Revisiting privileged access

Author(s):  
Paul L Harris

Children are prone to similar errors in attributing beliefs (or belief-based emotions) to themselves or to another person. Children also display no obvious advantage or accuracy in talking about their own mental states compared with those of other people. By implication, children have no special access to their own mental states. However, a closer examination of children’s reference to knowing and not knowing, shows that they talk asymmetrically about their own knowledge as compared with that of an interlocutor. More specifically, young children—two-year-olds—ask questions about what others know but not about what they know themselves. Conversely, they deny that they have knowledge but rarely deny that others have knowledge. The data imply that children have privileged access to, and less uncertainty about, their own knowledge states as compared with those of other people. Potential implications for future research on children’s developing theory of mind are discussed.

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (5) ◽  
pp. 897-905 ◽  
Author(s):  
RHIANNON CORCORAN ◽  
CHRISTOPHER D. FRITH

Background. It has been proposed that inferences about the mental states of others are drawn after a referral to autobiographical memory. This study explored the relationship between autobiographical memory retrieval and performance on tests of theory of mind in people with schizophrenia.Method. Fifty-nine people with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia and 44 healthy participants matched for age, sex and estimated IQ were given the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI), two measures of theory of mind (ToM) and a logical memory test.Results. There was clear evidence that the people with schizophrenia were under-performing on all tasks. Within the schizophrenia sample, robust relationships existed between the total scores achieved on the AMI and the ToM tasks. Furthermore, there was evidence that the participants with schizophrenia had a tendency to recollect odd or negative events when prompted by the standard questions of the AMI.Conclusions. The results of this study indicate that when people with schizophrenia attempt to think about the beliefs and intentions of others they use analogical reasoning. Whether this approach is also adopted by other clinical and normal adult groups is a question for future research.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Lewis ◽  
Christopher Krupenye

Social life demands complex strategies for coordinating and competing with others. In humans, these strategies are supported by rich cognitive mechanisms, such as theory of mind. Theory of mind (i.e., mental state attribution, mentalizing, or mindreading) is the ability to track the unobservable mental states, like desires and beliefs, that guide others’ actions. Deeply social animals, like most nonhuman primates, would surely benefit from the adept capacity to interpret and predict others’ behavior that theory of mind affords. Yet, after forty years of investigation, the extent to which nonhuman primates represent the minds of others remains a topic of contentious debate. In the present chapter, we review evidence consistent with the possibility that monkeys and apes are capable of inferring others’ goals, perceptions, and beliefs. We then evaluate the quality of that evidence and point to the most prominent alternative explanations to be addressed by future research. Finally, we take a more broadly phylogenetic perspective, to identify evolutionary modifications to social cognition that have emerged throughout primate evolutionary history and to consider the selective pressures that may have driven those modifications. Taken together, this approach sheds light on the complex mechanisms that define the social minds of humans and other primates.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 01-08
Author(s):  
Giulio Perrotta

The concept of "Theory of Mind" (ToM) is defined as the cognitive ability to represent one's own and others' mental states, in terms of thoughts and beliefs, but also of desires, demands and feelings, so that one can explain and predict behaviour. In this work the theoretical profiles, the main reference models, the related neurobiological and clinical profiles are analysed, orienting future research on the question whether or not it is interesting to further investigate the theoretical aspects under examination, such as empathy and the perception of the self and the other in relation to the neurobiological components, to draw a common line able to connect the loss of these functions with the accentuation or the onset of certain pathologies, wondering whether it is the functional compromises of these capacities and functions that cause the psychopathological condition to arise or whether it is rather the disease that induces the dysfunctional modification of these capacities or functions.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Rice Warnell ◽  
Elizabeth Redcay

Theory of mind—or the understanding that others have mental states that can differ from one’s own and reality—is currently measured across the lifespan by a wide array of tasks. These tasks vary across dimensions including modality, complexity, affective content, and whether responses are explicit or implicit. As a result, theoretical and meta-analytic work has begun to question whether such varied approaches to theory of mind should be categorized as capturing a single construct. To directly address the coherence of theory of mind, and to determine whether that coherence changes across development, we administered a diverse set of theory of mind measures to three different samples: preschoolers, school-aged children, and adults. All tasks showed wide variability in performance, indicating that children and adults often have inconsistent and partial mastery of theory of mind concepts. Further, for all ages studied, the selected theory of mind tasks showed minimal correlations with each other. That is, having high levels of theory of mind on one task did not predict performance on another task designed to measure the same underlying ability. In addition to showing the importance of more carefully designing and selecting theory of mind measures, these findings also suggest that understanding others’ internal states may be a multidimensional process that interacts with other abilities, a process which may not occur in a single conceptual framework. Future research should systematically investigate task coherence via large-scale and longitudinal efforts to determine how we come to understand the minds of others.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth C. Enevoldsen ◽  
Peter Thestrup Waade

