Perfectionist Liberalism and the Legitimacy of International Law

Legitimacy ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 206-222
Author(s):  
Michael Sevel

This chapter examines Joseph Raz’s perfectionist liberalism, an alternative to liberal neutrality. Perfectionists, unlike neutralists, have done little to extend their view beyond the state to international law and institutions. It considers whether perfectionist liberalism can be a theory of legitimacy in this sphere. The discussion focuses on the neutralist worry that the moral pluralism and the conception of autonomy that are aspects of Raz’s view fail to respect moral diversity and the equal standing of citizens across state boundaries. In particular, it looks at Martha Nussbaum’s claim that Raz’s liberalism is less stable than John Rawls’s because it is incompatible with the moral views of many people. The chapter argues that this critique is not persuasive in the state context and, even if it were compelling, it would be less so in the suprastate context, due to well-known attributes of international institutions, including their limited jurisdiction and their relatively limited capacity to enforce norms and decisions.

Author(s):  
Salam Abdullah Hassan

In the context of international law and international institutions, legitimacy as a concept has received a considerable amount of attention from scholars as well as political players on a global scale. This is while the issue remains as ambiguous and un-scrutinized as legitimacy has been used/abused based on context, which has led to recent confusions and inconsistency. This article endeavors to create a better understanding upon the matter of legitimacy as a concept by providing definitions and introducing various relevant means as well as provision of insights regarding the usage of the term within the borders of international law. As the topic remains a complex matter, this paper uses most relevant and recent scholarly works of this field to shine light upon the concept of legitimacy within international law. Issues, processes, aspects, functions and elements of legitimacy have been noted throughout this paper in terms of international context to further provide a comprehensive information regarding the state of legitimacy in modern world. Uncertainty remains an issue in this context as there is no consensus in the international atmosphere of law and governing bodies. Thus, this article emphasizes on providing clear information of how various factors have led to this complex state. International lawyers have shown an interest in the recent years regarding legitimacy and this may be of aid for further clarification of effects and relevant elements. Thus, increased participation of such actors on international scale is encouraged for provision of consensus in terms of legitimacy and surrounding debates and ambiguities


1914 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 769-801
Author(s):  
Denys P. Myers

The purpose of this study is the narration in detail of the responsible suggestions and action that resulted in erecting the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague and in bringing into the realm of “practical” statesmanship the Court of Arbitral Justice, designed as a genuine tribunal instead merely of a panel of judges. The origin of these courts, which, even as they exist, are the greatest achievements in the institutionalizing of international law, is important because in some degree it demonstrates the processes by which international law grows and it registers to some extent the state of its legislative development. Everybody knows that you cannot bring a code of international law into effect by the process of introducing a bill in any legislature, but beyond that there is no agreement or even any very clear conception as to the processes of securing international institutions. A study of the origins of the two Hague courts of general jurisdiction furnishes some clue to the existing processes, and is the more interesting because most “practical” people denied their possibility so long as the constituent conventions were not actually in existence. The origins of these two courts, in so far as they reveal a principle, point to the conclusion that the idealism of the world can be wrought into effective machinery when the trained publicist takes hold of it and works it into forms harmonizing with existent conditions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-103
Author(s):  
Komang Sukaniasa

International agreements are agreements between international subjects that give rise to binding obligations in international rights, which can be bilateral or multilateral. Based on these opinions, an understanding can be taken that international treaties are agreements or agreements entered into by two or more countries as subjects of international law that aim to cause certain legal consequences. International agreements, whether ratified or through approval or acceptance or accession, or other methods that are permitted, have the same binding force as ratified international treaties established in the Ratification Law of International Treaties. Once again, it is equally valid and binding on the state. Therefore, the authors consider that the position of international treaties are not made in the form of the Ratification Act of the International Agreement but are binding and apply to Indonesia. Then Damos Dumoli Agusman argues that ratification originates from the conception of international treaty law which is interpreted as an act of confirmation from a country of the legal acts of its envoys or representatives who have signed an agreement as a sign of agreement to be bound by the agreement.


Author(s):  
Chiedza Simbo

Despite the recent enactment of the Zimbabwean Constitution which provides for the right to basic education, complaints, reminiscent of a failed basic education system, have marred the education system in Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding glaring violations of the right to basic education by the government, no person has taken the government to court for failure to comply with its section 75(1)(a) constitutional obligations, and neither has the government conceded any failures or wrongdoings. Two ultimate questions arise: Does the state know what compliance with section 75(1)(a) entails? And do the citizens know the scope and content of their rights as provided for by section 75(1)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe? Whilst it is progressive that the Education Act of Zimbabwe as amended in 2020 has addressed some aspects relating to section 75(1)(a) of the Constitution, it has still not provided an international law compliant scope and content of the right to basic education neither have any clarifications been provided by the courts. Using an international law approach, this article suggests what the scope and content of section 75(1)(a) might be.


Author(s):  
John Linarelli ◽  
Margot E Salomon ◽  
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah

This chapter offers an argument on why the international law on trade, investment, and finance is subject to the demands of justice. It also looks at how those demands are greater than the basic minimums often suggested as applicable outside the state. International law is subject to the demands of justice because of its role as an institution essential to global cooperation, because it affects how people live their lives, because of its historic role in perpetuating and legitimizing moral wrongs, and because it can lead to domination and the deprivation of freedom. After elaborating these grounds, this chapter proceeds to a theory of justice for international law. International law must meet a standard of respect and ‘justification to’ each person, particularly those in weaker positions. International law cannot treat any person as only a passive recipient or supplicant to rules that benefit those in power or stronger positions.


