The Greatest Possible Being

Author(s):  
Jeff Speaks

Philosophical theology is the attempt to use reason to determine the attributes of God. An ancient tradition, which is perhaps more influential now than ever, tries to derive the attributes of God from the principle that God is the greatest possible being. This book argues that that constructive project is a failure. It also argues that the principle that God is the greatest possible being is unsuited to play two other theoretical roles. The first of these is the role of setting the limits of the concept of God, particularly in the context of debates over the existence of God. The second is the role of explaining the meaning of ‘God.’ This leaves us with three unanswered questions. If the principle that God is the greatest possible being can’t deliver results about the divine attributes, define the concept of God, or give the meaning of the name ‘God,’ what can? The last chapter makes some initial steps toward answering these questions.

2018 ◽  
pp. 67-73
Author(s):  
Bogdan Teodorovich Zavidniak

This article examines Erich Przywara‘s conceptual understanding of the proofs for the existence of God. It also interprets the proofs of God’s existence. Тhe concept of God in the philosophy of Przywara is considered by exploring the nature of the relations between the transcendent sphere of God and the spiritual world of the human person. From the point of view of historiography, the role of the book “The Analogia entis” by Przywara is highlighted.


2005 ◽  
Vol 61 (1/2) ◽  
Author(s):  
André J. Groenwald ◽  
Johan Buitendag

This article examines the reasons that brought Nietzsche to the point of declaring that God is dead, thus doubting the existence of God. Nietzsche’s was a reaction to modernity’s belief in progress as perceived through the philosophy of Hegel, while also being a reaction to the knowing subject of Descartes and Kant and the theology of Strauss. Nietzsche’s quest was for a concept of God that would be free from human domination.


2019 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 247-260
Author(s):  
Stefan Schmidt ◽  

According to Hans Ruin, there are two ways to approach the examination of freedom in Heidegger’s writings: One can use the notion of freedom as a heuristic concept to interpret the entirety of Heidegger’s work as a philosophy of freedom, which was famously done by Günter Figal, or one can reconstruct Heidegger’s actual use of the notion of freedom. In my paper I’ll focus on the second approach and show that although “freedom” or, rather, “being-free” can already be found in Being and Time, his more elaborate concept of freedom as transcendence is developed in the years 1928-1930. These years are part of a time period in which Heidegger tried to develop his own positive concept of metaphysics. The main texts which show this development are the lecture course The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic and the essay On the Essence of Ground. Based on Aristotle’s twofold metaphysics—consisting of ontology and philosophical theology—Heidegger sketches his own concept of metaphysics. The fundamental ontology which plays the role of ontology is complemented by his cosmological interpretation of theology: metontology. Together, they form Heidegger’s novel notion of metaphysics: the metaphysics of Dasein. Whereas fundamental ontology is concerned with the question of Being, the main subject of metontology is world as beings as a whole. Heidegger develops his concept of transcendence, i.e., metontological freedom, which describes the connection between freedom and world, on the basis of the terms world-projection (Weltentwurf), world-view (Weltanschauung), and world-formation (Weltbildung), each describing an aspect of transcendence.


Author(s):  
Alex Tissandier

This chapter looks in detail at the three main engagements with Leibniz in the main text of Deleuze’s Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. The first concerns the role of real definitions and proofs of possibility in arguments for the existence of God. The second concerns the theory of adequation in a logic of ideas. The third concerns mechanism, force and essence in a theory of bodies. The chapter argues that these engagements all share the same form. First, Deleuze locates a similarity between Leibniz and Spinoza in their criticism of a particular Cartesian doctrine. Second, he grounds this criticism in a shared concern for the lack of a sufficient reason operating in Descartes’s philosophy. Third, he nominates expression as the concept best suited to address this lack and fulfil the requirements of sufficient reason. Finally, he shows that the way expression functions in Spinoza’s philosophy is each time superior to Leibniz’s own use of the concept. Despite the priority given to Spinoza in this text, it nevertheless contains our first introduction to various key Leibnizian concepts which will become increasingly important in Deleuze’s later philosophy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 264-282
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Insole

The chapter articulates the following problem: given all that Kant’s notion of freedom, and the intelligible realm can achieve, what precisely is the role of God? That is, what do we need God for? And then, even if we have identified a role which God is expected to fill, there is the further question of whether God can fulfil this role, consistently with Kant’s wider commitments. It is suggested that God either seems to be ‘too much’, or ‘not enough’: ‘too much’, in that God can seem redundant, given all that is achieved by the notion of freedom, and ‘not enough’, in that, were God needed to make up some sort of deficit in our moral status, this would seem to violate Kant’s restrictions on human freedom, which is always ‘all or nothing’, such that all our free actions must come as a first cause from ourselves, and ourselves alone. This is a problem that threatens the cogency of Kant’s ‘moral proof’, which is to say, his understanding of the relationship between the highest good, happiness, and the existence of God.


