Diaspora Mobilization for Palestinian Statehood

Author(s):  
Maria Koinova

This chapter and the previous Chapter 6 are interconnected as they both discuss Albanian diaspora mobilizations. This chapter unpacks the typological theory through four causal pathways in the Palestinian field, one of them discussed twice as diaspora entrepreneurs were exposed to different non-state actors. All pathways occurred under host-state foreign policy divergence from the diaspora goals for Palestinian statehood, including refugees’ return. A non-contentious pathway exists but was rare when diaspora entrepreneurs acted under limited global influences. When lacking support from politicized homeland-based actors, diaspora entrepreneurs were less eager to launch contentious mobilizations on their own. Dual-pronged contentious mobilizations occurred: (a) when the homeland government was transnationally involved, under the PNA leadership, acting carefully while seeking to maintain international standing in difficult political circumstances; (b) when transnational left-wing movements were at play; many more diaspora entrepreneurs were on this pathway, seeking to counteract Israeli policies, quite often engaged in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign; and (c) when diaspora entrepreneurs related to transnational Islamic networks. Issues related to humanitarian charities and refugees’ right of return have been emphasized, even if they also have concerned others in the diaspora. The most contentious pathway occurred in response to critical violent events in the original homeland or adjacent fragile states, most notably due to the recurring warfare in Gaza since 2008. This pathway engulfed all four types of diaspora entrepreneurs.

Author(s):  
Maria Koinova

This chapter and the previous Chapter 4 are interconnected as they both discuss Albanian diaspora mobilizations. This chapter unpacks the typological theory through seven causal pathways in the Kosovo Albanian transnational social field. Three of these are associated with the secessionist period of the 1990s, when the foreign policies of host-states diverged from the diaspora goal of Kosovo independence. A relatively rare non-contentious pathway occurred when diaspora entrepreneurs acted autonomously under limited global influences. A more common dual-pronged approach pathway was visible when diaspora entrepreneurs were exposed to two non-state actors, the non-violent Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the radical Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In a contentious pathway, almost everyone in the diaspora was engulfed in response to the 1998–9 warfare. Four causal pathways occurred when host-land foreign policies were more open to endorse Kosovo’s statehood. Dual-pronged mobilization was visible under the influences of mob violence in Kosovo in 2004. The rest of the pathways were non-contentious. Acting autonomously, diaspora entrepreneurs developed political and cultural projects aimed to raise Kosovo’s status abroad. Under the homeland government’s influence diaspora entrepreneurs pursued public diplomacy, celebrity and football diplomacy, the building of cultural centres, education exchanges, and curriculum for the diaspora. When exposed to homeland parties, diaspora entrepreneurs followed political party dynamics, whether supporting or challenging them.


Author(s):  
Maria Koinova

Why do conflict-generated diasporas mobilize in contentious and non-contentious ways or use mixed strategies of contention? Why do they channel their homeland-oriented goals through host-states, transnational networks, and international organizations? This book develops a theory of socio-spatial positionality and its implications for the individual agency of diaspora entrepreneurs, moving beyond essentialized notions of diasporas as groups. Individual diaspora entrepreneurs operate in transnational social fields affecting their mobilizations beyond dynamics confined to host-states and original home-states. There are four types of diaspora entrepreneurs—Broker, Local, Distant, and Reserved—depending on the relative strength of their socio-spatial linkages to host-land, on the one hand, and original homeland and other global locations, on the other. A two-level typological theory captures nine causal pathways, unravelling how the socio-spatial linkages of these diaspora entrepreneurs interact with external factors: host-land foreign policies, homeland governments, parties, non-state actors, and critical events or limited global influences. Such pathways produce mobilization trajectories with varying levels of contention and methods of channelling homeland-oriented goals. Non-contentious pathways often occur when host-state foreign policies are convergent with the diaspora entrepreneurs’ goals, and when diaspora entrepreneurs can act autonomously. Dual-pronged contention pathways occur quite often, under the influence of homeland governments, non-state actors, and political parties. The most contentious pathway occurs in response to violent critical events in the homeland or adjacent to it fragile states. This book is informed by 300 interviews and a dataset of 146 interviews with diaspora entrepreneurs among the Albanian, Armenian, and Palestinian diasporas in the UK, Germany, France, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, as well as Kosovo and Armenia in the European neighbourhood.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 339-369
Author(s):  
David Romano

