scholarly journals The Theory of Mind (ToM): theoretical, neurobiological and clinical profiles

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 01-08
Author(s):  
Giulio Perrotta
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Reference Models ◽  
Common Line ◽  
Clinical Profiles

The concept of "Theory of Mind" (ToM) is defined as the cognitive ability to represent one's own and others' mental states, in terms of thoughts and beliefs, but also of desires, demands and feelings, so that one can explain and predict behaviour. In this work the theoretical profiles, the main reference models, the related neurobiological and clinical profiles are analysed, orienting future research on the question whether or not it is interesting to further investigate the theoretical aspects under examination, such as empathy and the perception of the self and the other in relation to the neurobiological components, to draw a common line able to connect the loss of these functions with the accentuation or the onset of certain pathologies, wondering whether it is the functional compromises of these capacities and functions that cause the psychopathological condition to arise or whether it is rather the disease that induces the dysfunctional modification of these capacities or functions.

scholarly journals Knowing me, knowing you: Spontaneous use of mentalistic language for self and other in autism

Autism ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 136236132095101
Author(s):  
Alexandra Zinck ◽  
Uta Frith ◽  
Peter Schönknecht ◽  
Sarah White
Keyword(s):  
Similar Pattern ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Psychological Traits ◽  
Unique Pattern ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
Autistic People ◽  
Physical Traits ◽  
Autistic Adults

Recent studies on mentalizing have shown that autistic individuals who pass explicit mentalizing tasks may still have difficulties with implicit mentalizing tasks. This study explores implicit mentalizing by examining spontaneous speech that is likely to contain mentalistic expressions. The spontaneous production of meta-statements provides a clear measure for implicit mentalizing that is unlikely to be learned through experience. We examined the self- and other-descriptions of highly verbally able autistic and non-autistic adults in terms of their spontaneous use of mentalistic language and meta-representational utterances through quantitative and qualitative analysis. We devised a hierarchical coding system that allowed us to study the types of statements produced in comparable conditions for the self and for a familiar other. The descriptions of autistic participants revealed less mentalistic content relating to psychological traits and meta-statements. References to physical traits were similar between groups. Within each group, participants produced a similar pattern of types of mental utterance across ‘self’ and ‘other’ conditions. This suggests that autistic individuals show a unique pattern of mental-state-representation for both self and other. Meta-statements add a degree of complexity to self- and other-descriptions and to the understanding of mental states; their reduction in autism provides evidence for implicit mentalizing difficulties. Lay abstract Autistic people can have difficulties in understanding non-autistic people’s mental states such as beliefs, emotions and intentions. Although autistic adults may learn to overcome difficulties in understanding of explicit (overt) mental states, they may nevertheless struggle with implicit (indirect) understanding of mental states. This study explores how spontaneous language is used in order to specifically point to this implicit (indirect) understanding of mental states. In particular, our study compares the spontaneous statements that were used in descriptions of oneself and a familiar other person. Here, we found that autistic and non-autistic adults were comparable in the number of statements about physical traits they made. In contrast, non-autistic adults made more statements about mentalistic traits (about the mental including psychological traits, relationship traits and statements reflecting about these) both for the self and the other. Non-autistic and autistic adults showed no difference in the number of statements about relationships but in the number of statements about psychological traits and especially in the statements reflecting on these. Each group showed a similar pattern of kinds of statements for the self and for the other person. This suggests that autistic individuals show the same unique pattern of description in mentalistic terms for the self and another person. This study also indicates that investigating spontaneous use of language, especially for statements reflecting about mental states, enables us to look into difficulties with implicit (indirect) understanding of mental states.

scholarly journals The Ape That Lived to Tell the Tale. The Evolution of the Art of Storytelling and Its Relationship to Mental Time Travel and Theory of Mind

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elias Garcia-Pelegrin ◽  
Clive Wilkins ◽  
Nicola S. Clayton
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Time Travel ◽  
The Self ◽  
Mental Time Travel ◽  
Present Condition ◽  
The Past ◽  
Time Space ◽  
The Future ◽  
Past Experiences

Engaging in the art of creating and telling stories is a defining behaviour of humankind. Humans have been sharing stories with each other, with and without words, since the dawn of recorded history, but the cognitive foundations of the behaviour can be traced deeper into our past. The emergence of stories can be strongly linked to Mental Time Travel (the ability to recall the past and imagine the future) and plays a key role in our ability to communicate past, present and future scenarios with other individuals, within and beyond our lifetimes. Stories are products engraved within the concept of time, constructed to elucidate the past experiences of the self, but designed with the future in mind, thus imparting lessons of such experiences to the receiver. By being privy to the experiences of others, humans can imagine themselves in a similar position to the protagonist of the story, thus mentally learning from an experience they might have never encountered other than in the mind's eye. Evolutionary Psychology investigates how the engagement in artistic endeavours by our ancestors in the Pleistocene granted them an advantage when confronted with obstacles that challenged their survival or reproductive fitness and questions whether art is an adaptation of the human mind or a spandrel of other cognitive adaptations. However, little attention has been placed on the cognitive abilities that might have been imperative for the development of art. Here, we examine the relationship between art, storytelling, Mental Time Travel and Theory of Mind (i.e., the ability to attribute mental states to others). We suggest that Mental Time Travel played a key role in the development of storytelling because through stories, humans can fundamentally transcend their present condition, by being able to imagine different times, separate realities, and place themselves and others anywhere within the time space continuum. We argue that the development of a Theory of Mind also sparked storytelling practises in humans as a method of diffusing the past experiences of the self to others whilst enabling the receiver to dissociate between the past experiences of others and their own, and to understand them as lessons for a possible future. We propose that when artistic products rely on storytelling in form and function, they ought to be considered separate from other forms of art whose appreciation capitalise on our aesthetic preferences.

