Making Good
Keyword(s):
This chapter assesses the “skill analogy” prominent in virtue ethics, which proposes that virtue be understood as a kind of expertise. Using the performance science literature, with special attention to skill development in chess, it is argued that the skill analogy is empirically undersupported, because a surprisingly limited amount is known about the development of skills in general, and “moral skills” in particular. It is further argued, given what is known about the domain specificity of expertise, that if virtues are to be understood along the lines of skills, they will have to be understood as highly domain specific, rather than as the highly general virtues of tradition.
2009 ◽
Vol 31
(2)
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pp. 291-321
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2015 ◽
Vol 39
(3)
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pp. 326-345
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2013 ◽
Vol 30
(2)
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pp. 171-190
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
1998 ◽
Vol 21
(4)
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pp. 588-589
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