Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer McKitrick
Keyword(s):  
Gender Identity ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Dispositional Property ◽  
Wide Applicability ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Dispositional Account

Dispositional Pluralism is more consistent with our dispositions talk than more monolithic views. Our evidence for extrinsic, ungrounded, and non-natural dispositions is comparable to that of intrinsic, grounded, and natural ones. Dispositional Pluralism has wide applicability to various philosophical issues. Secondary qualities, such as colors, can be given a dispositional account. Thinking of character traits as dispositions sheds light on the debate over Dispositionalism Situationism in moral psychology. One can give an account of gender identity as a cluster of behavioral dispositions. Finally, the potentiality of an embryo or a patient is best understood as an extrinsic dispositional property.

scholarly journals Dispositional Pluralism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer McKitrick
Keyword(s):  
Character Traits ◽  
Dispositional Property ◽  
Physical Objects ◽  
Do So ◽  
Dispositional Properties

Dispositional Pluralism is the view that dispositional properties are abundant and diverse. When something has a disposition, it is such that, if it were in a certain kind of circumstance, a certain kind of effect would occur. Dispositions include such varied properties as character traits like a hero’s courage, characteristics of physical objects like a wine glass’s fragility, and characteristics of microphysical entities like an electron’s charge. Some dispositions are natural while others are non-natural. Some dispositions called “powers” are ungrounded while non-fundamental dispositions are grounded in other properties. Some dispositions manifest constantly, some of them manifest spontaneously, while others manifest only when they are triggered to do so. Some dispositions manifest by causing another dispositional property to be instantiated, while others have manifestations that involve non-dispositional properties and relations. Some dispositions are intrinsic to their bearers while others are extrinsic. Some of them are causally relevant to their manifestations while others are not. Some dispositions manifest in some particular way in particular circumstances, while other dispositions manifest in various ways in various circumstances. What makes all of these diverse properties dispositions is their connection to a certain kind of counterfactual fact. Nevertheless, disposition ascriptions are not semantically reducible to counterfactual claims.

Heated Agreement

2021 ◽  
pp. 105-114
Author(s):  
John M. Doris
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Empirical Information ◽  
Book Symposium

This chapter was originally a contribution to a book symposium on Robert Adams’ A Theory of Virtue (2006), which develops an extended response to the arguments for character skepticism put forth in Doris’ Lack of Character (2002). It is argued that despite the differences between them, the works are actually in considerable agreement, both methodologically and substantively, when it comes to the fundamentals of moral psychology. Both sides agree that philosophical moral psychology ought to be empirically informed, and both sides agree that traditional conceptions of character traits require revision in light of empirical information.

No Character or Personality

2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Business Ethics ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Academic Discipline ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Personality Theory

Abstract:Solomon argues that, although recent research in social psychology has important implications for business ethics, it does not undermine an approach that stresses virtue ethics. However, he underestimates the empirical threat to virtue ethics, and his a priori claim that empirical research cannot overturn our ordinary moral psychology is overstated. His appeal to seemingly obvious differences in character traits between people simply illustrates the fundamental attribution error. His suggestion that the Milgram and Darley and Batson experiments have to do with such character traits as obedience and punctuality cannot help to explain the relevant differences in the way people behave in different situations. His appeal to personality theory fails, because, as an intellectual academic discipline, personality theory is in shambles, mainly because it has been concerned with conceptions of personality rather than with what is true about personality. Solomon’s rejection of Doris’s claims about the fragmentation of character is at odds with the received view in social psychology. Finally, he is mistaken to think that rejecting virtue ethics implies rejecting free will and moral responsibility.

scholarly journals Considering Dispositional Moral Realism

Perspectives ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-22
Author(s):  
Prabhpal Singh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Dispositional Account ◽  
Affective Attitudes ◽  
Simon Blackburn ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
David Enoch

AbstractMy aim in this paper is to consider a series of arguments against Dispositional Moral Realism and argue that these objections are unsuccessful. I will consider arguments that try to either establish a dis-analogy between moral properties and secondary qualities or try to show that a dispositional account of moral properties fails to account for what a defensible species of moral realism must account for. I also consider criticisms from Simon Blackburn (1993), who argues that there could not be a corresponding perceptual faculty for moral properties, and David Enoch (2011), who argues that Dispositional Moral Realism does not most plausibly explain the difference between moral disagreements and disagreements of mere preference. Finally, I examine a novel criticism concerning the relationship between the diverse variety of moral properties and the range of our normative affective attitudes, arguing that the view has no problem accounting for this diversity.

