The Relationship between the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles and the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
Leonardo Ruiz-Gómez
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Identity Of Indiscernibles ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
The Relationship

scholarly journals Metaphysical Rationalism

2019 ◽  
pp. 164-181
Author(s):  
Martin Lin
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Identity Of Indiscernibles ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Limited Scope

This chapter explores the meaning of Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and the role it plays in his system. Some commentators have argued that Spinoza’s PSR applies to every truth and that Spinoza relies on it in deriving a great deal of his system. Against such interpretations, this chapter argues that Spinoza’s PSR is restricted to existential truths and is applied only once by Spinoza, to the case of the existence of God. In making this case, it considers Spinoza’s arguments for necessitarianism, causal and conceptual dependence, and the identity of indiscernibles, and it concludes that none of them rely on the PSR. It further argues that the limited scope of Spinoza’s PSR is a philosophical advantage because a fully unrestricted PSR is an unattractive doctrine that creates demands for explanation that cannot be met.

Leibniz's Method and the Basis of His Metaphysics

Philosophy ◽  
1960 ◽  
Vol 35 (132) ◽  
pp. 51-61
Author(s):  
A. H. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Logic ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Identity Of Indiscernibles ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Deductive Logic ◽  
The Subject

The monumental works of Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat have set a firm pattern of interpretation which many follow in their approach to the Philosophy of Leibniz. In the Preface to the second edition of The Philosophy of Leibniz, Russell reaffirms his contention that “Leibniz’s philosophy was almost entirely derived from his logic”. He welcomes the support provided in Couturat’s La Logique de Leibniz. Russell remarks “No candid reader—can doubt that Leibniz’s metaphysic was derived by him from the subject-predicate logic. This appears, for example, from the paper ‘Primae Veritates’ where all the main doctrines of the Monadology are deduced, with terse logical rigor from the premises; ‘Always therefore the predicate or consequent adheres in the subject or antecedent, and in this fact consists the nature of truth in general—But this is true in every affirmative truth, universal or singular, necessary or contingent’.” Referring further to Couturat, he points out that in his book the “Principle of Sufficient Reason” and “The Identity of Indiscernibles” are “expressly deduced—from the analytic character of all true propositions”. In short, Russell is contending that in formulating his metaphysics Leibniz (i) used the rigorous methods of deductive logic and (2) employed “models” drawn from logic to construct his “picture of reality”, i.e. his metaphysics.

The Correspondence with Clarke

2020 ◽  
pp. 228-249
Author(s):  
Gregory Brown
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Identity Of Indiscernibles ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
The World

The correspondence between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke—mediated by Leibniz’s erstwhile friend and disciple at the electoral court in Hanover, Caroline of Brandenburg-Ansbach, princess of Wales—is arguably the most famous and influential of philosophical correspondences. In this chapter, I begin by tracing the background of the correspondence and the role that Caroline played in its inception and development. I then turn to a discussion of the main themes of the correspondence, paying particular attention to the importance of Caroline’s presence in shaping the themes of the debate: the principle of sufficient reason, the identity of indiscernibles, God’s choice in creating this world, space and time, God’s presence and activity in the world, miracles, and gravity.

Brute Facts about Emergence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Symons
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter explores the relationship between the concept of emergence, the goal of theoretical completeness, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Samuel Alexander and C. D. Broad argued for limits to the power of scientific explanation. Chemical explanation played a central role in their thinking. After Schrödinger’s work in the 1920s their examples seem to fall flat. However, there are more general lessons from the emergentists that need to be explored. There are cases where we know that explanation of some phenomenon is impossible. What are the implications of known limits to the explanatory power of science, and the apparent ineliminability of brute facts for emergence? One lesson drawn here is that we must embrace a methodological rather than a metaphysical conception of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

scholarly journals The Principles of Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, and Identity of Indiscernibles

2013 ◽  
pp. 44-64
Author(s):  
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Identity Of Indiscernibles ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason

