Albanian Diaspora Mobilization for Kosovo Statehood

Author(s):  
Maria Koinova

This chapter and the previous Chapter 4 are interconnected as they both discuss Albanian diaspora mobilizations. This chapter unpacks the typological theory through seven causal pathways in the Kosovo Albanian transnational social field. Three of these are associated with the secessionist period of the 1990s, when the foreign policies of host-states diverged from the diaspora goal of Kosovo independence. A relatively rare non-contentious pathway occurred when diaspora entrepreneurs acted autonomously under limited global influences. A more common dual-pronged approach pathway was visible when diaspora entrepreneurs were exposed to two non-state actors, the non-violent Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the radical Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In a contentious pathway, almost everyone in the diaspora was engulfed in response to the 1998–9 warfare. Four causal pathways occurred when host-land foreign policies were more open to endorse Kosovo’s statehood. Dual-pronged mobilization was visible under the influences of mob violence in Kosovo in 2004. The rest of the pathways were non-contentious. Acting autonomously, diaspora entrepreneurs developed political and cultural projects aimed to raise Kosovo’s status abroad. Under the homeland government’s influence diaspora entrepreneurs pursued public diplomacy, celebrity and football diplomacy, the building of cultural centres, education exchanges, and curriculum for the diaspora. When exposed to homeland parties, diaspora entrepreneurs followed political party dynamics, whether supporting or challenging them.

Author(s):  
Maria Koinova

This chapter and the previous Chapter 6 are interconnected as they both discuss Albanian diaspora mobilizations. This chapter unpacks the typological theory through four causal pathways in the Palestinian field, one of them discussed twice as diaspora entrepreneurs were exposed to different non-state actors. All pathways occurred under host-state foreign policy divergence from the diaspora goals for Palestinian statehood, including refugees’ return. A non-contentious pathway exists but was rare when diaspora entrepreneurs acted under limited global influences. When lacking support from politicized homeland-based actors, diaspora entrepreneurs were less eager to launch contentious mobilizations on their own. Dual-pronged contentious mobilizations occurred: (a) when the homeland government was transnationally involved, under the PNA leadership, acting carefully while seeking to maintain international standing in difficult political circumstances; (b) when transnational left-wing movements were at play; many more diaspora entrepreneurs were on this pathway, seeking to counteract Israeli policies, quite often engaged in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign; and (c) when diaspora entrepreneurs related to transnational Islamic networks. Issues related to humanitarian charities and refugees’ right of return have been emphasized, even if they also have concerned others in the diaspora. The most contentious pathway occurred in response to critical violent events in the original homeland or adjacent fragile states, most notably due to the recurring warfare in Gaza since 2008. This pathway engulfed all four types of diaspora entrepreneurs.


Author(s):  
Maria Koinova

This chapter and the previous Chapter 8 are interconnected as they both discuss Armenian diaspora mobilizations. This chapter unravels the typological theory through five causal pathways. Mobilizations took place most often when host-state foreign policies diverged from the diaspora goals for Karabakh’s statehood, and Armenian genocide recognition. The most contentious pathway is associated with the response to violent critical events in the homeland, most notably the 1988 Sumgait pogrom and Karabakh war in the 1990s. Dual-pronged contention occurred when Armenia’s government clashed with the diaspora on issues of genocide recognition throughout the 1990s. Although the conflict diminished thereafter, the Armenian government has been reluctant to turn to the diaspora for political support in Europe, but it seeks it primarily for economic, social, and development projects. Dual-pronged contention also occurred when transnationalized parties mobilized for genocide recognition. For Dashnaks this has been the most important homeland-oriented goal. Other diaspora entrepreneurs lobbied and protested as well, even if they also mobilized on different social, cultural, and educational projects. Largely non-contentious activities followed political parties in France, leader of European efforts for genocide recognition, as well as when diaspora entrepreneurs acted on limited global influences, building business platforms, or engaging in medical, social, and economic support for Armenia and Karabakh.


