Prisoner's Dilemma Popularized: Game Theory and Ethical Progress

Dialogue ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-304
Author(s):  
Peter Danielson

Is game theory good for us? This may seem an odd question. In the strict sense, game theory—the axiomatic account of interaction between rational agents—is as morally neutral as arithmetic. But the popularization of game theory as a way of thinking about social interaction is far from neutral. Consider the contrast between characterizing bargaining over distribution as a “zero-sum society” and focussing on “win-win” cooperative solutions. These reflections bring us to the book under review, Prisoner's Dilemma, a popular introduction to game theory and its relation to ethics by the respected science writer William Poundstone. The book begins with a moral dilemma and ends by discussing the evolution of co-operation. Poundstone emphasizes—correctly, to my mind—the ethical potential of game theory. He concludes his first chapter with this striking claim: “Today's practitioners of game theory are attempting to forge a kind of ethical progress. Is there any way to promote the common good in a prisoner's dilemma? The attempt to answer this question is one of the great intellectual adventures of our time” (p. 9).

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 3-30
Author(s):  
Tommi Lehtonen ◽  

The prisoner's dilemma famously shows that individuals seeking their own benefit end up with a worse outcome than could be achieved through cooperation. This dilemma provides an effective but neglected method for the study of the Hindu principle of "desireless action" (niṣkāmakarma). In the context of the prisoner's dilemma, one or the other of the following decision-making strategies is feasible for prisoners who want to follow the principle of "desireless action": (1) to be indifferent and to leave the decision to chance (e.g. by arbitrarily drawing lots) or (2) to pursue the common good or the benefit of the other (by remaining silent) instead of seeking primarily to benefit oneself (by confessing). The second strategy is more appropriate assuming the following: the followers of the principle of "desireless action" can be goal-oriented and target-driven, as long as unselfish goals are considered, while remaining indifferent and non-attached in terms of personal benefit. This interpretation is tested and further discussed in this article in light of the values of the modem environmental and anti-consumerist degrowth movement. A non-profit orientation and the emphasis on duties are shared by the concepts of degrowth and niṣkāmakarma. Social- or reality-centredness rather than self-centredness is also common to both concepts. The degrowth movement focuses on economic contraction and deceleration, and thus its scope is narrower and more specific than that of niṣkāmakarma. Moreover, the degrowth movement rejects economic grovrth because of its ecologically and socially harmful effects, such as pollution and income inequality, but it is - at least in theory - indifferent to the harmless results of economic activities. On the contrary, the principle of niṣkāmakarma involves a critical stance toward both good and bad results of actions, insofar as they are pursued because of self-regarding desires.


Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1443
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Dong ◽  
Ai-Guo Wu

In this paper, we extend the quantum game theory of Prisoner’s Dilemma to the N-player case. The final state of quantum game theory of N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is derived, which can be used to investigate the payoff of each player. As demonstration, two cases (2-player and 3-player) are studied to illustrate the superiority of quantum strategy in the game theory. Specifically, the non-unique entanglement parameter is found to maximize the total payoff, which oscillates periodically. Finally, the optimal strategic set is proved to depend on the selection of initial states.


1984 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 687-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick M. Gardner ◽  
Terry L. Corbin ◽  
Janelle S. Beltramo ◽  
Gary S. Nickell

Cooperation in pairs of rats playing the prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Six pairs of animals were taught to make either cooperative or uncooperative responses by running to one or the other end of a T-maze. Two T-mazes were joined together such that animals could respond simultaneously. Animals were run under conditions in which visual communication was present and absent. Mutually uncooperative responses were the most common and mutually cooperative behaviors the least preferred. Introduction of a barrier between the mazes, which removed visual communication between pairs, sharply accentuated uncooperative behavior. Similarities of the present findings to results with human subjects and the implications of using game theory for studying cooperative behavior in animals are discussed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 122-126
Author(s):  
Aleksandra L. Grinikh ◽  
◽  
Leon A. Petrosyan ◽  

In the paper n-person prisoner's dilemma on the network is investigated. A cooperative game with the pairwise interaction of players is constructed. The model is a modification of the classic 2-person prisoner's dilemma problem in the game theory. Network interaction provide an ability to take into account the in uence only to the adjacent players from the whole set of players. The feature of the game is found that allows to make a decision about necessity of playing dominated strategy by a few players. This solution is based on the number of the adjacent players. The work is a continuation of the paper published earlier by Grinikh A.L. and Petrosyan L.A. in 2021.


2018 ◽  
pp. 193-220
Author(s):  
Barry Hoffmaster ◽  
Cliff Hooker

Ethics is embedded in the practices and institutions of society. Three examples illustrate the communal importance of ethical design. First is the distinction between Fights, Games, and Debates as successively more ethical and more intelligent institutional designs for handling conflict. The second is the Prisoner’s Dilemma in game theory, whose best solution is to step outside the game and change the surrounding institutional design. The third is an account of the ethical and effective institutional design solutions for various situations, especially of mediation for those that invoke the notion of ‘polycentric’ problems.


1995 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Rescher

Even agents possessed of free will must—if rational—be substantially predictable. However, there will be some situations where the act-choices of rational agents will not be predictable—for example, in circumstances of underdetermination due to insufficient information. And moreover, unpredictability can also result in situations of analysis overdetermination that arise when equally cogent analyses yield disparate results, as in the example of Dr. Psychic Psycho. The Prisoner's Dilemma affords yet another instance of this. Clearly, when determination fails even after rationality has had its say, then rationality's predictive power is exhausted! Fortunately, however, that does not mean that our human resources of issue-resolution are at the end of their tether.


1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kay Mathiesen

Solomon’s article and Binmore’s response exemplify a standard exchange between the game theorist and those critical of applying game theory to ethics. The critic of game theory lists a number of problems with game theory and the game theorist responds by arguing that the critic’s objections are based on a misrepresentation of the theory. Binmore claims that the game theorist is in the position of the innocent man who, when asked why he beats his wife, must explain that he doesn’t beat his wife at all (Binmore, 2). However, even if we agree that the denial is true, we might still like to know why, if you are not beating your wife, do others consistently accuse you of doing so? Or, to get away from this rather sexist metaphor, why are critics of game theory like Solomon (according to game theorists) consistently getting game theory wrong?While, as I argue in the first section, critics of game theory such as Solomon may misrepresent game theory, this misrepresentation is not entirely their own fault. The way in which game theory is traditionally presented is misleading. For example, students are usually first introduced to game theory through the prisoner’s dilemma. It is compelling drama, but lousy PR for the use of ethics in game theory. (You want to know what to do? Let’s see how two thieves reason.) However, while Binmore is right to argue that game theory neither assumes nor entails the theory of human nature that Solomon finds objectionable, Solomon is also right to argue that game theory is promulgated and applied with what appear to be a robust set of assumptions about human motivation. I argue in the second section, however, that in fact neither these applications of game theory, nor game theory itself, is committed to a particular theory of human motivation. Thus, while game theory is not able to provide a complete ethical theory (assuming that a theory of human motivation is essential to such a theory), it is not contrary to ethics. In the final section I note that Aristotle, rather than being the alternative to using game theory in business ethics, as Solomon suggests, actually points the way to an ethical theory that can combine a discussion of both game theory and “those nagging and controversial questions about what it is that people do and ought to care about” (Solomon, 7).


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