This chapter discusses three fundamental principles of Leibniz's philosophy: the Principle of Contradiction, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. It evaluates various formulations of these principles, their axiomatic character, and some attempts to demonstrate them. In particular, the chapter discusses in detail the derivation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in Primary Truths, and argues that Leibniz does not use the Principle of Contradiction in that derivation. It also discusses an attempt, in the correspondence with Clarke, to prove the Principle of Sufficient Reason empirically. Finally, the article examines the argument for the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles in the Discourse on Metaphysics.

scholarly journals The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Spinoza

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Lin
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Identity Of Indiscernibles ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason

This chapter investigates Spinoza’s commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the PSR) and its role in his system. What sorts of things does Spinoza think require a cause or explanation? What counts, for him, as a cause or explanation? The PSR is often associated with doctrines such as necessitarianism, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, the Principle of Plenitude, and the existence of God. Some commentators have alleged that Spinoza’s commitment to the PSR leads him to accept all of these doctrines. This paper examines each of these doctrines as they pertain to Spinoza’s commitment to the PSR and his metaphysics more generally.

The Necessity of Sufficiency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce L. Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Quantum Physics ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Divine Action ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Quantum Phenomena

There is an argument for the existence of God from the incompleteness of nature that is vaguely present in Plantinga’s recent work. This argument, which rests on the metaphysical implications of quantum physics and the philosophical deficiency of necessitarian conceptions of physical law, deserves to be given a clear formulation. The goal is to demonstrate, via a suitably articulated principle of sufficient reason, that divine action in an occasionalist mode is needed (and hence God’s existence is required) to bring causal closure to nature and render it ontologically functional. The best explanation for quantum phenomena and the most adequate understanding of general providence turns out to rest on an ontic structural realism in physics that is grounded in the immaterialist metaphysics of theistic idealism.

The Provenance of Consciousness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Vision
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Material Base ◽  
Distinctive Character ◽  
Intrinsic Nature ◽  
Fundamental Particles ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason

Unlike brute ‘entities’, if conscious states (c-states) are brute, it will be a consequence of their primitive—viz., not admitting further elaboration—connection to their material base, what is commonly known as emergence. One might suppose the chief challenge to emergence comes from various materialist counter-proposals. However, given the distinctive character of c-states, a class of critics describe even materialist reductions as objectionable forms of emergentism. Instead, their fallback position is a reinvigorated panpsychism: consciousness is the intrinsic nature of the most fundamental particles. In this chapter the author examines that form of panpsychism, tracing its roots to a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and to suggestions aired in Bertrand Russell’s struggles with the issue. He concludes that this panpsychism fails, leaving the field to materialism and emergentist dualism.

Being and Reason

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Lin
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence And Nonexistence ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Necessary Existence

In Being and Reason, Martin Lin offers a new interpretation of Spinoza’s core metaphysical doctrines with attention to how and why, in Spinoza, metaphysical notions are entangled with cognitive, logical, and epistemic ones. For example, according to Spinoza, a substance is that which can be conceived through itself, and a mode is that which is conceived through another. Thus, metaphysical notions, substance and mode, appear to be defined through a notion that is either cognitive or logical, being conceived through. What are we to make of the intimate connections that Spinoza sees between metaphysical, cognitive, logical, and epistemic notions? Or between being and reason? Lin argues against idealist readings according to which the metaphysical is reducible to or grounded in something epistemic, logical, or psychological. He maintains that Spinoza sees the order of being and the order of reason as two independent structures that mirror one another. In the course of making this argument, he develops new interpretations of Spinoza’s notions of attribute and mode, and of Spinoza’s claim that all things strive for self-preservation. Lin also argues against prominent idealist readings of Spinoza according to which the Principle of Sufficient Reason is absolutely unrestricted for Spinoza and is the key to his system. He contends, rather, that Spinoza’s metaphysical rationalism is a diverse phenomenon and that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is limited to claims about existence and nonexistence which are applied only once by Spinoza to the case of the necessary existence of God.

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