Author(s):  
Maria Koinova

Why do conflict-generated diasporas mobilize in contentious and non-contentious ways or use mixed strategies of contention? Why do they channel their homeland-oriented goals through host-states, transnational networks, and international organizations? This book develops a theory of socio-spatial positionality and its implications for the individual agency of diaspora entrepreneurs, moving beyond essentialized notions of diasporas as groups. Individual diaspora entrepreneurs operate in transnational social fields affecting their mobilizations beyond dynamics confined to host-states and original home-states. There are four types of diaspora entrepreneurs—Broker, Local, Distant, and Reserved—depending on the relative strength of their socio-spatial linkages to host-land, on the one hand, and original homeland and other global locations, on the other. A two-level typological theory captures nine causal pathways, unravelling how the socio-spatial linkages of these diaspora entrepreneurs interact with external factors: host-land foreign policies, homeland governments, parties, non-state actors, and critical events or limited global influences. Such pathways produce mobilization trajectories with varying levels of contention and methods of channelling homeland-oriented goals. Non-contentious pathways often occur when host-state foreign policies are convergent with the diaspora entrepreneurs’ goals, and when diaspora entrepreneurs can act autonomously. Dual-pronged contention pathways occur quite often, under the influence of homeland governments, non-state actors, and political parties. The most contentious pathway occurs in response to violent critical events in the homeland or adjacent to it fragile states. This book is informed by 300 interviews and a dataset of 146 interviews with diaspora entrepreneurs among the Albanian, Armenian, and Palestinian diasporas in the UK, Germany, France, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, as well as Kosovo and Armenia in the European neighbourhood.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 339-369
Author(s):  
David Romano

