Albanian Transnational Social Field and Diaspora Entrepreneurs

This chapter and the following Chapter 5 are interconnected as they both discuss Albanian diaspora mobilizations. This chapter lays out political dynamics in the Albanian transnational social field and presents the profiles of the four types of diaspora entrepreneurs that operate within it. Incomplete nation-building and state-building processes have left Albanians scattered throughout the Balkans since the early twentieth century, where they currently live as either majorities or minorities. Weak state capacities of Kosovo alongside those of adjacent fragile states, as well as problematic treatment of Albanians where they are minorities, most notably North Macedonia and Serbia, have created dynamics conducive for Albanians to emigrate from the region and mobilize in the diaspora. Kosovo’s independence was a goal not simply for Albanians from Kosovo but was widespread among other diaspora Albanians until the 2008 independence. Albanians socialized with each other in the diaspora, irrespective of their original homeland, thereby forging bonds and seeking Kosovo’s statehood through a transnational social field perspective. More recently, another field-wide idea has emerged, of an ‘Albanian space’ formed through the EU integration of Balkan states with Albanian populations. This chapter presents data on migration in the Albanian field, in the Balkans and globally, and specifies the individual profiles of Albanian diaspora entrepreneurs.

Diaspora Mobilization for Palestinian Statehood

This chapter and the previous Chapter 6 are interconnected as they both discuss Albanian diaspora mobilizations. This chapter unpacks the typological theory through four causal pathways in the Palestinian field, one of them discussed twice as diaspora entrepreneurs were exposed to different non-state actors. All pathways occurred under host-state foreign policy divergence from the diaspora goals for Palestinian statehood, including refugees’ return. A non-contentious pathway exists but was rare when diaspora entrepreneurs acted under limited global influences. When lacking support from politicized homeland-based actors, diaspora entrepreneurs were less eager to launch contentious mobilizations on their own. Dual-pronged contentious mobilizations occurred: (a) when the homeland government was transnationally involved, under the PNA leadership, acting carefully while seeking to maintain international standing in difficult political circumstances; (b) when transnational left-wing movements were at play; many more diaspora entrepreneurs were on this pathway, seeking to counteract Israeli policies, quite often engaged in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign; and (c) when diaspora entrepreneurs related to transnational Islamic networks. Issues related to humanitarian charities and refugees’ right of return have been emphasized, even if they also have concerned others in the diaspora. The most contentious pathway occurred in response to critical violent events in the original homeland or adjacent fragile states, most notably due to the recurring warfare in Gaza since 2008. This pathway engulfed all four types of diaspora entrepreneurs.

Albanian Diaspora Mobilization for Kosovo Statehood

This chapter and the previous Chapter 4 are interconnected as they both discuss Albanian diaspora mobilizations. This chapter unpacks the typological theory through seven causal pathways in the Kosovo Albanian transnational social field. Three of these are associated with the secessionist period of the 1990s, when the foreign policies of host-states diverged from the diaspora goal of Kosovo independence. A relatively rare non-contentious pathway occurred when diaspora entrepreneurs acted autonomously under limited global influences. A more common dual-pronged approach pathway was visible when diaspora entrepreneurs were exposed to two non-state actors, the non-violent Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the radical Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In a contentious pathway, almost everyone in the diaspora was engulfed in response to the 1998–9 warfare. Four causal pathways occurred when host-land foreign policies were more open to endorse Kosovo’s statehood. Dual-pronged mobilization was visible under the influences of mob violence in Kosovo in 2004. The rest of the pathways were non-contentious. Acting autonomously, diaspora entrepreneurs developed political and cultural projects aimed to raise Kosovo’s status abroad. Under the homeland government’s influence diaspora entrepreneurs pursued public diplomacy, celebrity and football diplomacy, the building of cultural centres, education exchanges, and curriculum for the diaspora. When exposed to homeland parties, diaspora entrepreneurs followed political party dynamics, whether supporting or challenging them.

