The Explanatory Autonomy of Cognitive Models

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Weiskopf
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Models ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
Neural Models ◽  
Brain System ◽  
Mechanistic Explanations ◽  
Behavioral Phenomena ◽  
The Mind

Psychology and neuroscience offer distinctive ways of modeling the mind/brain. However, cognitive and neural models often have significantly different structures, raising challenging questions about how they should be integrated to provide a complete picture of how the mind/brain system is organized. According to a certain mechanistic perspective, cognitive models should be viewed as being sketchy, incomplete versions of the fuller and more adequate models produced by neuroscience. Psychology is essentially an approximation to the mechanistic explanations given in neuroscience. Cognitive models are inherently inadequate, pending their gaps being filled in by a completed neuroscientific model. I argue that cognitive models are autonomous: they are sufficient in themselves to give adequate explanations of psychological and behavioral phenomena. In particular, they are not mere sketches, or approximations to underlying neuroscientific explanations. I offer a criterion for how psychological entities and processes may be real despite not mapping onto entities in neural mechanisms.

scholarly journals From cognitive to neural models of working memory

2007 ◽  
Vol 362 (1481) ◽  
pp. 761-772 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark D'Esposito
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Functional Neuroimaging ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Cognitive Models ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Long Term Memory ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Internal Representations ◽  
Active Maintenance

Working memory refers to the temporary retention of information that was just experienced or just retrieved from long-term memory but no longer exists in the external environment. These internal representations are short-lived, but can be stored for longer periods of time through active maintenance or rehearsal strategies, and can be subjected to various operations that manipulate the information in such a way that makes it useful for goal-directed behaviour. Empirical studies of working memory using neuroscientific techniques, such as neuronal recordings in monkeys or functional neuroimaging in humans, have advanced our knowledge of the underlying neural mechanisms of working memory. This rich dataset can be reconciled with behavioural findings derived from investigating the cognitive mechanisms underlying working memory. In this paper, I review the progress that has been made towards this effort by illustrating how investigations of the neural mechanisms underlying working memory can be influenced by cognitive models and, in turn, how cognitive models can be shaped and modified by neuroscientific data. One conclusion that arises from this research is that working memory can be viewed as neither a unitary nor a dedicated system. A network of brain regions, including the prefrontal cortex (PFC), is critical for the active maintenance of internal representations that are necessary for goal-directed behaviour. Thus, working memory is not localized to a single brain region but probably is an emergent property of the functional interactions between the PFC and the rest of the brain.

scholarly journals Internet News Headlines: Ontological and Orthological Aspects

2021 ◽  
pp. 122-138
Author(s):  
E. N. Shirokova
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Models ◽  
Multidimensional Analysis ◽  
Internet News ◽  
Grammatical Errors ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Pragmatic Aspects ◽  
News Headlines ◽  
Semantic Interaction

The author presents the results of a multidimensional analysis of Internet news headlines based on the headings of the Yandex news aggregator. The issue of the text status of news headlines is considered. When solving this problem, special attention is paid to the formation of correlative paradigms of headings, united by a common denotative meaning. Methods of semantic interaction of heading paradigms based on different types of topic-rhematic deployment are described. It is proved that the paradigms of headings, complementing each other in informational and pragmatic aspects, form the discourse of Internet headings. It is concluded that this way of functioning of headlines enhances their semantic and visual autonomy from the news text, which allows us to consider Internet news headlines as minitext. The frequency methods of lexico-syntactic transformations of the original headings are analyzed, on the basis of which the constituents of paradigms are formed. At the same time, attention is focused on the orthological aspect of Internet headers. The author comes to the conclusion that the focus on the variability and efficiency of headings leads not only to the appearance of lexical and grammatical errors, but also to their replication and consolidation in the mind of the addressee as a result of changes in the structure of cognitive models.

scholarly journals Aprendizagem e normalidade: reflexões sobre o "não" aprender como parâmetro de exclusão