Author(s):  
Michael Moehler

This book develops a novel multilevel social contract theory that, in contrast to existing theories in the liberal tradition, does not merely assume a restricted form of reasonable moral pluralism, but is tailored to the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies that may be populated by liberal moral agents, nonliberal moral agents, and, according to the traditional understanding of morality, nonmoral agents alike. To develop this theory, the book draws on the history of the social contract tradition, especially the work of Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Rawls, and Gauthier, as well as on the work of some of the critics of this tradition, such as Sen and Gaus. The two-level contractarian theory holds that morality in its best contractarian version for the conditions of deeply morally pluralistic societies entails Humean, Hobbesian, and Kantian moral features. The theory defines the minimal behavioral restrictions that are necessary to ensure, compared to violent conflict resolution, mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in deeply morally pluralistic societies. The theory minimizes the problem of compliance by maximally respecting the interests of all members of society. Despite its ideal nature, the theory is, in principle, applicable to the real world and, for the conditions described, most promising for securing mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in a world in which a fully just society, due to moral diversity, is unattainable. If Rawls’ intention was to carry the traditional social contract argument to a higher level of abstraction, then the two-level contractarian theory brings it back down to earth.


This collection brings together scholars of jurisprudence and political theory to probe the question of ‘legitimacy’. It offers discussions that interrogate the nature of legitimacy, how legitimacy is intertwined with notions of statehood, and how legitimacy reaches beyond the state into supranational institutions and international law. Chapter I considers benefit-based, merit-based, and will-based theories of state legitimacy. Chapter II examines the relationship between expertise and legitimate political authority. Chapter III attempts to make sense of John Rawls’s account of legitimacy in his later work. Chapter IV observes that state sovereignty persists, since no alternative is available, and that the success of the assortment of international organizations that challenge state sovereignty depends on their ability to attract loyalty. Chapter V argues that, to be complete, an account of a state’s legitimacy must evaluate not only its powers and its institutions, but also its officials. Chapter VI covers the rule of law and state legitimacy. Chapter VII considers the legitimation of the nation state in a post-national world. Chapter VIII contends that legitimacy beyond the state should be understood as a subject-conferred attribute of specific norms that generates no more than a duty to respect those norms. Chapter IX is a reply to critics of attempts to ground the legitimacy of suprastate institutions in constitutionalism. Chapter X examines Joseph Raz’s perfectionist liberalism. Chapter XI attempts to bring some order to debates about the legitimacy of international courts.


Author(s):  
David Boucher

The classic foundational status that Hobbes has been afforded by contemporary international relations theorists is largely the work of Hans Morgenthau, Martin Wight, and Hedley Bull. They were not unaware that they were to some extent creating a convenient fiction, an emblematic realist, a shorthand for all of the features encapsulated in the term. The detachment of international law from the law of nature by nineteenth-century positivists opened Hobbes up, even among international jurists, to be portrayed as almost exclusively a mechanistic theorist of absolute state sovereignty. If we are to endow him with a foundational place at all it is not because he was an uncompromising realist equating might with right, on the analogy of the state of nature, but instead to his complete identification of natural law with the law of nations. It was simply a matter of subject that distinguished them, the individual and the state.


Author(s):  
Anna Stilz

This book offers a qualified defense of a territorial states system. It argues that three core values—occupancy, basic justice, and collective self-determination—are served by an international system made up of self-governing, spatially defined political units. The defense is qualified because the book does not actually justify all of the sovereignty rights states currently claim and that are recognized in international law. Instead, the book proposes important changes to states’ sovereign prerogatives, particularly with respect to internal autonomy for political minorities, immigration, and natural resources. Part I of the book argues for a right of occupancy, holding that a legitimate function of the international system is to specify and protect people’s preinstitutional claims to specific geographical places. Part II turns to the question of how a state might acquire legitimate jurisdiction over a population of occupants. It argues that the state will have a right to rule a population and its territory if it satisfies conditions of basic justice and facilitates its people’s collective self-determination. Finally, Parts III and IV of this book argue that the exclusionary sovereignty rights to control over borders and natural resources that can plausibly be justified on the basis of the three core values are more limited than has traditionally been thought.


Author(s):  
Rowan Nicholson

If the term were given its literal meaning, international law would be law between ‘nations’. It is often described instead as being primarily between states. But this conceals the diversity of the nations or state-like entities that have personality in international law or that have had it historically. This book reconceptualizes statehood by positioning it within that wider family of state-like entities. An important conclusion of the book is that states themselves have diverse legal underpinnings. Practice in cases such as Somalia and broader principles indicate that international law provides not one but two alternative methods of qualifying as a state: subject to exceptions connected with territorial integrity and peremptory norms, an entity can be a state either on the ground that it meets criteria of effectiveness or on the ground that it is recognized by all other states. Another conclusion is that states, in the strict legal sense in which the word is used today, have never been the only state-like entities with personality in international law. Others from the past and present include imperial China in the period when it was unreceptive to Western norms; pre-colonial African chiefdoms; ‘states-in-context’, an example of which may be Palestine, which have the attributes of statehood relative to states that recognize them; and entities such as Hong Kong.


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