scholarly journals Theory of Mind Increases Aesthetic Appreciation in Visual Arts

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Marina Iosifyan
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Causal Relationship ◽  
Visual Arts ◽  
Emotional State ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Aesthetic Appreciation ◽  
Aesthetic Cognition ◽  
Mental Characteristics

Abstract Theory of mind is a cognitive ability that enables us to understand mental states of others, important in real-life communications as well as in aesthetic cognition. The present research investigated whether understanding intentions and emotions is related to aesthetic appreciation. Study 1 tested whether there is a link between aesthetic appreciation of cinematic films and attempts to understand the intentions and emotions of the artists and the film characters. It showed that a self-reported understanding of emotions and intentions is positively associated with aesthetic appreciation. Studies 2 and 4 investigated a causal relationship between the attempt to understand emotions and an aesthetic appreciation of artistic photos. Study 3 investigated an actual understanding of emotions and aesthetic appreciation of movie shots. The results show that when people evaluate the emotional state of the characters, they aesthetically appreciate artistic photos more, compared to when they evaluate non-mental characteristics of these photos (age of the characters, the colour of the photos). Moreover, better understanding of another’s emotions is related to greater aesthetic appreciation.

scholarly journals Developmental evidence for enhanced theory of mind for competitive versus cooperative contexts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lily Tsoi ◽  
Kiley Hamlin ◽  
Adam Waytz ◽  
Andrew Scott Baron ◽  
Liane Young
Keyword(s):  
Preschool Children ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Interactions ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

There is a debate regarding the function of theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to infer, attribute, and reason about mental states. On the one hand are evolutionary and psychological work suggesting that ToM is greater for competition than cooperation. On the other hand are findings and theories promoting greater ToM for cooperation than competition. We investigate the question of whether ToM is greater for competition than cooperation or vice versa by examining the period of development during which explicit ToM comes online. In two studies, we examined preschool children’s abilities to explicitly express an understanding of false beliefs—a key marker of ToM—and ability to apply that understanding in first-person social interactions in competitive and cooperative contexts. Our findings reveal that preschool children are better at understanding false beliefs and applying that understanding in competitive contexts than in cooperative contexts.

Animation, Theory of Mind and Humanoid Robots: Creating a Social Robot Video Task

Leonardo ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Ziggy O’Reilly ◽  
David Silvera-Tawil ◽  
Ionat Zurr ◽  
Diana Tan
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Humanoid Robots ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social Robot ◽  
Autistic Children ◽  
Robot Assisted

Abstract Theory of Mind (ToM) —a social cognitive ability commonly under-developed in autistic individuals— is necessary to attribute mental states to oneself and others. Research into robot-assisted interventions to improve ToM ability in autistic children has become increasingly popular. However, no appropriate task currently exists to measure the degree of efficacy of robot-assisted interventions targeting ToM ability. In this paper, the authors demonstrate how animation techniques and principles can be leveraged to develop and produce videos of humanoid robots interacting, which could selectively measure ToM.

Autobiographical memory and theory of mind: evidence of a relationship in schizophrenia

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (5) ◽  
pp. 897-905 ◽  
Author(s):  
RHIANNON CORCORAN ◽  
CHRISTOPHER D. FRITH
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Autobiographical Memory ◽  
Analogical Reasoning ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Negative Events ◽  
The People ◽  
Two Measures ◽  
Under Performing ◽  
And Performance

Background. It has been proposed that inferences about the mental states of others are drawn after a referral to autobiographical memory. This study explored the relationship between autobiographical memory retrieval and performance on tests of theory of mind in people with schizophrenia.Method. Fifty-nine people with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia and 44 healthy participants matched for age, sex and estimated IQ were given the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI), two measures of theory of mind (ToM) and a logical memory test.Results. There was clear evidence that the people with schizophrenia were under-performing on all tasks. Within the schizophrenia sample, robust relationships existed between the total scores achieved on the AMI and the ToM tasks. Furthermore, there was evidence that the participants with schizophrenia had a tendency to recollect odd or negative events when prompted by the standard questions of the AMI.Conclusions. The results of this study indicate that when people with schizophrenia attempt to think about the beliefs and intentions of others they use analogical reasoning. Whether this approach is also adopted by other clinical and normal adult groups is a question for future research.

