Revising the Bargain?

This chapter examines the effect of the GFC on mass policy preferences. We argue that preferences are not only shaped by the individual’s position in the social structure, but also by the set of feasible options provided by competing political elites. The theory of constrained partisanship views public policy preferences as rooted in institutions, economic circumstances, and past policy legacies. Parting ways with this view, we argue that parties can shape citizens’ preferences through policy efforts and rhetoric. We test a set of arguments on preferences for spending in two areas: health care (a universal benefit) and unemployment assistance (a targeted benefit). Consistent with other research, we find that individual-level attributes associated with labour market positions, skills, and wealth inform policy preferences. But party politics also mattered. Both the depth of the crisis and the extent of the recovery shaped some post-GFC policy demands by way of party cues. We also show that the scope of the crisis recovery influenced how preferences react to past policy efforts. In strong recoveries, there was a strong negative thermostatic relationship, but in weak recoveries, path dependence ruled. Implications for policy responsiveness are discussed.