Armenian Transnational Social Field and Diaspora Entrepreneurs

This chapter and the following Chapter 9 are interconnected as they both discuss Armenian diaspora mobilizations. This chapter focuses on the transnational social field and the four types of diaspora entrepreneurs. Armenians have lived in the Caucasus and the Middle East prior to the 1915 Armenian genocide, a defining moment historically and especially for the diaspora. Self-determination claims of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh have been interconnected historically, considered part of ‘Eastern Armenia’. They both seceded from the Soviet Union in 1991. An independent Armenia was internationally recognized as a state, unlike the de facto state of Karabakh, unrecognized at present. A devastating 1988 earthquake and a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Karabakh (1992–4) created opportune moments for the diaspora in Western countries to connect to Armenia and Karabakh. The diaspora in Europe was primarily formed by survivors and descendants of the Armenian genocide, with roots in ‘Western Armenia’ in Turkey and the larger Middle East, and organized by diaspora parties. Fragility of statehood in Armenia and Karabakh, and recurrent violence and authoritarianism in the Middle East continued to create push factors for Armenians to emigrate across the globe and for the diaspora to mobilize. The highest priority in the diaspora, especially in Europe, remained the recognition of the Armenian genocide, while Karabakh’s recognition and supporting Armenia took a back seat. The chapter presents data on migration in the Armenian field, in the Caucasus, the Middle East and globally, and specifies the individual profiles of Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs.

The Macrofoundations

Chapter 2 is the first theoretical chapter developing the contours of the theory of socio-spatial positionality and how it applies to the four types of diaspora entrepreneurs—Broker, Local, Distant, and Reserved. They operate in transnational social fields, simultaneously embedded in different global contexts. The chapter builds on diaspora-, host-land-, and home-land-centric theories and further integrates three streams of thought that have not been in conversation with one another. First, it reimagines transnational social fields from a socio-spatial positionality perspective, considering earlier work in International Political Sociology. Secondly, it draws on scholarship on fragile and weak states in IR, especially on de facto states, and discusses their place in the international system and the rationales through which they engage diasporas abroad. Third, the chapter consults relational theories in IR, demonstrating that durable interactions among actors in international politics form structures spanning borders. These theories are useful to think about configurations of socio-spatial linkages of the four types of diaspora entrepreneurs, at the core of the typology. The chapter then lays out the socio-spatial positionality approach and its major features—relativity, power, fluidity, and perception—while delving deeper into the individual level of analysis. The four types of diaspora entrepreneurs have different socio-spatial positionalities at the intersection of various global contexts that empower them differently to pursue homeland-oriented goals. The chapter ends with a discussion about structure and agency in diaspora mobilizations.

Introduction

The Introduction lays out the book’s theoretical and empirical foundations, based on large-scale research conducted among the Albanian, Armenian, and Palestinian diasporas in the UK, Germany, France, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. Two questions are of core interest: (1) why do conflict-generated diasporas mobilize in more or less contentious ways; and (2) why do they pursue their mobilizations through host-state, transnational, and supranational channels? Diaspora entrepreneurs are studied with their linkages to contested states experiencing challenges to their sovereignty, specifically de facto states with limited international recognition, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Palestine, respectively. The chapter presents a novel typology of four types of diaspora entrepreneurs based on configurations of their socio-spatial linkages to different global contexts: the Broker, Local, Distant, and Reserved. A two-level typological theory features interactions between diaspora entrepreneurs and homeland governments, parties, non-state actors, and critical events or limited global influences. This chapter presents other intellectual contributions of this book: going beyond analysis of diasporas as groups but focusing on individual agency; considering the socio-spatial positionality of diaspora entrepreneurs to different global contexts, not simply to host-states and home-states; shedding light comparatively on little explored diaspora lobbying in Europe, and integrating scholarship on migrant integration into the study of contested statehood. Scope conditions, methodology, coding, and dataset based on 146 interviews with diaspora entrepreneurs are presented next. The Introduction finishes by laying out the content of the individual chapters.

Palestinian Transnational Social Field and Diaspora Entrepreneurs

This chapter and the following Chapter 7 are interconnected as they both discuss Palestinian diaspora mobilizations. This chapter focuses on the transnational social field and the four types of diaspora entrepreneurs connected not simply to the West Bank and Gaza but also to Jerusalem, Palestinian camps in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and other fragile states in the Middle East. The 1948 ‘great dispersal’ of Palestinians became a pivotal point for refugee migration and subsequent commemoration in the diaspora. The PLO secularist nationalist movement and Islamic movements have developed rich exile politics since the 1970s–1980s. The 1993 Oslo Accords presented an opportunity for embedding the diaspora-based PLO into homeland territory and establishing an internationally endorsed local government under PNA leadership. Islamic networks existed in parallel, drawing more strength from the failed peace process and gaining momentum with the second intifada after 2000. It paved the way for Hamas to win elections in 2006 and establish alternative governance in Gaza, which has been disputed ever since. The polarization of domestic politics was transposed to the diaspora. There are many disagreements in this field on what is the main goal of the Palestinian cause beyond ending occupation of the Palestinian territories. For some, achieving statehood is important, advocating either a two-state or a one-state solution. For others, a solution for refugee return needs to be prioritized. This chapter presents data on migration in the Palestinian field, in the Middle East and globally, and specifies the individual profiles of Palestinian diaspora entrepreneurs.

