Resource Extraction and Inclusive Development

Author(s):  
Anthony Bebbington ◽  
Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai ◽  
Denise Humphreys Bebbington ◽  
Marja Hinfelaar ◽  
Cynthia A. Sanborn ◽  
...  

This chapter develops a conceptual framework for understanding the politics of extractive industry governance. Building from the work of Karl, Ross, Watts, and others, and their efforts to understand the political drivers and consequences of the resource curse, the chapter proposes an approach that also engages with political settlements theory, addressing the political implications of the materiality of natural resources and the politics of ideas surrounding resource governance. The chapter then introduces a programme of cross-country, comparative research designed to address the relationships among political settlements, extractive industry, and patterns of development; describes the questions that guided this research; and presents the methods used.

Author(s):  
Anthony Bebbington ◽  
Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai ◽  
Denise Humphreys Bebbington ◽  
Marja Hinfelaar ◽  
Cynthia A. Sanborn ◽  
...  

By comparing historical periods of high and low social and economic investment related to the mining sector, this chapter explores the reasons why Zambia’s mineral wealth has not been translated into sustained and inclusive development. A political settlements approach is utilized to explore the dynamics of the governance of natural resources. The analysis reveals a level of continuity in political arrangements, a meta-settlement of some kind, which is founded on a long lineage of the power of foreign influence in shaping economic and social policies. While the building of political coalitions proved useful for establishing some level of stability in Zambia, these coalitions have not stimulated development and have tended to push non-dominant groupings to the political margins.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 583-610
Author(s):  
Nicolas Clootens ◽  
Djamel Kirat

AbstractThis paper analyzes the behavior of cross-country growth rates with respect to resource abundance and dependence. We reject the linear model that is commonly used in growth regressions in favor of a multiple-regime alternative. Using a formal sample-splitting method, we find that countries exhibit different behaviors with respect to natural resources depending on their initial level of development. In high-income countries, natural resources play only a minor role in explaining the differences in national growth rates. On the contrary, in low-income countries, abundance seems to be a blessing but dependence restricts growth.


2000 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 526-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henning Bohn ◽  
Robert T Deacon

The effect of insecure ownership on ordinary investment and natural resource use is examined. Insecure ownership is postulated to depend on the type of government regime in power and the prevalence of political violence or instability. The political determinants of economywide investment are estimated from cross-country data, and the results are used to form an index of ownership security. When introduced into empirical models of natural resource use, this index has a significant and quantitatively important effect on the use of forests and petroleum. Contrary to conventional wisdom, ownership risk slows resource use in some circumstances. (JEL Q20, Q30, E22)


PCD Journal ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 173
Author(s):  
Indah Surya Wardhani

Said innovative policy and influencing movements, the circumstance of governing natural resources has been changing in the last decade. Along with the wave of democratization in the late 1990s, the global norms of transparency and accountability reach new leverage today, including in Southeast Asia. The norms ignite the active participation of civil societies in controlling extractive governance – a praxis that never been occurred in two or three decades ago. Meanwhile, the governments require people active participation to advance people trust and political legitimation.                Innovative policy and influencing movements stand at the central argumentations of this book. Perceive as an introduction, this book denotes contributions on the extractive industry governance by using the lenses of civil society movements to acquaint intricacy of the sectors. There is a “resource curse” or paradox of plenty refers to the paradox that countries with an abundance of natural resources tend to have less economic growth and worse development outcomes. Therefore, the civil engagement has been perceived as a tool to ensure the benefit of extractive industries run for the greatest benefit of the people, as well as mitigates the risk and undesirable impacts of the extractive operations.Throughout the selected articles, the book addresses on how civil societies engage in the extractive industries governance and through what mechanisms. Instead of outlining resource revenues management as the crucial aspects to be monitored by the citizens, this book rather highlights political perspective to challenge conventional understanding that extractive industries are pure – exclusively – economic affairs. The analysis convinces that extractive industry is highly political since they draw elites into the core decision-making. The high intensity of money and high technology within sectors subsequently renders those activities beyond the reach of the public. Thus, strong civil societies with the active participation are required to undermine oligarch notions and miss use power of the extractive sectors.The discussion of civil society engagements in this book is divided into process and results. The selected cases depict experiences from the local, national, and transnational contexts enrich the discussion and provide civil society movements in a broader sense. The multi-governance perspectives are used to picture the multiple factors enabling the movements, including various challenges and opportunities for the engagements. The elaboration on the book’s content will become the entry point to the more critical discussion in the subsequent of this review.


