scholarly journals Virtue, Vice, and Situationism

Author(s):  
Tom Bates ◽  
Pauline Kleingeld

On the basis of psychological research, a group of philosophers known as “situationists” argue that the evidence belies the existence of broad (“global”) character traits. They argue that this condemns as psychologically unrealistic those traditions in moral theory in which global virtues are upheld as ideals. After a survey of the debate to date, this chapter argues that the thesis of situationism is ill-supported by the available evidence. Situationists overlook the explanatory potential of a large class of global vices, namely, vices that do not involve other-directed malevolence, such as laziness, cowardice, and selfishness. A detailed discussion of the relevant empirical studies bearing on moral psychology shows that once one takes seriously the possibility that such vices are widespread, global character traits may well turn out to be abundant.

Author(s):  
T.J. Kasperbauer

This chapter applies the psychological account from chapter 3 on how we rank human beings above other animals, to the particular case of using mental states to assign animals moral status. Experiments on the psychology of mental state attribution are discussed, focusing on their implications for human moral psychology. The chapter argues that attributions of phenomenal states, like emotions, drive our assignments of moral status. It also describes how this is significantly impacted by the process of dehumanization. Psychological research on anthropocentrism and using animals as food and as companions is discussed in order to illuminate the relationship between dehumanization and mental state attribution.


2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 439-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Wettersten

Two sharply separated traditions in the philosophy of science and in thought psychology began with Otto Selz’s psychology. The first tradition began with Karl Popper; it has been developed by many others. The developers of the second tradition have included Julius Bahle, Adriaan de Groot, Herbert Simon, and Gerd Gigerenzer. The first tradition has ignored empirical studies of thought processes. The second tradition is widely based on Simon’s inductivist philosophy. The first tradition can be improved by integrating empirical studies of rationality into its research. The second tradition can be improved by replacing its inductivist assumptions with a fallibilist framework.


2021 ◽  
pp. 009164712110219
Author(s):  
T. Ryan Byerly ◽  
Keith J. Edwards ◽  
Peter C. Hill

Researchers in several academic disciplines have begun to take an interest in group character traits, including the character traits of religious congregations. This article reports the first empirical studies of congregational virtues. The Congregational Character Questionnaire was developed for measuring 12 different virtues of Christian churches: clinging to apostolic teaching, honoring teachers, prayerfulness, hopefulness, discipleship, emotional supportiveness, material supportiveness, spiritual equality, unity, submission, peace with the world, and spreading the faith. The instrument was then used with an online sample ( N = 530) to study how congregants’ perceptions of their congregation’s virtuousness related to congregants’ evaluations of their congregation, participation in their congregation, as well as congregants’ satisfaction with life, presence of meaning in life, and religious well-being. Results indicated that congregants’ overall perceptions of congregational virtuousness were significantly positively related to all of these dependent variables. These results help to reveal the important role that congregational character may play in the experience of congregants. Directions for future research in this area are outlined.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Wade Reardon ◽  
Avante J Smack ◽  
Kathrin Herzhoff ◽  
Jennifer L Tackett

Although an emphasis on adequate sample size and statistical power has a long history in clinical psychological science (Cohen, 1992), increased attention to the replicability of scientific findings has again turned attention to the importance of statistical power (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012). These recent efforts have not yet circled back to modern clinical psychological research, despite the continued importance of sample size and power in producing a credible body of evidence. As one step in this process of scientific self-examination, the present study estimated an N-pact Factor (the statistical power of published empirical studies to detect typical effect sizes; Fraley & Vazire, 2014) in two leading clinical journals (the Journal of Abnormal Psychology; JAP, and the Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology; JCCP) for the years 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015. Study sample size, as one proxy for statistical power, is a useful focus because it allows direct comparisons with other subfields and may highlight some of the core methodological differences between clinical and other areas (e.g., hard-to-reach populations, greater emphasis on correlational designs). We found that, across all years examined, the average median sample size in clinical research is 179 participants (175 for JAP and 182 for JCCP). The power to detect a small-medium effect size of .20 is just below 80% for both journals. Although the clinical N-pact factor was higher than that estimated for social psychology, the statistical power in clinical journals is still limited to detect many effects of interest to clinical psychologists, with little evidence of improvement in sample sizes over time.


