Subjectivity as a sentient perspective and the role of interoception
This chapter argues that the most basic form of subjectivity is different from and more fundamental than having a self, and forwards a hypothesis about the origin of subjectivity in terms of interoception. None of those topics are new, and a consensus concerning the homeostatic-interoceptive origin of subjectivity is rapidly growing in the domains of the neurosciences and psychology. This chapter critically explores that growing consensus, and it argues that the idea that the brain topographically represents bodily states is unfit for thinking about the coming about of subjectivity. In the first part, four inherent characteristics of subjectivity are discussed from a philosophical phenomenological point of view. The second part explores whether a model of subjectivity in which interoception maintains its crucial role is possible without relying on topographical representations of the in-depth body, and giving due to the inherent characteristics of subjectivity.