The analysis presented here offers a possible framework for understanding when sub-state actors behave prudently and more strategically in their foreign relations, and when other priorities might instead heighten the chances of seemingly irrational, erratic, or dangerous, foreign policies. Using a case study of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq to illustrate the argument, the author attempts to show how “regime consolidation” plays a key role in allowing such actors to prioritise policies aimed at grappling with external challenges, threats and opportunities. Internally legitimate, consolidated regimes can better present “one face” to the outside world and behave more strategically in the international arena.  Political systems lacking consolidation or internal legitimacy, in contrast, turn to the external environment in search of resources to help them with domestic threats and challenges. This may lead to seemingly erratic, unpredictable and risky foreign policies on their part. Abstract in Kurmanji Aktorên bin-dewletî û girtina rîskên siyaseta derve: Hikûmeta Herêma Kurdistanê ya Iraqê Analîza ku li vir hatiye pêşkêşkirin çarçoveyeke muhtemel ji bo fehmkirina demên ku aktorên bin-dewletî di têkiliyên xwe yên derve de bi hişyarî û stratejîk tevdigerin û demên di dewsê de pêşkiyên din şansên siyaseta derve yên xeternak, guherbar û îrrasyonel didine ber xwe. Bi bikaranîna mînaka Hikûmeta Herêma Kurdistanê ya Iraqê nivîskar hewl dide ku nîşan bide ka çawa “xurtkirina rejîmê” roleke serekî dilîze di destûrdana van aktoran de ku pêşekiyê bidin polîtîkayên ku bi dijwarî, tehdît û talûkeyên derve bigre. Rejîmên di hundir de meşrû û xurt dikarin baştir “rûyekî” nîşanê cîhana derve bidin û di qada navneteweyî de bêhtir stratejîk tevbigerin. Lê belê sîstemên siyasî yên ne xurt û di hundir de ne meşrû jî berê xwe didin derdora derve di lêgerîna çavkaniyan de da ku alîkariya wan bikin ji bo talûke û zehmetiyên hundirîn. Ev dikare bibe sedem ku ew polîtîkayên derveyî yên birîsk, netexmînbar û hevnegir ên berçav bigrin ji aliyê xwe ve. Abstract in Sorani Ektere dewllete lawekeyyekan û xoleqerey metrisî danî syasetî derewe: hkumetî herêmî kurdistanî ‘êrraq Ew şîkaryaney lêreda amadekrawn , çwarçêweyekî guncaw pêşkeş dekat bo têgeyiştin lewey le katêkda ektere dewllete lawekîyekan beşêweyekî wiryayane û sitratîjyanetir le peywendîyekanî derewey xoyanda hellsukewt deken, we katêkîş ewlewîyetekanî tir renge şansî ewey le rukeşda wek syasetî derekî na'eqllanî, namo, yan trisnak derdekewêt berizbkatewe. Hkumetî herêmî kurdistanî 'êraq wek keysî twêjînewe bekarhatuwe bo rûnkirdnewey ew argumêntey ke nûser hewll dedat nîşanî bdat çon “ptewkirdnî rjêm” rollêkî serekî debînêt le rêgedan bew core ekterane bo ewey ew syasetane bkate ewlewîyet ke amanc lêy berberekanêy allingarîy û hereşe û derfete drekîyekane. Ew rjêmaney ke şer'îyetî nawxoyyan heye û çespawn baştir detwanin “yek rûîy” pîşanî dinyay derewe bken û le meydanî nêwdewlletîşda sitratîjyanetir hellsukewt bken. Bepêçewanewe, ew sîsteme syasyaney ke neçespawn û şer'îyetî nawxoyyan kurtidênêt, le gerran bedway serçawekanda rû le jîngey derekî deken bo ewey yarmetîyan bda le herreşe û allingarîye nawxoyyekan. Eme lewaneye wabkat ke ew syasete derekîyaney ke be namo, pêşbînî nekraw û metrisîdar derdekewn le terefî ewanewe bêt. Abstract in Zazaki Faîlê bindewletkî û rîskgêrîya sîyasetê teberî: Hukmatê Herêmê Kurdîstanî yê Îraqî   No analîzê tîyayî seba fehmkerdişê wextê ke faîlê bindewletkîyî têkilîyanê xo yê teberî de bitedbîr û hîna zaf stratejîk hereket kenê û wexto ke herinda ci de prîorîteyê bînî asayîş ra gore îhtîmalê polîtîkayanê teberî yê bêmantiq, bêqerar yan zî xeternakan kenê zêde, ci rê çarçewayêka potansîyele pêşkêş keno. Bi xebata nimûneyî yê Hukmatê Herêmê Kurdîstanî yê Îraqî no arguman nîşan dîyeno. Nuştox wazeno bimusno ke “konsolîdasyonê rejîmî” senî rolêko sereke gêno ke tede kerdoxanê winasîyan rê destûr dîyeno ke polîtîkayanê xo yê çareserkerdişê zehmetî, tehdîd û îmkananê teberî prîorîtîze bikerê. Eke zere de meşrû yê, rejîmê kondolîdekerdeyî eşkenê xo bi “yew rî” teber rê bimusnê û sahneya mîyanneteweyîye de hîna zaf stratejîk hereket bikerê. Heto bîn ra, sîstemê sîyasîyî ke tede konsolîdasyon yan zî meşrûîyetê zereyî çin ê, ê xo çarnenê dorûverê xo yê teberî ke seba helkerdişê tehdîd û zehmetîyanê zereyî ro çimeyan bigêre. No seba înan beno ke bibo sebebê polîtîkayanê teberî yê bêqerar, nevervînbar û rîzîkodaran.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 49-65
Author(s):  
Binod Khanda Timilsana