scholarly journals Constructing a Narrative in the Standard Unexpected Transfer Test in Adolescence and Adulthood

2010 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Białecka-Pikul ◽  
Marta Rynda ◽  
Daria Syrecka
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Transfer Test ◽  
Transfer Task ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Adolescents And Adults ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Way Of Thinking

Constructing a Narrative in the Standard Unexpected Transfer Test in Adolescence and Adulthood The aim of the presented research was the replication and extension of the research by Nelson, Plesa and Henseler (1998), which was the basis for examining the nature of the theory of mind or mentalizing ability (that is, the ability to attribute mental states to other people in order to explain and predict their behaviors) in adolescents and adults. Specifically, its experience-like versus theory-like character. The test, an unexpected transfer task (the Max story), was completed by 827 people aged 13 to 75 (average 21.9). Half of them were supposed to solve the task with a shorter version of the story (including only the facts), and the other half were given the longer version (including descriptions of emotions, beliefs of the protagonist and explanations of ongoing events). All of the answers were then categorized applying Nelson's classification and two other types of analysis. Gender, age and fields of interest were taken into account during analysis of the participants' answers. The Polish respondents rarely answered in a narrative way (only 13%, in contrast to Nelson's result of 46%). Despite the fact that age was not a factor corresponding to a narrative answer, it was proven that older respondents did indeed assume the first person perspective when justifying Max's behavior. Women, more often than men, appealed to the knowledge and the protagonist's way of thinking. The respondents' fields of interest did not seem to diversify the obtained results, nor did the version of the story. The results do not allow us to draw unambiguous conclusions about the nature of the adult's theory of mind, but they form the basis for analyzing the methodology of research on theory of mind.

Revisiting privileged access

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul L Harris
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Young Children ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Obvious Advantage ◽  
Knowledge States

Children are prone to similar errors in attributing beliefs (or belief-based emotions) to themselves or to another person. Children also display no obvious advantage or accuracy in talking about their own mental states compared with those of other people. By implication, children have no special access to their own mental states. However, a closer examination of children’s reference to knowing and not knowing, shows that they talk asymmetrically about their own knowledge as compared with that of an interlocutor. More specifically, young children—two-year-olds—ask questions about what others know but not about what they know themselves. Conversely, they deny that they have knowledge but rarely deny that others have knowledge. The data imply that children have privileged access to, and less uncertainty about, their own knowledge states as compared with those of other people. Potential implications for future research on children’s developing theory of mind are discussed.

How do people with schizophrenia explain the behaviour of others? A study of theory of mind and its relationship to thought and speech disorganization in schizophrenia

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
YVES SARFATI ◽  
MARIE-CHRISTINE HARDY-BAYLÉ
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Speech Disorders ◽  
Comic Strips ◽  
General Psychopathology ◽  
Normal Controls

Background. This paper examines the attribution of mental states to others in schizophrenia and its links with thought and speech disorganization.Methods. Two groups of schizophrenic subjects (15 with and 10 without thought and speech disorganization) were compared with 10 manic subjects and 15 normal controls on their pattern of answers to 14 theory of mind comic strips.Results. Schizophrenic subjects with disorganization and a more severe general psychopathology exhibited more unadaptated interpretations of others' mental states than those without disorganization or the manic or normal controls. Their explanation of other people's behaviour tended to be influenced by the frequency of their actions rather than their mental states.Conclusions. The disorganization pattern in schizophrenia may be associated with a specific deficit of the cognitive ability referred to as theory of mind, and this deficit could be a state rather than a trait variable. Patients with thought and speech disorders may be more likely to understanding other people's mental states in unambiguous and common situations.

scholarly journals Theory of Mind in Nonhuman Primates

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Lewis ◽  
Christopher Krupenye
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Nonhuman Primates ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
Mind Theory ◽  
Phylogenetic Perspective ◽  
Social Minds

Social life demands complex strategies for coordinating and competing with others. In humans, these strategies are supported by rich cognitive mechanisms, such as theory of mind. Theory of mind (i.e., mental state attribution, mentalizing, or mindreading) is the ability to track the unobservable mental states, like desires and beliefs, that guide others’ actions. Deeply social animals, like most nonhuman primates, would surely benefit from the adept capacity to interpret and predict others’ behavior that theory of mind affords. Yet, after forty years of investigation, the extent to which nonhuman primates represent the minds of others remains a topic of contentious debate. In the present chapter, we review evidence consistent with the possibility that monkeys and apes are capable of inferring others’ goals, perceptions, and beliefs. We then evaluate the quality of that evidence and point to the most prominent alternative explanations to be addressed by future research. Finally, we take a more broadly phylogenetic perspective, to identify evolutionary modifications to social cognition that have emerged throughout primate evolutionary history and to consider the selective pressures that may have driven those modifications. Taken together, this approach sheds light on the complex mechanisms that define the social minds of humans and other primates.

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