Heidegger II

Anxiety ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 361-396
Author(s):  
Bettina Bergo

Following claims that Being and Time was essentially philosophical anthropology, and questions about the embodiment and mortality of Dasein, and Heidegger recurred to the distinction between humans who, as being-there, create a “world” for themselves and confront their death resolutely, versus animals who are caught up in their natural environments and do not die so much as “perish” biologically. In 1929 he studied the work of gestalt biologists like Jakob von Uexküll to support his arguments for the world-poverty of animals, unable hermeneutically to forge a real “world.” By 1936, nevertheless, his logic faltered when he argued that the age of technology and giganticism had reduced most humans to mere “technicized animals.” Even if this was a rhetorical flourish, it remained that only an anxious few remained among us who could dwell poetically and be free for their death, an idea with significant implications for the metaphysical politics Heidegger developed in response to Nazi politics. By 1949, the technicized animal—poor in world—appeared to perish with no greater resoluteness and dignity than its animal relatives.

Author(s):  
Alberto Constante

The impossible moral in Heidegger is based on two fundamental facts: firstly, that Heidegger devoted himself to the theme of being. All other issues, thesis or questions derive from that fundamental and unique “question about the meaning of Being”. Secondly, the ontological question in Heidegger wasn’t the question for the entity, but the question for the Being. On these bases, “The impossible moral” in Heidegger arises from his initial ontological argumentation from which all other structures derive and that Heidegger tries to separate from each anthropological, psychological or biological matter. In fact, we may suggest that an ethical approach in Heidegger could only arise from the exegesis of the structural whole of the “being-in-the-world”. This would happen by apprehending the original being of the “being-there” as “care” that isn’t anything else that the manifestation of the following features: “being-with” and “being one’s self”. All these without forgetting that Being and time has an ontological fundamental intention. Finally, “The impossible moral” in Heidegger is given by his radical antihumanism.


2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elspeth Jajdelska

AbstractLanguage and literature can stimulate the embodied resources of perception. I argue that there is a puzzle about why we experience sequences of these embodied responses as integrated and coherent, even though they are not anchored in space and time by a perceiving body. Some successions of embodied representations would even be impossible in real world experience, yet they can still be experienced as coherent and flowing in response to verbal texts. One possibility is that embodied responses to language are fleeting; they need not be integrated because they do not depend on, or relate to, one another as they would in perception. Yet it is the potential for embodied representations to linger and connect with one another which underlies new and persuasive embodied literary theories of vividness, narrative coherence and metaphor comprehension. Another possibility is that readers anchor their embodied representations in a notional human body, one endowed with superhuman powers, such as omniscience. But this account relies on implausible, post hoc explanations. A third possibility is that integrating embodied representations produced by language need be no more problematic than integrating the deceptively patchy information harvested from the environment by perception, information which gives rise to an experience of the world in rich and continuous detail. Real world perceptual cues, however, sparse though they might be, are still integrated through grounding in specific points in time and space. To explain the integration of embodied effects, I draw on sensorimotor theories of perception, and on Clark’s suggestion (1997,


2010 ◽  
Vol 37 (117) ◽  
pp. 107
Author(s):  
Acylene Maria Cabral Ferreira

Nosso objetivo é refletir sobre a constituição ontológico-existencial da corporeidade em Heidegger, a partir da estrutura ser-no-mundo e dos existenciais da mundanidade do mundo, disposição e compreender. Nossa hipótese consiste em que a corporeidade é um modo de ser e, portanto, um existencial da presença (Dasein). Primeiramente, analisaremos a importância e as dificuldades relativas ao tema da corporeidade no pensamento heideggeriano, ao mesmo tempo em que indicaremos a viabilidade da temática proposta. Em seguida, discutiremos o caráter de abertura dos existenciais com o intuito de estabelecermos o nexo ontológico entre estas aberturas. Com isto, pretendemos esclarecer porque a corporeidade é um existencial que estrutura a presença em modos de ser. Fundamentados nos Seminários de Zollikon e em Ser e tempo discutiremos a relação entre espacialidade e corporeidade existencial, através das características constitutivas de direcionamento, distanciamento e proximidade. Por fim, apontaremos que a constituição ontológico-existencial da corporeidade é, ao mesmo tempo, uma constituição hermenêutica da corporeidade.Abstract: Our aim is to reflect over the ontological and existential constitution of corporeity in Heidegger in the lighit of the being-in-the-world structure as well as of the existentials of the mundanity of the world, disposition and conunderstanding. Our hypothesis is that corporeity is a mode of being and, therefore, an existential of the being-there (Dasein). First of all, we will analyze the importance and difficulties related to the issue of corporeity in Heideggerian thought, and indicate the viability of the proposed theme. We will then discuss the openness characteristic of existentials, in order to establish the ontological connection between them. This approach will help us clarify why corporeity is an existential that structures the being-there into modes of being. Taking as a basis the Zollikon Seminars and Being and Time, we will discuss the relationship between spaciality and existential corporeity, through the constitutive characteristics of direction (“directioning”), distanciation and proximity. Finally, we will point that the ontological-existential constitution of corporeity is also a hermeneutic constitution of corporeity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Darren Sears