Soft power, according to Nye, is a particular power of attraction to a state based on the appeal of its culture, political values, and foreign policies (Nye Jr. 2004, p. 11, 2008, p. 96). In the changing paradigms of state powers from military strength, economic might, political power, technological competency to soft power endeavors, identification of own soft power is the process of measuring own strength. Hard power measures can be observed from out sides as well but soft power potentialities will not appear easily without systematic attempt to expose them in front of international actors. Hard power measurement is easy and more exact than soft power qualities. There are very limited academic attempts visible in identification of Nepal’s soft power. Great soft powers of the world are visible and measurable through soft power indices developed by different think tanks and research agencies. The soft power 30 and Global Soft Power Index are exemplary forums engaged in ranking states in terms of soft powers. Reputation, influence, political values, culture, foreign policies, enterprise, culture, digital, governance, engagements and education are the indicators of soft power. The newly explained taxonomy of soft power includes four subunits of soft power namely resources, instruments, receptions and outcomes. Buddhism is a powerful soft power resource of Nepal. Conflict resolution and peace process model of Nepal is another potential soft power. Culture, engagement in multilateral global and regional forum, natural beauty with the world is highest Mt. Everest, diasporic community of Nepal, social networks, public diplomacy and personal diplomacy are remarkable soft power properties of Nepal. Nonetheless, identification of Nepal’s soft power is in very preliminary phase.


This chapter considers the ways in which selected perspectives from the new public diplomacy, as well as established forms of diplomatic study of both state and non-state actors, can illuminate and enhance an understanding of the history and growth of the governing body of world football and the "continental" confederations recognized by FIFA. In turn, it reflect on the ways in which a rigorous study of sporting institutions such as FIFA can contribute to an understanding of the crossover between sport development, sport governance and related forms of diplomacy. A new analysis of the cultural and political dynamics of the developments of FIFA’s regional bodues warrants a forensic approach to the analysis of the historical phases of the confederations emergence. The chapter therefore considers the cases of the formative years of CONCACAF and OCEANIA, small players initially in global football politics but by 2016 providing 52 full members of FIFA, almost a quarter of the powerbrokers making up the 209 members of its Congress. In conclusion, the generally unacknowledged contribution of sport governing bodies to forms of diplomatic practice and relations is reconsidered, in the comparative light of other studies within the book, and the detailed consideration in this chapter of the selected phase of FIFA and confederation development.


Author(s):  
Leonardo Cardoso

The chapter focuses on two law enforcement institutions. The first is the police, one of the most visible state actors in the city and a recurrent choice for dealing with community noise. The second institution is the Urban Silence Program (Programa de Silêncio Urbano, or PSIU), a municipal agency created in 1994. After tracing the administrative flows inside the police and the PSIU, I suggest a comparative analysis of the two institutions. By following sound as it circulates within each of these governmental bodies, I argue that, different than the groups considered so far, the main concern for the executive branch is not so much ontological or epistemological issues surrounding noise, but rather consolidating (1) legal-bureaucratic stability, (2) budgetary principles, and (3) political party affiliations.


Author(s):  
Jan Christoph Bublitz

Whether there are intrinsic differences between different means to intervene into brains and minds is a key question of neuroethics, which any future legal regulation of mind-interventions has to face. This chapter affirms such differences by a twofold argument:. First, it present differences between direct (biological, physiological) and indirect (psychological) interventions that are not based on crude mind–brain dualisms or dubious properties such as naturalness of interventions. Second, it shows why these differences (should) matter for the law. In a nutshell, this chapter suggests that indirect interventions should be understood as stimuli that persons perceive through their external senses whereas direct interventions reach brains and minds on different, nonperceptual routes. Interventions primarily differ in virtue of their causal pathways. Because of them, persons have different kinds and amounts of control over interventions; direct interventions regularly bypass resistance and control of recipients. Direct interventions also differ from indirect ones because they misappropriate mechanisms of the brain. These differences bear normative relevance in light of the right to mental self-determination, which should be the guiding normative principle with respect to mind-interventions. As a consequence, the law should adopt by and large a normative—not ontological—dualism between interventions into other minds: nonconsensual direct interventions into other minds should be prohibited by law, with few exceptions. By contrast, indirect interventions should be prima facie permissible, primarily those that qualify as exercises of free speech. The chapter also addresses a range of recent objections, especially by Levy (in the previous chapter).


Author(s):  
Hasok Chang

This chapter presents a commentary on the move from the descriptive to the etiological perspective in psychiatry, as discussed in the previous chapter. It also raises additional considerations, including the notion of the “cause” of non-existent things, epistemic iteration and evolving meaning, and description and latent class analysis (LCA).


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