The Nonsense View
Chapter 5 is the first of three chapters articulating alternatives to Literalism. Chapter 5 presents Bennett and Hacker’s Wittgenstein-inspired criticism of ascriptions of psychological capacities to brains by cognitive neuroscientists. On their view the uses violate semantic rules of proper use and so are nonsensical. The mereological fallacy, as they label this conceptual violation, is to ascribe psychological features of persons to their parts. This chapter shows that their criticism fails by their own standards, and that it is not endorsed by neuroscientists aware of their criticism. It presents Dennett and Searle’s responses to Bennett and Hacker, and contrasts their responses to the Literalist view.
2018 ◽
Vol 16
(1)
◽
pp. 112-119
2020 ◽
Vol 1
(100)
◽
pp. 42-49