Abstract. Maps have the empowering effect of placing the “world at your fingertips,” compressing portions of it into a more “knowable” form. I find that some places have this map-like character even in real life—natural environments that are sliced by sharp, unexpected edges and contrasts into more accessible and digestible fragments. Over the years I have explored creating maps that heighten these places’ compressed quality but also preserve their immersive aspect.This search led me first to the field of landscape architecture, and then into two dimensions after I realized that creating these idealized places out in real world was mostly a fantasy. I began piecing together travel photographs into abstract photomontages, later reinterpreted in oil paints, that sharpen natural edges and contrasts to depict imaginary places. I then transitioned to watercolors, and toward depicting places not quite as imaginary, using the same fractured style to combine travel-inspired landscapes with bird’s-eye views.Finding the task of painting the individual fragments less engaging than the process of shaping them into compositions, I came to think of these works as maps in terms of both theory and process—in emphasizing the spatial relationships between scenes rather than the individual scenes themselves. My motivation for creating these maps has expanded beyond personal fulfilment to include conveying the fragility of the natural remnants and contrasts that captivate me.


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 98-119
Author(s):  
Shawn Loht ◽  

This article examines Martin Heidegger's concept of conscience in Being and Time as it is manifested by the characters Don Draper from the television series Mad Men (Matthew Weiner, 2007-2013) and Chauncey Gardiner in the film Being There (Hal Ashby, 1979). The article suggests that Draper hears and occasionally responds to what Heidegger terms the “call of conscience,” whereas Gardiner neither hears this call nor responds to it. Gardiner poses a problem case for Heidegger’s account of Dasein by virtue of failing to exhibit conscience. A question latent in Gardiner’s makeup is what causes him to be this way. The contrast of the characters Draper and Gardiner is approached through the lens of the portrayal of secret identity in filmic media. Both characters live public lives that are at odds with their genuine selves, but they react to this disconnect differently. Core concepts addressed vis-a-vis Heidegger’s account of conscience include facticity, falling, discourse, authenticity, and death. The article concludes that Draper hears and responds to conscience’s call because he has a discursive comprehension of the disconnect between his true self and the public life he has lived; a crucial component of the phenomenon of conscience according to Heidegger is the existential capacity for discourse. Gardiner, in contrast, does not hear conscience at all because his Dasein lacks the discursive element that conscience requires in order to be activated. Gardiner’s being-in-the-world is such that he fails to understand the divide between his lived self and his public self. For Gardiner, these are the same.


2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-251
Author(s):  
Anthony Pavlik

Fantasy other worlds are often seen as alternative, wholly ‘other’ locations that operate as critiques of the ‘real’ world, or provide spaces where child protagonists can take advantage of the otherness they encounter in their own process of growth. Rather than consider fantasy fiction's presentations of ‘other’ worlds in this way, this article proposes reading them as potential thirdspaces of performance and activity that are neutral rather than confrontational such that, in fantasy other world fiction for children and young adults, the putative ‘other’ world may not, in fact, be ‘other’ at all.


In his later work, Heidegger argued that Western history involved a sequence of distinct understandings of being and correspondingly distinct worlds. Dreyfus illustrates several distinct world styles by contrasting Greek, industrial, and technological practices for using equipment. By reading Being and Time in the light of Heidegger’s later concerns with the history of being, Dreyfus shows how Heidegger’s own account of equipment in Being and Time helped set the stage for technology by encouraging an understanding of being that leaves equipment and natural objects open to a technological reorganization of the world into a standing reserve of resources. Seen in the light of the relation of nature and technology revealed by later Heidegger, Being and Time appears in the history of the being of equipment not just as a transition but as the decisive step toward technology.


Author(s):  
Donald C. Williams

This chapter begins with a systematic presentation of the doctrine of actualism. According to actualism, all that exists is actual, determinate, and of one way of being. There are no possible objects, nor is there any indeterminacy in the world. In addition, there are no ways of being. It is proposed that actual entities stand in three fundamental relations: mereological, spatiotemporal, and resemblance relations. These relations govern the fundamental entities. Each fundamental entity stands in parthood relations, spatiotemporal relations, and resemblance relations to other entities. The resulting picture is one that represents the world as a four-dimensional manifold of actual ‘qualitied contents’—upon which all else supervenes. It is then explained how actualism accounts for classes, quantity, number, causation, laws, a priori knowledge, necessity, and induction.


Author(s):  
Jon Stewart

In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel treats the religions of the world under the rubric “the determinate religion.” This is a part of his corpus that has traditionally been neglected, since scholars have struggled to understand what philosophical work it is supposed to do. The present study argues that Hegel’s rich analyses of Buddhism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Egyptian and Greek polytheism, and the Roman religion are not simply irrelevant historical material, as is often thought. Instead, they play a central role in Hegel’s argument for what he regards as the truth of Christianity. Hegel believes that the different conceptions of the gods in the world religions are reflections of individual peoples at specific periods in history. These conceptions might at first glance appear random and chaotic, but there is, Hegel claims, a discernible logic in them. Simultaneously a theory of mythology, history, and philosophical anthropology, Hegel’s account of the world religions goes far beyond the field of philosophy of religion. The controversial issues surrounding his treatment of the non-European religions are still very much with us today and make his account of religion an issue of continued topicality in the academic landscape of the twenty-first century.


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