2019 ◽  
Vol 88 (219) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Luisa Bissoto
Keyword(s):  
Special Needs ◽  
Social Exclusion ◽  
Mental Deficiency ◽  
Cognitive Models ◽  
Educational Practices ◽  
The Mind

Tem como objetivo discutir a (não) aprendizagem de conceitos acadêmicos e de condutas e hábitos socialmente validados como parâmetro de (a)normalidade e, assim, de exclusão social. A argumentação base é a de que as definições de (a)normalidade, principalmente as que categorizam a deficiência mental, se atêm, primeiramente, a determinadas concepções do que é a mente, do que significa aprender e de quem é o sujeito cognoscente, antes que a atributos portados pelo "anormal" em si. Metodologicamente, a questão da constituição da (a)normalidade da aprendizagem é analisada sob três modelos de cognição: o cognitivismo, o conexionismo e o dinamicismo. Pelos resultados se levanta a reflexão de que, concebendo-se a cognição por referenciais teóricos ligados ao dinamicismo, as delimitações de anormalidade mental, ora existentes, se fragilizam. Como conclusão, longe de negar a existência da deficiência, se assevera que é possível conceber o deficiente como um ser não afastado da ordem, abrindo caminhos para pensar práticas socioeducacionais que lhe permitam constituir-se, de fato, como sujeito. Palavras-chave: aprendizagem; cognição; deficiência; sujeito cognoscente. Abstract The aim of this article is to debate the (non) learning of academic concepts, behaviors and habits socially validated as parameter of (ab)normality, and thus, of social exclusion. The basic claim is that the current definitions of (ab)normality, mainly the ones that categorize the mental deficiency, if abides firstly to definitive conceptions about "what is the mind", "what does it mean to learn" and "who is the cognoscenti being"; before that the attributes carried for the "abnormal person" himself. Methodologically speaking the question of the learning ab(normality) constitution is analyzed in three cognitive models: the cognitivism, the conexionism and the dynamicism. From the results, one reflects the following: when conceiving cognition on dynamicism, the existing theoretical bias of mental abnormality is powerless. Far from the denying the existence of the deficiency as conclusion, one claims that it is possible to conceive the person with special needs not as a being drawn away from the order, opening ways to think socio-educational practices that allows him to be, in fact, a being. Keywords: learning; cognition; deficiency; cognoscente being.

On the proper treatment of connectionism

1988 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Smolensky
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Modeling ◽  
Cognitive Models ◽  
Massively Parallel ◽  
Neural Models ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Connectionist Models ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Sequential Rule ◽  
Computational Systems ◽  
Level Of Analysis

AbstractA set of hypotheses is formulated for a connectionist approach to cognitive modeling. These hypotheses are shown to be incompatible with the hypotheses underlying traditional cognitive models. The connectionist models considered are massively parallel numerical computational systems that are a kind of continuous dynamical system. The numerical variables in the system correspond semantically to fine-grained features below the level of the concepts consciously used to describe the task domain. The level of analysis is intermediate between those of symbolic cognitive models and neural models. The explanations of behavior provided are like those traditional in the physical sciences, unlike the explanations provided by symbolic models.Higher-level analyses of these connectionist models reveal subtle relations to symbolic models. Parallel connectionist memory and linguistic processes are hypothesized to give rise to processes that are describable at a higher level as sequential rule application. At the lower level, computation has the character of massively parallel satisfaction of soft numerical constraints; at the higher level, this can lead to competence characterizable by hard rules. Performance will typically deviate from this competence since behavior is achieved not by interpreting hard rules but by satisfying soft constraints. The result is a picture in which traditional and connectionist theoretical constructs collaborate intimately to provide an understanding of cognition.

