Recognition and Critical Interaction Theory
This chapter explores how we might move from considerations that focus on social-cognitive issues to understanding their implications for concepts that are basic to the development of a critical theory that addresses social and political issues—basic concepts of agency, autonomy, and recognition. Following a brief philosophical history of the concept of recognition from Fichte through Hegel to contemporary accounts in Honneth and Ricoeur, this chapter takes a close look at Honneth’s analysis of recognition. I argue that Honneth does not sufficiently distinguish recognition as uniquely or specifically intersubjective. Moreover, he starts at a developmental point too late to acknowledge the role of primary intersubjectivity, a concept he interprets from a psychoanalytic perspective in contrast to its original formulation in developmental psychology. I then outline a concept of responsivity as an alternative to Honneth’s notion of elementary recognition. This is nonetheless in broad agreement with his analysis of relational autonomy.