Subverting the Organizational Cartel: Explaining Cross-Party Leadership Selection in U.S. State Houses

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-483
Author(s):  
Matthew N. Green

In the U.S. House of Representatives, the majority party constitutes an organizational cartel that monopolizes the selection of chamber leaders. But in state legislatures, that cartel power is sometimes circumvented by a bipartisan bloc that outvotes the leadership preferences of a majority of the majority party. Drawing from an original data set of instances of cross-party organizational coalitions at the state level, I use statistical analysis to test various hypotheses for when these coalitions are more likely to form. The analysis reveals that party ideology does not adequately explain the violation of these cartels; rather, violations depend on the costs associated with keeping the party unified and the benefits that come from selecting the chamber’s top leadership post. This finding underscores the potential vulnerability of organizational cartels and suggests that governing parties are strategic when deciding how fiercely to defend their cartel power.

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882198896
Author(s):  
Javier Astudillo ◽  
Andreu Paneque

This paper examines the effect of party primaries on women’s chances of winning a leadership contest in eight Western parliamentary countries since 1985. By doing so, we revisit an ongoing debate about a possible trade-off between the democratic values of ‘inclusion’ of party members and ‘representation’ of excluded groups that this type of selection method may involve. Using an original data set consisting of 608 candidates who participated in 168 leadership mixed-gender contests at the national or regional level, we show that female candidates perform worse under party primaries. This finding holds even after controlling for the type of candidate competing. We therefore sustain the argument that this leadership selection mechanism, in its current format, involves a trade-off between ‘inclusion’ and ‘representation’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-459 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sue Thomas ◽  
Ryan Treffers ◽  
Nancy F. Berglas ◽  
Laurie Drabble ◽  
Sarah C. M. Roberts

As U.S. states legalize marijuana and as governmental attention is paid to the “opioid crisis,” state policies pertaining to drug use during pregnancy are increasingly important. Little is known about the scope of state policies targeting drug use during pregnancy, how they have evolved, and how they compare to alcohol use during pregnancy policies. Method: Our 46-year original data set of statutes and regulations in U.S. states covers the entirety of state-level legislation in this policy domain. Data were obtained through original legal research and from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism’s Alcohol Policy Information System. Policies were analyzed individually as well as by classification as punitive toward or supportive of women. Results: The number of states with drug use during pregnancy policies has increased from 1 in 1974 to 43 in 2016. Policies started as punitive. By the mid- to late 1980s, supportive policies emerged, and mixed policy environments dominated in the 2000s. Overall, drug/pregnancy policy environments have become less supportive over time. Comparisons of drug laws to alcohol laws show that the policy trajectories started in opposite directions, but by 2016, the results were the same: Punitive policies were more prevalent than supportive policies across states. Moreover, there is a great deal of overlap between drug use during pregnancy policies and alcohol/pregnancy policies. Conclusion: This study breaks new ground. More studies are needed that explore the effects of these policies on alcohol and other drug use by pregnant women and on birth outcomes.


2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 377-395
Author(s):  
Saumyajit Ray

In the presidential system of government in the United States, the President’s party has on more than one occasion been reduced to a minority in the federal legislature. The US President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives—the leader of the majority party—had often found themselves clashing on matters of policy, legislation, and executive action. This essay makes a careful selection of five House Speakers in the post-1945 period, all belonging to the ‘other party’, and explores their relations with the Presidents of their times. Out of these, only Newt Gingrich succeeded in dividing the government as never before, demonstrating that the House Speaker had the capacity to stall government altogether, something even a ‘Leader of the Opposition’ in a parliamentary system can never do.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Leandro De Magalhães

Abstract Regression discontinuity design could be a valuable tool for identifying causal effects of a given party holding a legislative majority. However, the variable “number of seats” takes a finite number of values rather than a continuum and, hence, it is not suited as a running variable. Recent econometric advances suggest the necessary assumptions and empirical tests that allow us to interpret small intervals around the cut-off as local randomized experiments. These permit us to bypass the assumption that the running variable must be continuous. Herein, we implement these tests for US state legislatures and propose another: whether a slim-majority of one seat had at least one state-level district result that was itself a close race won by the majority party.


