Marginalized in the Middle

2021 ◽  
pp. 21-40
Author(s):  
Neilan S. Chaturvedi
Keyword(s):  
Majority Party

Chapter 2 lays out the theory for why moderates so often fail to take on the mantle of being the pivotal voter. Theoretically, as the Senate loses moderates and becomes more polarized, the remaining moderates should gain power and become pivotal to every vote. This chapter argues that in the polarized era, moderates are cross-pressured as they are elected from states in which the opposition is the majority party or from swing states that have a roughly equal number of partisans from both sides. As a result, moderates must balance a volatile coalition of voters by avoiding traceability on most issues. Chapter 2 argues that in the onstage legislative game, when senators can shape and defend legislation, they should remain inactive and invisible. In the behind-the-scenes legislative game, where senators negotiate and push their influence behind closed doors, they should seek consensus but avoid driving legislation too strongly.

Turnout and the Vote: The Joke's on the Democrats

1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 406-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
James DeNardo
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Conventional View ◽  
Theoretical Reasoning ◽  
The Relationship

A heavy turnout is commonly believed to favor the Democrats. This study presents theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence that challenge the conventional view. Reasonable assumptions about the behavior of core and peripheral voters lead to the conclusion that the majority party is most likely to suffer when turnout increases, common sense notwithstanding. It also appears that the recent decay of partisan loyalties among voters has eroded the relationship between turnout and the vote.

Majority Party Leadership and the Committee System in the House of Representatives

1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 1593-1604 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis P. Westefield
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Steady Increase ◽  
Party Leadership ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Leadership Strategy ◽  
Explicit Theory

In this paper one party leadership strategy with respect to the committee system of the House is examined. Building on several relatively clear concepts such as compliance, quality of assignment, expectation, scarcity, and exchange, a very elementary, yet explicit, theory is constructed. It is shown that the leaders pursue a strategy of accommodation. The leaders increase the number of positions on those committees prized by the members in order to guarantee a steady supply of resources to gain leverage with the members. But a steady increase in the supply of positions reduces the scarcity of positions and hence their value to the leaders. Thus, a consequence of the strategy is the need periodically to reorganize or make adjustments in the committee system.

scholarly journals CHANGING FACE OF ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR: ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA -GENERAL ELECTIONS 2019

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (03) ◽  
pp. 118-121
Author(s):  
Archana Sawshilya ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Digital Media ◽  
Digital Technology ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Social Media Platforms ◽  
General Elections ◽  
History Of ◽  
Electoral Behaviour

The 2019 election witnessed a society that was consuming digital technology .For the first time in the history of India’s political platform the national elections were fought both on the streets and by using the smart phones and social media platforms using the digital technology .The digital media teams of the political parties in the 2019 elections played a very crucial role in trying to tip the scales in the favor of their party .The NaMo app had nearly 10 million downloads while the Shakti app of the Congress had around 70-80 lakh users. But the critics raised the question what if the party that mis-adopted the technology during 2019 is also the majority party in the house that would be responsible for designing the control mechanisms?

The Changing Structure of Party Identification

1985 ◽  
Vol 18 (01) ◽  
pp. 48-52
Author(s):  
Laurily K. Epstein
Keyword(s):  
Party Identification ◽  
Presidential Candidate ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
Democratic Presidential Candidate

However one wishes to characterize Walter Mondale's campaign for the presidency, his loss was only the latest in a series of Democratic presidential candidate defeats beginning in 1968. In 1968, Hubert Humphrey got 43 percent of the popular vote. In 1972, George McGovem received 38 percent of the popular vote. And in both 1980 and 1984, the Democratic presidential tickets got 41 percent of the popular vote. Only in 1976 did a Democratic presidential candidate receive a (very slim) majority of the popular votes cast. Indeed, Democratic presidential candidates have received only 42 percent of the total votes cast between 1968 and 1984.Although Democratic presidential candidates have not been faring well for 16 years, party identification has remained about the same—with the Democrats as the majority party. Until 1984. And that is what makes the 1984 election interesting, for in this election the voters finally seemed to change their party identification to correspond with what now appears to be their habit of electing Republican presidents.In 1980, when Jimmy Carter received the same proportion of the total votes cast as did Walter Mondale in 1984, self-styled Democrats were still in the majority. But, by 1984, Republicans and Democrats were at a virtual tie nationwide, as these figures from NBC News election day voter polls demonstrate.

Subverting the Organizational Cartel: Explaining Cross-Party Leadership Selection in U.S. State Houses

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-483
Author(s):  
Matthew N. Green
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
State Level ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Leadership Selection ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Party Ideology ◽  
Level I ◽  
Selection Of

In the U.S. House of Representatives, the majority party constitutes an organizational cartel that monopolizes the selection of chamber leaders. But in state legislatures, that cartel power is sometimes circumvented by a bipartisan bloc that outvotes the leadership preferences of a majority of the majority party. Drawing from an original data set of instances of cross-party organizational coalitions at the state level, I use statistical analysis to test various hypotheses for when these coalitions are more likely to form. The analysis reveals that party ideology does not adequately explain the violation of these cartels; rather, violations depend on the costs associated with keeping the party unified and the benefits that come from selecting the chamber’s top leadership post. This finding underscores the potential vulnerability of organizational cartels and suggests that governing parties are strategic when deciding how fiercely to defend their cartel power.

Will the Republicans Retake the House in 2010?

2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (04) ◽  
pp. 639-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred G. Cuzán
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Statistical Models ◽  
National Level ◽  
The United States ◽  
Similar Model ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Successful Model ◽  
Midterm Elections

Historically, statistical models for forecasting the outcome of midterm elections to the United States House of Representatives have not been particularly successful (Jones and Cuzán 2006). However, in what may have been a breakthrough, most models correctly predicted that the Democrats would re-emerge as the majority party in 2006 (Cuzán 2007). One successful model was estimated using 46 elections, beginning with 1914 (only the second time that 435 representatives, the present number, were elected). The model was relatively simple, making use of national-level variables only (Cuzán and Bundrick 2006). Using a similar model, I generated a forecast for the 2010 midterm election.

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