Computational implementations of Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to others, has been used to investigate a variety of issues. This includes the effect of framing effects on, or inter-species differences in, ability to do ToM (Devaine et al., 2014a, 2017), ToM in autists (d’Arc et al., 2018), or providing an explanation for the apparent limits on human ability to do ToM recursively (Devaine et al., 2014b). It has been implemented in the VBA package for Matlab (Daunizeau et al., 2014), but not in any free and open-source software. Therefore this thesis presents the Theory of Mind simulation using Python (tomsup) package.The tomsup package provides accessible tools for running agent-based models in a game theory context, and allows the implementation of a computational model of ToM, either in agent-based models or in interaction with a human player. The implementation of the ToM model was originally proposed by Yoshida et al. (2008), and was developed by drawing on the Free Energy Principle (Friston, 2010) to its current form as it is in Devaine et al. (2017), where it is generalized to any 2-player game which can be operationalized as a 2-by-2 payoff matrix. Importantly, the ToM implementation introduces a sophistication level k, which determines how many recursive simulations of its opponent it can perform, hereby assuming bounded rationality (Kahneman, 2003). An agent using the ToM model, denoted as k-ToM, uses a variational Bayes Laplace approximation (Daunizeau, 2017b) on a turn-by-turn basis to infer its opponent’s model parameters and sophistication level, based on which it predicts the opponent’s choice and acts accordingly.An agent-based model simulation using the competitive matching pennies game was done to perform a prelim- inary investigation of the behaviour of the k-ToM model. Most importantly, it was found that k-ToM’s prior beliefs about its opponent have a notable effect on its performance, even over many trials, warranting further research into how its priors should be formed. Various ways are suggested in which the tomsup package and the k-ToM model could be applied and developed further, as well as a discussion on how to make it broadly available, so as to scaffold future research using computational ToM models.


2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Megan J. Bulloch ◽  
Ellen E. Furlong ◽  
Klaree J. Boose ◽  
Sarah T. Boysen

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Judith Mildner ◽  
Diana Tamir

One can never know the internal workings of another person – one can only infer others’ mental states based on external cues. In contrast, each person has direct access to the contents of their own mind. Here we test the hypothesis that this privileged access shapes the way people represent internal mental experiences, such that they represent their own mental states more distinctly than the states of others. Across four studies, participants considered their own and others’ mental states; analyses measured the distinctiveness of mental state representations. Two neuroimaging studies used representational similarity analyses to demonstrate that the social brain manifests more distinct activity patterns when thinking about one’s own states versus others’. Two behavioral studies support these findings. Further, they demonstrate that people differentiate between states less as social distance increases. Together these results suggest that we represent our own mind with greater granularity than the minds of others.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Foyzul Rahman ◽  
Sabrina Javed ◽  
Ian Apperly ◽  
Peter Hansen ◽  
Carol Holland ◽  
...  

Age-related decline in Theory of Mind (ToM) may be due to waning executive control, which is necessary for resolving conflict when reasoning about others’ mental states. We assessed how older (OA; n=50) versus younger adults (YA; n=50) were affected by three theoretically relevant sources of conflict within ToM: competing Self-Other perspectives; competing cued locations and outcome knowledge. We examined which best accounted for age-related difficulty with ToM. Our data show unexpected similarity between age groups when representing a belief incongruent with one’s own. Individual differences in attention and motor response speed best explained the degree of conflict experienced through conflicting Self-Other perspectives. However, OAs were disproportionately affected by managing conflict between cued locations. Age and spatial working memory were most relevant for predicting the magnitude of conflict elicited by conflicting cued locations. We suggest that previous studies may have underestimated OA’s ToM proficiency by including unnecessary conflict in ToM tasks.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas James Rowark

Depression has been associated with poor social cognitive functioning, including impaired performance on measures of theory of mind. However, the association between depression and theory of mind performance has been removed when controlling for differences in executive functioning, which is also impacted by depression. Among these executive functions, inhibition of prepotent response has been demonstrated as enabling success on theory of mind tests. In the context of these findings, the current investigation tested whether a relationship could be found between depressive traits and theory of mind in a non-clinical sample, and whether this relationship was mediated by differences in executive control of inhibition. Theory of mind was assessed in 31 healthy individuals using an audio-presented false-belief reasoning task, which also tested baseline performance in non-mental-state reasoning. Inhibition of prepotent response was assessed with interference measures on a Stroop colour-word task, and depressive traits were self-reported through the second version of the Beck Depression Inventory. Mediation analysis revealed that executive control of inhibition did not significantly mediate an indirect effect of depressive traits on theory of mind. It was interpreted that relationships previously found between major depression, executive and social-cognitive functions do not generalise beyond clinical boundaries. However, these findings are discussed in terms of the small sample size, limiting statistical power, and several methodological limitations. Future research should assess the relationship between depressive traits and theory of mind using alternative measures of mental representation, or include a neurocognitive battery assessing executive functions other than inhibition.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Elena Botts

This article aims at explicating that can we usefully talk about a failure of intelligence and deliberating the perspective of mind theory into it. Failures of intelligence are useful insofar as they can be evaluated so as to improve analysis. In this process, it is important that one considers the psychological processes that underpin analytical failures. It is especially important to consider how failures of intelligence are governed by an insufficient ability to understand the perspectives of others. This ability to determine others mental states is known as the theory of mind. This paper further argues that discourse on the failure of intelligence is increased because of a flaw in the epistemic process among intelligence operators and consumers.


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