Author(s):  
Jeffery A. Jenkins ◽  
Charles Stewart

The Speaker of the House of Representatives is the most powerful partisan figure in the contemporary U.S. Congress. How this came to be, and how the majority party in the House has made control of the speakership a routine matter, is far from straightforward. This book provides a comprehensive history of how speakers have been elected in the U.S. House since 1789, arguing that the organizational politics of these elections were critical to the construction of mass political parties in America and laid the groundwork for the role they play in setting the agenda of Congress today. The book shows how the speakership began as a relatively weak office, and how votes for Speaker prior to the Civil War often favored regional interests over party loyalty. While struggle, contention, and deadlock over House organization were common in the antebellum era, such instability vanished with the outbreak of war, as the majority party became an “organizational cartel” capable of controlling with certainty the selection of the Speaker and other key House officers. This organizational cartel has survived Gilded Age partisan strife, Progressive Era challenge, and conservative coalition politics to guide speakership elections through the present day. This book reveals how struggles over House organization prior to the Civil War were among the most consequential turning points in American political history.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 852-869
Author(s):  
Philipp Adorf

Every ten years, the districts to the U .S . House of Representatives are redrawn, a task that in most states falls to state legislatures . Electoral success for Republican state parties has provided the party with the opportunity to draw district lines in its own favor, a factor that has contributed to - but not made possible - Republican majorities in the lower chamber of the U .S . Congress . The practice of redistricting has also contributed to the country’s political polarization, as critics tend to nonetheless overstate the relevance of the former on the latter . Opponents of this method had hoped that the Supreme Court would use the case of Gill versus Whitford to declare a standard for determining unconstitutional gerrymandering . Instead, the justices decided to hand the case back down to a lower court before ruling a year later that the issue of partisan gerrymandering was non-justiciable . Reformers will therefore have to place more emphasis on plebiscitary measures at the state level . Regardless of any potential reforms that may be enacted in future years, their impact on both the majorities in the House of Representatives as well as on the level of polarization will be rather marginal . [ZParl, vol . 50 (2019), no . 4, pp . 852 - 869]


2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
DANIEL A. SMITH ◽  
DUSTIN FRIDKIN

Between 1898 and 1918, voters in 20 American states adopted constitutional amendments granting citizens the power of the initiative. The embrace of direct democracy by voters invites inquiry into why some state legislatures opted to delegate to citizens the power of the initiative, while others did not. Drawing on an original data set, this article uses Event History Analysis hazard models to explain the puzzle of why legislatures might devolve institutional power to citizens. Our longitudinal, macrolevel analysis of socioeconomic and political forces reveals that political considerations—interparty legislative competition, party organizational strength, and third parties—are the most powerful predictors of a legislature's decision to refer the initiative to the ballot. Although several of our findings comport with the conventional wisdom explaining the adoption of the initiative during the Progressive Era, others are surprising, offering us new theoretical insights into why and when legislative bodies might be willing to divest themselves of their institutional power.


2007 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina L. Davis ◽  
Yuki Shirato

What explains the selection of cases for WTO adjudication? This article explores the business conditions under which industries lobby their home government to use the WTO adjudication process and the political factors that influence government decisions. It explains the industry pattern of selection for international trade disputes as a function of the velocity of the business environment. While WTO adjudication is seen as costly and slow, a positive ruling brings broad benefits in terms of deterrence against future discrimination. Firms in static industries will invest in WTO dispute settlement to achieve these benefits, but firms in industries shaped by dynamic competition have high opportunity costs that make them less willing to pursue adjudication. This argument accounts for why there are fewer WTO cases about electronics industry issues than there are likely incidences of protectionist measures. Since Japan is a leading exporter and provides a government report with unique data on potential WTO disputes, it was chosen to test the argument in greater depth. Interviews with Japanese business officials and statistical analysis of an original data set provide support for the argument. The authors conclude that the passive attitude toward WTO adjudication by Japan's largest export industry, electronics, and the sensitivity of Japan's diplomatic relations with China have constrained the cases that Japan files. These findings suggest that the effectiveness of the WTO for dispute settlement is conditional upon the time horizon of the industry and the political relations among members.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 324-346
Author(s):  
Barry Edwards

What makes some lawmakers more effective than others is a central question in American politics. Recent research has emphasized the role of informal, persuasive leadership, but this research has focused almost exclusively on Congress, so it is unclear whether this approach to lawmaking is generally effective. Analysis of state legislatures is hampered by the lack of a theoretically sound and practically feasible measure of legislative effectiveness. I offer a solution to the primary problem with traditional hit rates. I apply this approach to North Carolina legislators and show my effectiveness estimates correspond with expert evaluations. I then examine recent terms of the Michigan, Georgia, and North Carolina legislatures to evaluate the relative importance of formal and informal powers at the state level. I hypothesize and find that informal, persuasive leadership is not effective in state legislatures where lawmaking is better explained by formal, hierarchical authority.


2015 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 819-859 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kris James Mitchener ◽  
Matthew Jaremski

We use a novel data set spanning 1820–1910 to assess the factors leading to the creation of formal bank supervisory institutions across American states. We show that it took more than a century for all states to create separate agencies tasked with monitoring the safety and soundness of banks. State legislatures initially pursued cheaper regulatory alternatives, such as double liability laws; however, banking distress at the state level as well as the structural shift from note-issuing to deposit-taking commercial banks and competition with national banks propelled policymakers to adopt costly and permanent supervisory institutions.


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