Introduction
The author’s argumentative strategy for the book is introduced, and situated methodologically. An explanation follows that in the first half of this book a theory of fictional content known as ‘extreme intentionalism’ is proffered, with the argument that it should be taken very seriously as an adequate account of fictional truth. Some critics of the theory are canvassed and extreme intentionalism is differentiated from certain other positions with which it might be confused. It is then indicated how, in the second half of the book, it will be shown that extreme intentionalism and the lessons learnt from it can illuminate cognate questions in the philosophy of fiction and imagination. The author’s aim in this book is explained as being to construct three complementary explanatory theories simultaneously, one about fictional truth, one about fictional content, and one about imagination. In each case the methodological approach employed is distinguished from that of straightforward conceptual analysis. Finally, several advantages of the proposed approach are pointed out.