2021 ◽  
pp. 105-114
Author(s):  
John M. Doris

This chapter was originally a contribution to a book symposium on Robert Adams’ A Theory of Virtue (2006), which develops an extended response to the arguments for character skepticism put forth in Doris’ Lack of Character (2002). It is argued that despite the differences between them, the works are actually in considerable agreement, both methodologically and substantively, when it comes to the fundamentals of moral psychology. Both sides agree that philosophical moral psychology ought to be empirically informed, and both sides agree that traditional conceptions of character traits require revision in light of empirical information.


2020 ◽  
pp. 93-107
Author(s):  
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski

This chapter defends the view that intellectual virtues are deep and enduring acquired intellectual excellences, supported by the underlying idea in Exemplarist Moral Theory that excellences are admirable traits, and admirable traits are those that people admire on reflection and that have features identified in empirical studies. The intellectual virtues require both admirable intellectual motivations and reliable success in reaching the truth, and the defense of this claim is that that is what people admire on reflection. The connection of intellectual virtue with moral virtue also explains admirable states like wisdom that are recently getting attention in philosophy and psychology after a long period of neglect.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-300
Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan ◽  
Russell Powell

Abstract Commentators on The Evolution of Moral Progress: A Biocultural Theory raise a number of metaethical and moral concerns with our analysis, as well as some complaints regarding how we have interpreted and made use of the contemporary evolutionary and social sciences of morality. Some commentators assert that one must already presuppose a moral theory before one can even begin to theorize moral progress; others query whether the shift toward greater inclusion is really a case of moral progress, or whether our theory can be properly characterized as ‘naturalistic’. Other commentators worry that we have uncritically accepted the prevailing evolutionary explanation of morality, even though it gives short shrift to the role of women or presupposes an oversimplified view of the environment in which the core elements of human moral psychology are thought to have congealed. Another commentator laments that we did not make more extensive use of data from the social sciences. In this reply, we engage with all of these constructive criticisms and show that although some of them are well taken, none undermine the core thesis of our book.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 616-625 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristopher M. Smith ◽  
Coren L. Apicella

To the extent that moral character is grounded in stable and observable truths, there should exist agreement between people in their judgments of others’ character. In Western populations, this agreement is found. We examine whether this is universal in Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania. Ninety-four judges ranked their campmates on global character and relevant character traits for a total of 802 observations. Judges disagreed on rankings of global character, generosity, and honesty but agreed more on hard work and hunting ability. Individual rankings on specific traits predicted character evaluations. There was agreement between judges on the extent to which generosity and hard work related to character. These findings suggest that Hadza have shared beliefs about what traits constitute character but disagree on which of their campmates exhibit these traits. We discuss these findings in light of other research suggesting that stable moral dispositions may not be universal.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heidi L. Maibom

Many spectacular claims about psychopaths are circulated. This contribution aims at providing the reader with the more complex reality of the phenomenon (or phenomena), and to point to issues of particular interest to philosophers working in moral psychology and moral theory. I first discuss the current evidence regarding psychopaths’ deficient empathy and decision-making skills. I then explore what difference it makes to our thinking whether we regard their deficit dimensionally (as involving abilities that are on or off) and whether we focus on primary or secondary psychopathy. My conclusion is that most grand claims about psychopathy settling long-standing debates in moral philosophy and psychology are overblown, but there is much to be learnt from this disorder when it comes to formulating modern theories of moral psychology.


2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman

Abstract:Solomon argues that, although recent research in social psychology has important implications for business ethics, it does not undermine an approach that stresses virtue ethics. However, he underestimates the empirical threat to virtue ethics, and his a priori claim that empirical research cannot overturn our ordinary moral psychology is overstated. His appeal to seemingly obvious differences in character traits between people simply illustrates the fundamental attribution error. His suggestion that the Milgram and Darley and Batson experiments have to do with such character traits as obedience and punctuality cannot help to explain the relevant differences in the way people behave in different situations. His appeal to personality theory fails, because, as an intellectual academic discipline, personality theory is in shambles, mainly because it has been concerned with conceptions of personality rather than with what is true about personality. Solomon’s rejection of Doris’s claims about the fragmentation of character is at odds with the received view in social psychology. Finally, he is mistaken to think that rejecting virtue ethics implies rejecting free will and moral responsibility.


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