Brain-Mind

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Thagard
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Comprehensive Treatment ◽  
Cognition And Emotion ◽  
The Social ◽  
Multiple Levels ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Action Intention

Minds enable people to perceive, imagine, solve problems, understand, learn, speak, reason, create, and be emotional and conscious. Competing explanations of how the mind works have identified it as soul, computer, brain, dynamical system, or social construction. This book explains minds in terms of interacting mechanisms operating at multiple levels, including the social, mental, neural, and molecular. Brain–Mind presents a unified, brain-based theory of cognition and emotion with applications to the most complex kinds of thinking, right up to consciousness and creativity. Unification comes from systematic application of Chris Eliasmith’s powerful new Semantic Pointer Architecture, a highly original synthesis of neural network and symbolic ideas about how the mind works. The book shows the relevance of semantic pointers to a full range of important kinds of mental representations, from sensations and imagery to concepts, rules, analogies, and emotions. Neural mechanisms are used to explain many phenomena concerning consciousness, action, intention, language, creativity, and the self. This book belongs to a trio that includes Mind–Society: From Brains to Social Sciences and Professions and Natural Philosophy: From Social Brains to Knowledge, Reality, Morality, and Beauty. They can be read independently, but together they make up a Treatise on Mind and Society that provides a unified and comprehensive treatment of the cognitive sciences, social sciences, professions, and humanities.

scholarly journals Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paweł Gładziejewski
Keyword(s):  
Error Detection ◽  
Internal Representation ◽  
Functional Architecture ◽  
Internal Representations ◽  
Cognitive Mechanism ◽  
Mechanistic Explanations ◽  
Structural Resemblance ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Action Guidance

AbstractDespite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a (truly, genuinely, nontrivially, etc.) representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition.

Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 63-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Process Information ◽  
Conscious Mind ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Ice Cube ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind

In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection (Chalmers 1996, 4; 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem — also known astheproblem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995, 201) — is the problem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee,’ to ‘touch an ice cube,’ to ‘look at a sunset,’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it feel like anything at all?

Neuroökonomie – Grundlagen und Grenzen

2007 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Pauen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Basic Research ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Human Decision ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Widespread View

AbstractAccording to a widespread view, neuroscientific basic research tells us more about the essence of the mind than psychology and may, in the long run, even replace those higher level approaches. Contrary to this view, it is demonstrated that many features can only be observed and explained on a certain level of complexity. This is particularly obvious in the case of neuromarketing and neuroeconomics. In both cases, neuroscientific methods depend on behavioral paradigms. Still, neuroscientific research in these fields may enhance our understanding of the underlying neural mechanisms. In addition, neuroeconomics provide excellent conditions for the study of human decision making.

scholarly journals A Case for Cognitive Models in Visualization Research

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lace Padilla
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Cognitive Model ◽  
Cognitive Models ◽  
User Studies ◽  
Integrative Model ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Framework ◽  
The Mind

The visualization community has seen a rise in the adoption of user studies. Empirical user studies systematically test the assumptions that we make about how visualizations can help or hinder viewers' performance of tasks. Although the increase in user studies is encouraging, it is vital that research on human reasoning with visualizations be grounded in an understanding of how the mind functions. Previously, there were no sufficient models that illustrate the process of decision-making with visualizations. However, Padilla et al., 2018 recently proposed an integrative model for decision-making with visualizations, which expands on modern theories of visualization cognition and decision-making. In this paper, we provide insights into how cognitive models can accelerate innovation, improve validity, and facilitate replication efforts, which have yet to be thoroughly discussed in the visualization community. To do this, we offer a compact overview of the cognitive science of decision-making with visualizations for the visualization community, using the Padilla et al., 2018 cognitive model as a guiding framework. By detailing examples of visualization research that illustrate each component of the model, this paper offers novel insights into how visualization researchers can utilize a cognitive framework to guide their user studies. We provide practical examples of each component of the model from empirical studies of visualizations, along with visualization implications of each cognitive process, which have not been directly addressed in prior work. Finally, this work offers a case study in utilizing an understanding of human cognition to generate a novel solution to a visualization reasoning bias in the context of hurricane forecast track visualizations.

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