Introduction

Author(s):  
Anik Waldow ◽  
Nigel DeSouza

This interview explores Charles Taylor’s understanding of philosophical anthropology and its relationship to Herder. Taylor argues that human culture can be properly understood only in a genetic fashion, through hermeneutics and phenomenology, and names Herder as an important precursor here. Taylor illustrates this through the difference between a purely normative political theory and a contextual political philosophy. On the relationship between naturalism and philosophical anthropology, Taylor identifies what he calls a “good naturalism,” associated with Herder, that explains what kind of animal human beings are, and a “bad naturalism” that explains human beings in reductive, natural scientific terms. Finally, Taylor outlines his current work on language, in which a similar opposition arises, between language as necessarily emerging as a rich set of language games/practices and language as pure description. Theories of language that interpret it only in terms of the latter are thus fundamentally flawed and inaccurate.

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 135-146
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic

In this paper I will explore the importance of making the difference between the reasonable and the rational for normative political theory. The starting point of my analysis is Rawls?s distinction between the rational and the reasonable in his later political philosophy. For Rawls one of the main characteristics of reasonable persons is that they are able to offer the justifications for their actions, but also for fair principles of cooperation, in terms of reasons that all can accept. There are many criticisms of this view of reasonable persons and its role within normative political theory. My main concern, however, is whether the presupposition of reasonableness is necessary if one already assumes that all individuals are rational. I will argue that not only the reasonable, but the relationship between the reasonable and the rational is crucially important for normative political theory.


Author(s):  
Fen LIN

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English only.In the dominant discourse of the "human–machine relationship," people and machines are the subjects, with a mutually shaping influence. However, this framework neglects the crux of the current critical analysis of AI. It reduces the problems with new technology to the relationship between people and machines, ignoring the re-shaping of the relationship between "people and people" in the era of new technology. This simplification may mislead policy and legal regulations for new technologies. Why would a robot killing cause more panic than a murder committed by a human? Why is a robot's misdiagnosis more troubling than a doctor's? Why do patients assume that machines make more accurate diagnoses than doctors? When a medical accident occurs, who is responsible for the mistakes of an intelligent medical system? In the framework of traditional professionalism, the relationship between doctors and patients, whether trusted or not, is based on the premise that doctors have specialized knowledge that patients do not possess. Therefore, the authority of a doctor is the authority of knowledge. In the age of intelligence, do machines provide information or knowledge? Can this strengthen or weaken the authority of doctors? It is likely that in the age of intelligence, the professionalism, authority and trustworthiness of doctors require a new knowledge base. Therefore, the de-skilling of doctors is not an issue of individual doctors, but demands an update of the knowledge of the entire industry. Recognizing this, policy makers must not focus solely on the use of machines, but take a wider perspective, considering how to promote the development of doctors and coordinate the relationship between doctors with different levels of knowledge development. We often ask, "In the era of intelligence, what defines a human?" This philosophical thinking should be directed toward not only the difference between machines and people as individuals, but also how the relationship between human beings, i.e., the social nature of humans, evolves in different technological environments. In short, this commentary stresses that a "good" machine or an "evil" machine—beyond the sci-fi romance of such discourse—reflects the evolution of the relationships between people. In today's smart age, the critical issue is not the relationship between people and machines. It is how people adjust their relationships with other people as machines become necessary tools in life. In the era of intelligence, therefore, our legislation, policy and ethical discussion should resume their focus on evolutionary relationships between people.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 41 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


Author(s):  
James Gouinlock

The philosophy of John Dewey is original and comprehensive. His extensive writings contend systematically with problems in metaphysics, epistemology, logic, aesthetics, ethics, social and political philosophy, philosophy and education, and philosophical anthropology. Although his work is widely read, it is not widely understood. Dewey had a distinctive conception of philosophy, and the key to understanding and benefiting from his work is to keep this conception in mind. A worthwhile philosophy, he urged, must be practical. Philosophic inquiry, that is, ought to take its point of departure from the aspirations and problems characteristic of the various sorts of human activity, and an effective philosophy would develop ideas responsive to those conditions. Any system of ideas that has the effect of making common experience less intelligible than we find it to be is on that account a failure. Dewey’s theory of inquiry, for example, does not entertain a conception of knowledge that makes it problematic whether we can know anything at all. Inasmuch as scientists have made extraordinary advances in knowledge, it behoves the philosopher to find out exactly what scientists do, rather than to question whether they do anything of real consequence. Moral philosophy, likewise, should not address the consternations of philosophers as such, but the characteristic urgencies and aspirations of common life; and it should attempt to identify the resources and limitations of human nature and the environment with which it interacts. Human beings might then contend effectively with the typical perplexities and promises of mortal existence. To this end, Dewey formulated an exceptionally innovative and far-reaching philosophy of morality and democracy. The subject matter of philosophy is not philosophy, Dewey liked to say, but ‘problems of men’. All too often, he found, the theories of philosophers made the primary subject matter more obscure rather than less so. The tendency of thinkers is to become bewitched by inherited philosophic puzzles, when the persistence of the puzzle is a consequence of failing to consider the assumptions that created it. Dewey was gifted in discerning and discarding the philosophic premises that create needless mysteries. Rather than fret, for instance, about the question of how immaterial mental substance can possibly interact with material substance, he went to the root of the problem by challenging the notion of substance itself. Indeed, Dewey’s dissatisfaction with the so-called classic tradition in philosophy, stemming at least from Plato if not from Parmenides, led him to reconstruct the entire inheritance of the Western tradition in philosophy. The result is one of the most seminal and fruitful philosophies of the twentieth century.


