that paid in Taiwan. The main reason for the increase is that new and easier trade routes have opened up, primarily from Tanzania by air to Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates and then overland to Yemen.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 793-815
Author(s):  
Harlan Grant Cohen

ABSTRACT Economics and security seem increasingly intertwined. Citing national security, states subject foreign investments to new scrutiny, even unwinding mergers. The provision of 5G has become a diplomatic battleground—Huawei at its center. Meanwhile, states invoke national security to excuse trade wars. The USA invoked the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade national security exception to impose steel and aluminum tariffs, threatening more on automotive parts. Russia invoked that provision to justify its blockade of Ukraine, as did Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to excuse theirs of Qatar. And with the spread of COVID-19, states are invoking national security to scrutinize supply lines. Multiplying daily, such stories have led some observers to dub the era one of geoeconomics. Nonetheless, these developments remain difficult to judge, and the relationship between economics and national security remains confused and slippery. The essay seeks clarity in the deeper logic of these labels, revealing a fundamental choice between the logics of markets and the logics of state. Whether invoked to ‘secure’ borders, privacy, health, the environment, or jobs, ‘national security’ is a claim about the proper location of policymaking. Appeals to economics, with their emphasis on global welfare and global person-to-person relationships, are such claims as well. Resolving disputes, this essay argues, requires recognizing these root choices.


Significance Hopes for a swift resolution of the Gulf crisis were dashed on June 23 when details emerged of a list of 13 demands sent by the four countries that launched a boycott of Qatar on June 5: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt and Bahrain. Impacts The concept of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a common market has been permanently damaged. An increased political risk premium will raise borrowing costs across the GCC. Firms in Qatar will find it harder to retain and recruit professional expatriate staff.


2018 ◽  
pp. 141-154
Author(s):  
Antonio Giustozzi

Antonio Giustozzi’s chapter charts out the reactionary policies of Gulf monarchies to the evolving regional politics in Afghanistan and to changing perceptions of American hegemony post 2003. It traces the post-9/11 funding of the Afghan Taliban sourcing from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The competition between Iran and these Sunni funders in buying hegemony in the region is explored as also the competitive dynamics amongst the Sunni funders themselves, particularly the Saudis and Qataris. The role of Pakistan in lobbying for the involvement of the Gulf powers in nurturing the Afghan Taliban while simultaneously pursuing the ‘peace process’ is equally scrutinized. Finally, the complications caused by Pakistan’s conciliatory approach towards the Iranian presence along with the Taliban and a subsequent fallout between the Gulf and Pakistani agendas are explained.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-60
Author(s):  
Miftahul Huda

The reality of the difference in applying Islamic law in the context of marriage law legislation in modern Muslim countries is undeniable. Tunisia and Turkey, for example, have practiced Islamic law of liberal nuance. Unlike the case with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that still use the application of Islamic law as it is in their fiqh books. In between these two currents many countries are trying to apply the law in their own countries by trying to bridge the urgent new needs and local wisdom. This is widely embraced by modern Muslim countries in general. This paper reviews typologically the heterogeneousness of family law legislation of modern Muslim countries while responding to modernization issues. Typical buildings seen from modern family law reforms can be classified into four types. The first type is progressive, pluralistic and extradoctrinal reform, such as in Turkey and Tunisia. The second type is adaptive, unified and intradoctrinal reform, as in Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Algeria and Pakistan. The third type is adaptive, unified and intradoctrinal reform, represented by Iraq. While the fourth type is progressive, unifiied and extradoctrinal reform, which can be represented by Somalia and Algeria.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document