The analysis presented here offers a possible framework for understanding when sub-state actors behave prudently and more strategically in their foreign relations, and when other priorities might instead heighten the chances of seemingly irrational, erratic, or dangerous, foreign policies. Using a case study of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq to illustrate the argument, the author attempts to show how “regime consolidation” plays a key role in allowing such actors to prioritise policies aimed at grappling with external challenges, threats and opportunities. Internally legitimate, consolidated regimes can better present “one face” to the outside world and behave more strategically in the international arena.  Political systems lacking consolidation or internal legitimacy, in contrast, turn to the external environment in search of resources to help them with domestic threats and challenges. This may lead to seemingly erratic, unpredictable and risky foreign policies on their part. Abstract in Kurmanji Aktorên bin-dewletî û girtina rîskên siyaseta derve: Hikûmeta Herêma Kurdistanê ya Iraqê Analîza ku li vir hatiye pêşkêşkirin çarçoveyeke muhtemel ji bo fehmkirina demên ku aktorên bin-dewletî di têkiliyên xwe yên derve de bi hişyarî û stratejîk tevdigerin û demên di dewsê de pêşkiyên din şansên siyaseta derve yên xeternak, guherbar û îrrasyonel didine ber xwe. Bi bikaranîna mînaka Hikûmeta Herêma Kurdistanê ya Iraqê nivîskar hewl dide ku nîşan bide ka çawa “xurtkirina rejîmê” roleke serekî dilîze di destûrdana van aktoran de ku pêşekiyê bidin polîtîkayên ku bi dijwarî, tehdît û talûkeyên derve bigre. Rejîmên di hundir de meşrû û xurt dikarin baştir “rûyekî” nîşanê cîhana derve bidin û di qada navneteweyî de bêhtir stratejîk tevbigerin. Lê belê sîstemên siyasî yên ne xurt û di hundir de ne meşrû jî berê xwe didin derdora derve di lêgerîna çavkaniyan de da ku alîkariya wan bikin ji bo talûke û zehmetiyên hundirîn. Ev dikare bibe sedem ku ew polîtîkayên derveyî yên birîsk, netexmînbar û hevnegir ên berçav bigrin ji aliyê xwe ve. Abstract in Sorani Ektere dewllete lawekeyyekan û xoleqerey metrisî danî syasetî derewe: hkumetî herêmî kurdistanî ‘êrraq Ew şîkaryaney lêreda amadekrawn , çwarçêweyekî guncaw pêşkeş dekat bo têgeyiştin lewey le katêkda ektere dewllete lawekîyekan beşêweyekî wiryayane û sitratîjyanetir le peywendîyekanî derewey xoyanda hellsukewt deken, we katêkîş ewlewîyetekanî tir renge şansî ewey le rukeşda wek syasetî derekî na'eqllanî, namo, yan trisnak derdekewêt berizbkatewe. Hkumetî herêmî kurdistanî 'êraq wek keysî twêjînewe bekarhatuwe bo rûnkirdnewey ew argumêntey ke nûser hewll dedat nîşanî bdat çon “ptewkirdnî rjêm” rollêkî serekî debînêt le rêgedan bew core ekterane bo ewey ew syasetane bkate ewlewîyet ke amanc lêy berberekanêy allingarîy û hereşe û derfete drekîyekane. Ew rjêmaney ke şer'îyetî nawxoyyan heye û çespawn baştir detwanin “yek rûîy” pîşanî dinyay derewe bken û le meydanî nêwdewlletîşda sitratîjyanetir hellsukewt bken. Bepêçewanewe, ew sîsteme syasyaney ke neçespawn û şer'îyetî nawxoyyan kurtidênêt, le gerran bedway serçawekanda rû le jîngey derekî deken bo ewey yarmetîyan bda le herreşe û allingarîye nawxoyyekan. Eme lewaneye wabkat ke ew syasete derekîyaney ke be namo, pêşbînî nekraw û metrisîdar derdekewn le terefî ewanewe bêt. Abstract in Zazaki Faîlê bindewletkî û rîskgêrîya sîyasetê teberî: Hukmatê Herêmê Kurdîstanî yê Îraqî   No analîzê tîyayî seba fehmkerdişê wextê ke faîlê bindewletkîyî têkilîyanê xo yê teberî de bitedbîr û hîna zaf stratejîk hereket kenê û wexto ke herinda ci de prîorîteyê bînî asayîş ra gore îhtîmalê polîtîkayanê teberî yê bêmantiq, bêqerar yan zî xeternakan kenê zêde, ci rê çarçewayêka potansîyele pêşkêş keno. Bi xebata nimûneyî yê Hukmatê Herêmê Kurdîstanî yê Îraqî no arguman nîşan dîyeno. Nuştox wazeno bimusno ke “konsolîdasyonê rejîmî” senî rolêko sereke gêno ke tede kerdoxanê winasîyan rê destûr dîyeno ke polîtîkayanê xo yê çareserkerdişê zehmetî, tehdîd û îmkananê teberî prîorîtîze bikerê. Eke zere de meşrû yê, rejîmê kondolîdekerdeyî eşkenê xo bi “yew rî” teber rê bimusnê û sahneya mîyanneteweyîye de hîna zaf stratejîk hereket bikerê. Heto bîn ra, sîstemê sîyasîyî ke tede konsolîdasyon yan zî meşrûîyetê zereyî çin ê, ê xo çarnenê dorûverê xo yê teberî ke seba helkerdişê tehdîd û zehmetîyanê zereyî ro çimeyan bigêre. No seba înan beno ke bibo sebebê polîtîkayanê teberî yê bêqerar, nevervînbar û rîzîkodaran.


