Perfectionist Liberalism and the Legitimacy of International Law
This chapter examines Joseph Raz’s perfectionist liberalism, an alternative to liberal neutrality. Perfectionists, unlike neutralists, have done little to extend their view beyond the state to international law and institutions. It considers whether perfectionist liberalism can be a theory of legitimacy in this sphere. The discussion focuses on the neutralist worry that the moral pluralism and the conception of autonomy that are aspects of Raz’s view fail to respect moral diversity and the equal standing of citizens across state boundaries. In particular, it looks at Martha Nussbaum’s claim that Raz’s liberalism is less stable than John Rawls’s because it is incompatible with the moral views of many people. The chapter argues that this critique is not persuasive in the state context and, even if it were compelling, it would be less so in the suprastate context, due to well-known attributes of international institutions, including their limited jurisdiction and their relatively limited capacity to enforce norms and decisions.