Kant-Studien ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 107 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Horn

Abstract:Kant’s political philosophy confronts its interpreters with a crucial difficulty: it is far from clear if (or how) Kant, in his political theory, makes use of the Categorical Imperative (CI). It is notoriously demanding to clarify the relationship that exists between his political thought on the one hand and the ethics of the


2001 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANTONIO FRANCESCHET

This article explores a fundamental division among contemporary liberal internationalists regarding the relationship between state sovereignty and the goal of freedom. The article suggests that, in spite of his popular status among a wide variety of contemporary liberal international theorists, Immanuel Kant's political philosophy is an extraordinarily ambiguous ‘legacy’ because of the dualistic doctrine of state sovereignty to which he subscribed. Kant's thought is committed to state sovereignty while providing the grounds for a profound critique of its existence. The reason that sovereignty is ambiguous in Kant's political theory is that it is justified by his bifurcated understanding of human freedom.


1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-250
Author(s):  
Charles Butterworth

This is a "work in progress" presentation based on mearch I am nowconducting about the development of Islamic political philosophy duringthe classical period of Islam. My contention is that a better understandingof that tradition puts the current debate about Islamic fundamentalism orresurgence into a new perspective. Behind the sensational, popular demandsfor greater adherence to the strictures of the revealed law of Islamlies an issue of fundamental importance: how divine revelation is to beunderstd and interpreted for political guidance. Those who developedIslamic political philosophy spoke directly to this issue and did so in amanner that merits the attention of contemporary Muslim activists, scholarsinterested in Islam, and thoughtful human beings in general. Theythought clearly about the relationship between religious belief andpolitical practice because they addressed the issue ditectly and withoutpreconceptions. Consequently, whatever our religious and cultural origins,we can benefit greatly from their teaching.One of my goals is to refocus current social science scholarship whileengaging Muslim scholars in debate on topics they deem urgent. Lately,there have been many, perhaps too many, reports and prognostics concerningthe success of resurgent Islam as well as the challenges it posesto Middle Eastern and western regimes. Such studies invariably talkabout, rather than with, those calling for greater attention to Islamic preceptsand practices; they presuppose and reinforce an attitude of "us" and"our valued' vetSUS "them" and "their values." Such a posture not onlyfosters antagonism and misunderstanding, it also ignores the way Muslimsare now addressing this complex phenomenon.Indeed, for almost a decade, Muslims trained in the West have beeninvestigating how western learning, especially the social sciences, illuminatestraditional Islamic sciences and vice versa. This task addresses, atthe highest level, the issue behind the call for application of the Shari'ahand offers the best Contemporary possibility of achieving some kind ofintercultural understanding. It offers those interested in western and Islamicculture a unique opportunity to delve mare deeply into another cultureand thereby understand the other and their own culture better.Another goal is to investigate how philosophers within the classicalperiod of Islam understood revelation and its outward manifestationprophecy-to influence political life. While mast scholars recognize the ...


Author(s):  
Karl Widerquist ◽  
Grant S. McCall

Because this book involves two very different academic disciplines, political philosophy and anthropology, some background about the relevant topics in each one is helpful. In this chapter, Section 1 introduces the relevant political theory. Section 2 discusses some of the anthropological methods and conceptual issues involved in the examination of the evidence relevant to these philosophical arguments. Section 3 discusses how the state and the state of nature are defined in relation to each other. Section 4 addresses some responses this book is likely to receive. Section 5 discusses the relationship between this book and modern indigenous peoples.


Author(s):  
Will Kymlicka

This edition provides an introduction to the major schools of thought that dominate contemporary debates in political philosophy. The focus is on theories which have attracted a certain allegiance, and which offer a more or less comprehensive vision of the ideals of politics. The text examines the notion, advanced by Ronald Dworkin, that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality. It considers another, more abstract and more fundamental, idea of equality in political theory — namely, the idea of treating people ‘as equals’. It also explores what it might mean for libertarianism to have freedom as its foundational value, or for utilitarianism to have utility as its foundational value. Finally, it analyses the relationship between moral and political philosophy and argues that the ultimate test of a theory of justice is that it should be concordant with, and help illuminate, our convictions of justice.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 148
Author(s):  
Elijah Okon John ◽  
Joseph Ajuluchukwu Uka

<p><em>Aristotle’s socio-political theory emphasizes the belief that human beings are naturally political. Aristotelian ideals that the political life of a free citizen is a sovereign state which provides for the well-being of the citizenry is the highest form of life. Thus, his idea of free citizenship immediately introduces the concept of limitations between citizens—the free and the not free, the masters and the slave. The consequence of his political theory is the introduction of inequality among the members of the society but the question is: was Aristotle right in justifying social inequality? The answer to it embodies the major issues of this work. How we can evaluate Aristotle’s positive and negative socio-political theories is one of the concerns of this paper. Effort will be made to critically explicate the good aspects of his theory as well as drawing a synthesis from the critique of the condemnable aspects of Aristotle’s political philosophy in fashioning out a formidable route for African political leaders.</em><em></em></p>


2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-438 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Haugaard

While Lukes’ view of power as an ‘essentially contested concept’ is a move in the right direction, it does not go far enough because it falls short of arguing for a plural view of power. Power constitutes a ‘family resemblance concept’, with family members forming complex relationships within overlapping language games. Members include, among others: episodic power, dispositional power, systemic power, power to, power over, empowerment, legitimate power and domination. This argument does not entail relativism or that ‘anything goes’, as all usages have to be justified as ‘conceptual tools’, whereby pragmatic criteria of usefulness, rather than essence, define better or worse usage. When moving language games, the relationship between signifier and referent changes, which leads to confusion, unless the family resemblance nature of power is understood. In the literature, the most significant confusion has taken place between sociological analytic and normative political theory language games.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document