Author(s):  
David M. Webber

Having mapped out in the previous chapter, New Labour’s often contradictory and even ‘politically-convenient’ understanding of globalisation, chapter 3 offers analysis of three key areas of domestic policy that Gordon Brown would later transpose to the realm of international development: (i) macroeconomic policy, (ii) business, and (iii) welfare. Since, according to Brown at least, globalisation had resulted in a blurring of the previously distinct spheres of domestic and foreign policy, it made sense for those strategies and policy decisions designed for consumption at home to be transposed abroad. The focus of this chapter is the design of these three areas of domestic policy; the unmistakeable imprint of Brown in these areas and their place in building of New Labour’s political economy. Strikingly, Brown’s hand in these policies and the themes that underpinned them would again reappear in the international development policies explored in much greater detail later in the book.


2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baris Kesgin

Scholars and policymakers have long used the shorthand of hawks and doves to characterize leader personalities that correspond to a particular political inclination, whereby hawks are considered right-wing and more aggressive in foreign policy, and doves are left-wing and more peaceful. This article posits that a sound discussion of who hawks and doves in foreign policy are requires an engagement with research on political leadership. It promises a less superficial understanding of the dichotomy of hawks and doves, and uses leadership trait analysis to explore hawkish and dovish leaders’ qualities. The article profiles Israel’s prime ministers since the end of the Cold War, where in a high security environment, these words are most often used to describe its domestic and foreign matters and its cooperative and conflictual actions. This article’s findings encourage an unpacking of these commonly used shorthand labels with political leadership approaches. They are also useful to highlight, most notably, the significance of complexity and distrust in understanding hawkish and dovish leaders. Hawks think simpler and are more doubtful of others than doves, this article finds. Future research, the article suggests, will benefit from looking deeper than simple, dichotomous use of this analogy, and exploring ways to operationalize individual-level measurements of hawks and doves in foreign policy.