Author(s):  
Anthony Bebbington ◽  
Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai ◽  
Denise Humphreys Bebbington ◽  
Marja Hinfelaar ◽  
Cynthia Sanborn

Proposals for more effective natural resource governance emphasize the importance of institutions and governance, but say less about the political conditions under which institutional change occurs. This book synthesizes findings regarding the political drivers of institutional change in extractive industry governance. The authors analyse resource governance from the late nineteenth century to the present in Bolivia, Ghana, Peru, and Zambia. They focus on the ways in which resource governance and national political settlements interact. Special attention is paid to the nature of elite politics, the emergence of new political actors, forms of political contention, changing ideas regarding natural resources and development, the geography of natural resource deposits, and the influence of the transnational political economy of global commodity production. National elites and subnational actors are in continuous contention over extractive industry governance. Resource rents are used by elites to manage this contention and incorporate actors into governing coalitions and overall political settlements. Periodically, new resource frontiers are opened, and new political actors emerge with the power to redefine how extractive industries are governed and used as instruments for development. Colonial and post-colonial histories of resource extraction continue to give political valence to ideas of resource nationalism that mobilize actors who challenge existing institutional arrangements. The book is innovative in its focus on the political longue durée, and the use of in-depth, comparative, country-level analysis in Africa and Latin America, to build a theoretical argument that accounts for both similarity and divergence between these regions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Jingu

The discovery and exploitation of petroleum resources in a number of African countries has thrown into prominence the ‘resource curse’ thesis which suggests that resource wealth causes problems for a country. This article argues that petroleum resources, like all natural resources, are not a curse; instead, it is the actions and decisions of various actors involved in the struggle for such resources that lead to misery, particularly for the victims. The inappropriateness of the concept ‘resource curse’ in the context of Africa has moved this writer to propose an alternative concept – ‘resource misery’ – to reflect the actual condition that tends to befall a country and the victims owing to the often irresponsible actions and decisions of powerful actors involved in the abuse of natural resources. The article expands on seven maxims that, if embraced and implemented, should enable the new petro-states of Africa to escape resource misery.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-403
Author(s):  
Anaïd Flesken ◽  
Annegret Kuhn

AbstractStudies of public contentious action in response to mineral resource extraction have rarely employed quantitative methods. In a highly disaggregated statistical analysis we examine local protest dynamics in Bolivia and argue for a political conditioning of the so-called resource curse. We find that mineral gas resources spark disputes over both extraction and rent redistribution at the local level, and that this relationship is especially pronounced where the population has highly heterogenous political values and interests. In contrast, where the population is relatively united in their political views, significantly fewer protests occur.


2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paasha Mahdavi

While some resource-rich countries are highly corrupt, others have transparent and well-functioning governments. What explains this wide variation in so-called “resource-cursed” states? I show that these differences result from domestic institutional choices over how resource extraction is governed. Some governments grant procurement authority—the ability to award contracts for production rights—to state-owned enterprises, whereas others place this authority in ministries. Building upon agency theory, I argue that this choice matters: The relative political autonomy of state-owned enterprises compared with ministries fosters an opaque regulatory environment that incentivizes malfeasance. Using new data on transnational bribes in 59 oil-producing countries, I show evidence for a robust link between oil-related institutions and bribery, even after addressing the endogeneity of institutional choice via instrumental variables analysis. This research has implications not only for the political economy of the resource curse hypothesis but also for existing theories on corruption and regulatory independence.


2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 639-661 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nita Rudra ◽  
Nathan M. Jensen

Much political science scholarship, including important work in this journal, has explored the implications of natural resource endowments— particularly oil and other highly valuable export commodities—on political and economic outcomes. Although the first wave of literature emphasized the negative effects of these resources, more recent work emphasizes how domestic institutions can condition the relationship, sometimes leading to positive effects. In this special issue, the authors expand this literature in two important ways. First, they renew attention on the international dimensions of this relationship, exploring how trade, migration, foreign investment, and other global forces influence the effects these resources have on countries. Second, they link the study of the globalization—natural resources nexus to broader debates in international and comparative political economy, such as how domestic institutions shape the impact of globalization and how economic factors affect the political survival of regimes and individual leaders. The five studies in this collection use a variety of research methodologies (formal models, country case studies, and large- N empirical analyses) to examine several different international economic factors linking resources with politics. The findings provide new insights into the politics of natural resources, expand the traditional focus of the resource curse literature to include other natural resources (e.g., water), and shed light on whether globalization has the ability to improve natural resource governance around the world.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 649-666
Author(s):  
Eliana Cusato

AbstractAccess to and distribution of natural resources have been since immemorable time at the root of violent conflict. Over the last few decades, international institutions, legal scholars and civil society started to pay attention to the dangerous liaison between resource commodities and wars. Current debates emphasize how, through sanctions, global regulatory initiatives, and legal accountability, the governance of natural resources in conflict and post-conflict countries has improved, although international law should play a greater role to support the transition to a durable peace. The aim of this article is to illuminate the biases and limitations of dominant accounts by exploring the influence of the resource curse thesis, and its hidden propositions, upon legal developments. Using the Sierra Leonean and Liberian Truth Commissions as a case study, it shows how legal practices and discourses have contributed to a narrow understanding of resource-driven wars as started by voracious rebel groups or caused by weak/authoritarian/corrupt governments. What is obscured by the current focus on greed and ineffective resource governance? What responsibilities and forms of violence are displaced? Engaging with these questions allows us to see the dynamics through which structural injustices and distributive concerns are marginalized in existing responses to these conflicts, how the status quo is perpetuated, and the more subtle ways in which external interventions in the political economy of the Global South take place.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document