Author(s):  
William P. Alston

The philosophy of religion comprises any philosophical discussion of questions arising from religion. This has primarily consisted in the clarification and critical evaluation of fundamental beliefs and concepts from one or another religious tradition. Major issues of concern in the philosophy of religion include arguments for and against the existence of God, problems about the attributes of God, the problem of evil, and the epistemology of religious belief. Of arguments for the existence of God, the most prominent ones can be assigned to four types. First, cosmological arguments, which go back to Plato and Aristotle, explain the existence of the universe by reference to a being on whom all else depends for its existence. Second, teleological arguments seek to explain adaptation in the world, for example, the way organisms have structures adapted to their needs, by positing an intelligent designer of the world. Third, ontological arguments, first introduced by Anselm, focus on the concept of a perfect being and argue that it is incoherent to deny that such a being exists. Finally, moral arguments maintain that objective moral statuses, distinctions or principles presuppose a divine being as the locus of their objectivity. Discussions of the attributes of God have focused on omniscience and omnipotence. These raise various problems, for example, whether complete divine foreknowledge of human actions is compatible with human free will. Moreover, these attributes, together with God’s perfect goodness give rise to the problem of evil. If God is all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good, how can there be wickedness, suffering and other undesirable states of affairs in the world? This problem has been repeatedly discussed from ancient times to the present. The epistemology of religious belief has to do with the questions of what is the proper approach to the assessment of religious belief (for rationality, justification, or whatever) and with the carrying out of such assessments. Much of the discussion has turned on the contrast between the roles of human reason and God’s revelation to us. A variety of views have been held on this. Many, such as Aquinas, have tried to forge a synthesis of the two; Kant and his followers have sought to ground religion solely on reason; others, most notably Kierkegaard, have held that the subjecting of religious belief to rational scrutiny is subversive of true religious faith. Recently, a group of ‘Reformed epistemologists’ (so-called because of the heavy influence of the Reformed theology of Calvin and his followers on their thinking) has attacked ‘evidentialism’ and has argued that religious beliefs can be rationally justified even if one has no reasons or evidence for them.


Author(s):  
Linda Zagzebski

The concept of perfect goodness had a central place in ancient Greek and medieval philosophy, and is still frequently discussed in contemporary natural theology. Medieval philosophers adopted the idea from the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, with the difference that they identified perfect goodness with a personal God. In ancient and medieval philosophy the concept is primarily a metaphysical one, since goodness was thought to be extensionally equivalent to being, but it is secondarily a moral concept referring to the distinctive sort of goodness appropriate to those beings that have wills. Thus it is fundamental to a long tradition on the metaphysical basis of value which lasted from Plato until at least the sixteenth century. In Plato, perfect goodness is the Form of the Good, upon which everything that has being is ontologically and causally dependent. In Aristotle, the good is identified with the end or purpose of a natural being. The good is that towards which all things move for the fulfilment of their natures. By the time of Aquinas, medieval philosophers had identified the good in both the Platonic and Aristotelian senses with the Christian God and had argued that God is both the perfectly good creative source and the perfectly good end of all beings other than himself. The concept of a perfectly good being in Christian philosophical theology faces two major kinds of difficulty. One is the problem that perfect goodness appears to be incompatible with the divine attributes of omnipotence and freedom of the divine will. And if a perfectly good being does not have a will that is free in a morally significant sense, that being seems to lack goodness in the moral sense of goodness. The second kind of problem is that the existence of a being who is both omnipotent and perfectly good seems to be incompatible with the existence of evil. In spite of these problems, there is a strong attraction to the idea of a perfectly good God in contemporary philosophical theology. The category of perfect goodness is therefore one of the most persistent of the concepts in the Platonic legacy.


1966 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-240
Author(s):  
John Lachs

Philosophers have long debated the question of the existence of God. This is one of many philosophical issues in which the motivation for inquiry has come more perhaps from the side of human feeling than from disinterested scientific curiosity. Powerful emotions appear to prompt thinkers to devote effort to the attempt to prove or disprove the existence of God. The urgency of this task has made some of these philosophers pay less than adequate heed to the concepts they employ. It appears to have escaped the attention of many of them that the word “God” does not have a single meaning either in religious language generally or in philosophical theology. It is obvious that one of the important ways in which religious traditions differ is in their conceptions of the Deity. But a considerable number of different God-concepts may be distinguished in the Judeo-Christian religious tradition itself, and not even in Christian theology proper is the word “God” free of ambiguity.


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