A Dispositional Account of War Crimes

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Talbert ◽  
Jessica Wolfendale
Keyword(s):  
Military Personnel ◽  
Military Service ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Military Training ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Dispositional Account ◽  
Causes Of War ◽  
Personality System

Chapter 3 challenges the situationist account of war crimes and offers an alternative dispositional account of the causes of war crimes. After criticizing the situationist accounts of war crimes described in Chapter 2, we propose a dispositional account of war crimes that emphasizes the ways in which war crimes can be conceived of as expressions of combatants’ character traits and moral agency. This account draws on a social cognitivist theory of personality according to which personality is best construed as a Cognitive-Affective Personality System (CAPS). We argue that military training and culture leads to the development of CAPS traits in military personnel by interacting with and shaping their goals, actions, beliefs, and emotions related to their military service.

scholarly journals Virtue, Vice, and Situationism

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Bates ◽  
Pauline Kleingeld
Keyword(s):  
Large Class ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Global Character

On the basis of psychological research, a group of philosophers known as “situationists” argue that the evidence belies the existence of broad (“global”) character traits. They argue that this condemns as psychologically unrealistic those traditions in moral theory in which global virtues are upheld as ideals. After a survey of the debate to date, this chapter argues that the thesis of situationism is ill-supported by the available evidence. Situationists overlook the explanatory potential of a large class of global vices, namely, vices that do not involve other-directed malevolence, such as laziness, cowardice, and selfishness. A detailed discussion of the relevant empirical studies bearing on moral psychology shows that once one takes seriously the possibility that such vices are widespread, global character traits may well turn out to be abundant.

The Case for Nietzschean Moral Psychology

2019 ◽  
pp. 162-180
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter ◽  
Joshua Knobe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Relative Influence ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
Human Psychology ◽  
Conscious Decision

This chapter (co-authored with Joshua Knobe) reviews a vast body of evidence from empirical psychology—for example, concerning the role of conscious decision in behavior, and the relative influence of heritability versus upbringing on character traits—demonstrating the superiority of Nietzsche’s moral psychology, as defended throughout the book, to the moral psychologies associated with Aristotle and Kant, which are based on false and often fantastic assumptions about human psychology.

scholarly journals Phenomenal roles: a dispositional account of bodily pain

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Gozzano
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Bodily Pain ◽  
Phenomenal Property ◽  
Dispositional Property ◽  
Dispositional Account ◽  
Fundamental Properties ◽  
Per Se

AbstractIn this paper I argue that bodily pain, as a phenomenal property, is an essentially and substantial dispositional property. To this end, I maintain that this property is individuated by its phenomenal roles, which can be internal -individuating the property per se- and external -determining further phenomenal or physical properties or states. I then argue that this individuation allows phenomenal roles to be organized in a necessarily asymmetrical net, thereby overcoming the circularity objection to dispositionalism. Finally, I provide reasons to argue that these roles satisfy modal fixity, as posited by Bird, and are not fundamental properties, contra Chalmers’ panpsychism. Thus, bodily pain can be considered a substantial dispositional property entrenched in non-fundamental laws of nature.

Benevolence: A Minor Virtue

1987 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Kekes
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Requirement ◽  
A Minor ◽  
Sense Of Justice

Morality requires us to act for the good of others. This is not the only moral requirement there is, and it is, of course, controversial where the good of others lies. But whatever their good is, there can be no serious doubt that acting so as to bring it about is one crucial obligation morality places on us. Yet the nature of this obligation is unclear, because there are difficult questions about its aim and about the motivational sources required for realizing it. Who are the others for whose good we are obligated to act? Are they only people in our immediate context, or members of our society, or all human beings? And, as a matter of moral psychology, what leads us to honor this obligation? Is it a sense of justice, decency, prudence, benevolence, or some combination of these and perhaps other virtues? The answers we give will shape our understanding of the nature of the obligation. For the character traits which we think should move us will influence the choice of people we aim to benefit and the inclusiveness we attribute to the obligation will affect the motives we wish to cultivate in ourselves and others.

Plato on Recognition of Political Leaders: the Importance of Mirrored Character Traits

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-289
Author(s):  
Leo Catana
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Leader ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Dominant Character ◽  
Political Candidates ◽  
Civic Institutions

Abstract This article argues for two inter-related theses keyed to Plato’s Gorgias. (I) Callicles does not represent a constitutional form, but political participation itself, characterised by ambition, competition among political candidates, and the psychological and ethical mechanisms entailed in the process of gaining political recognition. (II) According to Socrates’s understanding, the political leader’s mirroring and internalisation of dominant character traits, held amongst those individuals transferring power, is decisive to the approval bestowed upon the political leader in question. This reading supplements that of Ober, who has claimed that the would-be political leader’s conformity with the demos’ ideology is decisive. This article argues that Socrates’ point is that a would-be political leader needs to mirror the character traits of those exercising power in specific civic institutions, implying a more pluralistic and context-determined approach. Moreover, this reading connects Socrates’ notion of recognition with that of moral psychology.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document