2013 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 121-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volkan İpek ◽  
Gonca Biltekin

Turkey's activism in Africa has been extensively noted. It has been argued that non-state actors like business and civil society organizations take part in Turkeys Africa initiative. Nevertheless, state/non-state interaction in Turkey's foreign policy implementation has not been accounted for in theoretical terms in Turkish foreign policy literature. This paper combines post-international theory and foreign policy implementation in looking at Turkey's foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that adapting to the multi-centric world, the Turkish government has moved beyond conventional state-to-state dealings in implementing its foreign policy and increasingly relies on the cooperation of non-state actors.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Deborah Welch Larson ◽  
Alexei Shevchenko

This chapter provides an overview of the book's main themes. This book draws on social identity theory (SIT) for insights into how status concerns and social identity shape Chinese and Russian foreign policy. SIT argues that social groups strive to achieve a positively distinctive identity. When a group's identity is threatened, it may pursue one of several identity management strategies: social mobility, social competition, or social creativity. Using SIT as a framework, the book addresses several questions. First, how important were status considerations in shaping Chinese and Russian foreign policy? Second, why did China and Russia choose a particular strategy in a given context for improving their state's international standing? Third, how effective were their chosen strategies as measured by the perceptions and beliefs of the leading states.


2020 ◽  
pp. 424-434
Author(s):  
Y. A. Levin ◽  
S. O. Buranok

The issue of how the an important and multifaceted aspect of domestic and foreign policy formed by US FBI, called the "Red Scare" is addressed in the article. It is shown that this political and ideological concept seemed unacceptable for distribution in the United States, since it created a danger of the penetration of communist ideas and their adherents into all government bodies and major public organizations. Factors that influenced the strengthening of the FBI’s position in the fight against communist ideology in the United States in the 1920s, in particular, terrorist acts carried out by left-wing forces, which allowed the FBI to implement a program of struggle (Palmer raids) with organizations, adhering to communist views are examined. The measures taken by the FBI and its director John Edgar Hoover in the 1930s against Soviet intelligence, which contributed to reinforcing negative perceptions of the “Red Scare” within the agency are highlighted. The authors conclude that the position of the FBI influenced the building of the attitude of the entire US intelligence community in this vein, which in turn had a great impact on the development of the country’s domestic and foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Jan Christoph Bublitz

Whether there are intrinsic differences between different means to intervene into brains and minds is a key question of neuroethics, which any future legal regulation of mind-interventions has to face. This chapter affirms such differences by a twofold argument:. First, it present differences between direct (biological, physiological) and indirect (psychological) interventions that are not based on crude mind–brain dualisms or dubious properties such as naturalness of interventions. Second, it shows why these differences (should) matter for the law. In a nutshell, this chapter suggests that indirect interventions should be understood as stimuli that persons perceive through their external senses whereas direct interventions reach brains and minds on different, nonperceptual routes. Interventions primarily differ in virtue of their causal pathways. Because of them, persons have different kinds and amounts of control over interventions; direct interventions regularly bypass resistance and control of recipients. Direct interventions also differ from indirect ones because they misappropriate mechanisms of the brain. These differences bear normative relevance in light of the right to mental self-determination, which should be the guiding normative principle with respect to mind-interventions. As a consequence, the law should adopt by and large a normative—not ontological—dualism between interventions into other minds: nonconsensual direct interventions into other minds should be prohibited by law, with few exceptions. By contrast, indirect interventions should be prima facie permissible, primarily those that qualify as exercises of free speech. The chapter also addresses a range of recent objections, especially by Levy (in the previous chapter).


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