The Impact of Host-states and Places Within Them on Diaspora Mobilizations

Closer focused on host-states in which diaspora entrepreneurs live, Chapter 10 presents a comparative discussion. The empirical chapters (4–9) have demonstrated that analysts cannot make clear-cut comparisons of host-states, unless considering a transnational social field perspective: the UK has been the hub for mobilization for Palestinians, France for Armenians, and Switzerland and Germany for Kosovo Albanians in Europe, apart from the US. The chapter argues that host-states are not to be treated as units of analysis for controlled comparisons but should be considered as contexts of embeddedness that empower diaspora entrepreneurs in specific ways. Such approach is in line with scholarly efforts to analyse beyond methodological nationalism. The chapter argues, while a diaspora entrepreneur’s contextual embeddedness is not powerful enough to explain the contentiousness of diaspora mobilizations, it shapes the socio-spatial positionality of individual diaspora entrepreneurs. The discussion focuses on three dimensions: migration incorporation regimes, systems of interest representation, and decentralization patterns of these host-states. Empirical evidence from the Albanian, Armenian, and Palestinian diasporas shows that diaspora entrepreneurs are shaped in their migrant integration experiences, engagement through federal vs unitary systems of states, with trade unions, host-land political parties, and protest politics. Also, certain places within these host-states, such as London and Sheffield in the UK, Berlin and Stuttgart in Germany, Malmö and Gothenburg in Sweden, The Hague in the Netherlands, Paris in France, and Zurich and Geneva in Switzerland, play an important role for diaspora mobilizations but do not explain their contentiousness.

Conclusions

Chapter 11 summarizes the two-level typological theory and empirical evidence from the three transnational social fields of the Armenian, Albanian, and Palestinian diasporas. A chart summarizes how the different types of diaspora entrepreneurs are more or less present on the nine causal pathways, followed by a discussion. A causal pathway, even if not always present in each case, gets repeated across the three transnational social fields, hence allowing for comparative generalization. The chapter demonstrates the relevance of this book’s findings to recent conversations about diasporas’ public diplomacy, soft power, authoritarian states’ outreach to diasporas abroad, and the diasporas’ autonomy. It appeals to look at how homeland governments, non-state actors, and political parties have different capacities to penetrate the diaspora and engage specific personalities within it. Preliminary empirical evidence shows how the theoretical approach of this book speaks to other cases. The evidence relates to diaspora linkages to other de facto states (Tamil Eelam, Taiwan), a stateless diaspora related to multiple fragile states in the Middle East (Kurdish), diasporas linked to both weak and fragile states (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Syria), and to relatively stronger states with significant diasporas abroad (Bulgaria, Poland and Ukraine). The conclusions feature policy recommendations.

Armenian Diaspora Mobilization for Nagorno-Karabakh and Genocide Recognition

This chapter and the previous Chapter 8 are interconnected as they both discuss Armenian diaspora mobilizations. This chapter unravels the typological theory through five causal pathways. Mobilizations took place most often when host-state foreign policies diverged from the diaspora goals for Karabakh’s statehood, and Armenian genocide recognition. The most contentious pathway is associated with the response to violent critical events in the homeland, most notably the 1988 Sumgait pogrom and Karabakh war in the 1990s. Dual-pronged contention occurred when Armenia’s government clashed with the diaspora on issues of genocide recognition throughout the 1990s. Although the conflict diminished thereafter, the Armenian government has been reluctant to turn to the diaspora for political support in Europe, but it seeks it primarily for economic, social, and development projects. Dual-pronged contention also occurred when transnationalized parties mobilized for genocide recognition. For Dashnaks this has been the most important homeland-oriented goal. Other diaspora entrepreneurs lobbied and protested as well, even if they also mobilized on different social, cultural, and educational projects. Largely non-contentious activities followed political parties in France, leader of European efforts for genocide recognition, as well as when diaspora entrepreneurs acted on limited global influences, building business platforms, or engaging in medical, social, and economic support for Armenia and Karabakh.