Imagining the Sounds Themselves

Author(s):  
Malcolm Riddoch

Malcolm Riddoch investigates the relationship between the auditory imagination and our perception of sound. He states that, from a physical perspective, both imaginary and externally stimulated sound would seem to be the product of neurological processes. From a phenomenological perspective, however, phenomenal sound is fundamentally something that is heard. This apparent paradox leads Riddoch, via the “hard problem of consciousness,” to present and discuss a number of different forms and understandings of “sound” and to eventually posit that the sounds themselves—imagined or externally stimulated—are “nonphysical phenomena disclosed in the lived experience of hearkening to the meaningful sounds one hears in the world.”

2021 ◽  
pp. 320-342
Author(s):  
Valia Allori

Quantum mechanics is a groundbreaking theory: it not only is extraordinarily empirically adequate but also is claimed to having shattered the classical paradigm of understanding the observer-observed distinction as well as the part-whole relation. This, together with other quantum features, has been taken to suggest that quantum theory can help one understand the mind-body relation in a unique way, in particular to solve the hard problem of consciousness along the lines of panpsychism. In this chapter, after having briefly presented panpsychism, Valia Allori discusses the main features of quantum theories and the way in which the main quantum theories of consciousness use them to account for conscious experience.


Arts ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 129
Author(s):  
Sigrún Alba Sigurðardóttir

The past 20 years have seen a shift in Icelandic photography from postmodern aesthetics towards a more phenomenological perspective that explores the relationship between subjective and affective truth on the one hand, and the outside world on the other hand. Rather than telling a story about the world as it is or as the photographer wants it to appear, the focus is on communicating with the world, and with the viewer. The photograph is seen as a creative medium that can be used to reflect how we experience and make sense of the world, or how we are and dwell in the world. In this paper, I introduce the theme of poetic storytelling in the context of contemporary photography in Iceland and other Nordic Countries. Poetic storytelling is a term I have been developing to describe a certain lyrical way to use a photograph as a narrative medium in reaction to the climate crisis and to a general lack of relation to oneself and to the world in times of increased acceleration in the society. In my article I analyze works by a few leading Icelandic photographers (Katrín Elvarsdóttir, Heiða Helgadóttir and Hallgerður Hallgrímsdóttir) and put them in context with works by artists from Denmark (Joakim Eskildsen, Christina Capetillo and Astrid Kruse Jensen), Sweden (Helene Schmitz) and Finland (Hertta Kiiski) artists within the frame of poetic storytelling. Poetic storytelling is about a way to use a photograph as a narrative medium in an attempt to grasp a reality which is neither fully objective nor subjective, but rather a bit of both.


Author(s):  
Daniel Stoljar

According to the epistemic view of the hard problem of consciousness, we are ignorant at least for the time being of something important and relevant when it comes to the hard problem, and this fact has a significant implication for its solution. This chapter outlines one version of the view before considering two objections. The first is that, while we may be ignorant of various features of the world, we are not ignorant of any feature that is relevant to the hard problem. The second is that, even if the epistemic approach is true, properly understood it is not an answer to the hard problem; indeed, it is no contribution to that problem at all. The chapter concludes with some brief reflections on why the epistemic approach, despite its attractiveness, remains a minority view in contemporary philosophy of mind.


Author(s):  
Monika Szuba

Following Kathleen Jamie’s words that ‘poetry is a sort of connective tissue where myself meets the world, and it rises out of that, that liminal place’, the chapter discusses Jamie’s poetic work from a phenomenological perspective. An important aspect of Jamie’s writing, connectivity highlights interrelations between the world and poetic form and as such is examined in a theoretically-informed analysis. The chapter argues that in a place where the poet meets the world, poetic language negotiates external factors that have an impact upon it, and in doing so, the poet can begin to illuminate lived experience. In the process of writing a temporary self that evokes the experience of the world through embodied participation, temporality plays an important role. As Jamie demonstrates in her writing, the perception of the land — and our coexistence with it — is affected by the awareness of the passage of time. The discussion focuses on the poems recording the experience of landscape represented in past, present and future considerations of change, and examines how in Jamie’s writing a sense of permanence is intermingled with a pervasive sense of transience. It centres around Jamie’s emphasis on transitoriness, which foregrounds the temporality of our dwelling.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Klein ◽  
Andrew B Barron

Abstract For the materialist, the hard problem is fundamentally an explanatory problem. Solving it requires explaining why the relationship between brain and experience is the way it is and not some other way. We use the tools of the interventionist theory of explanation to show how a systematic experimental project could help move beyond the hard problem. Key to this project is the development of second-order interventions and invariant generalizations. Such interventions played a crucial scientific role in untangling other scientific mysteries, and we suggest that the same will be true of consciousness. We further suggest that the capacity for safe and reliable self-intervention will play a key role in overcoming both the hard and meta-problems of consciousness. Finally, we evaluate current strategies for intervention, with an eye to how they might be improved.


2009 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-107
Author(s):  
Joanneliese de Lucas FREITAS

The present article has the objective of examining how we can understand the therapeutic relationship from the dialogue with the Merleau-Ponty's concept of other. The human interaction and communication in the psychotherapeutic contexts are discussed utilizing the understanding of psychotherapeutic relationship in Gestalt-therapy. The subject of dialog and the encounter are raised from the paradox I-other as well as the understanding of corporeity as part of the man-world field. The article presents the idea that in a therapeutic relationship both psychotherapist and client must encounter with each other in their differences. That being said, the therapeutic stance implies a non-stop search for the comprehension and the availability of the other so that the client may come to grasp himself through the differences that emerges at the therapist-client field. The psychotherapist must act on the field of the relationship and, therefore, operate as an opening between the client and the world as an effort to reach the lived-experience of his client.


Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (9) ◽  
pp. 1226
Author(s):  
Garrett Mindt

The hard problem of consciousness has been a perennially vexing issue for the study of consciousness, particularly in giving a scientific and naturalized account of phenomenal experience. At the heart of the hard problem is an often-overlooked argument, which is at the core of the hard problem, and that is the structure and dynamics (S&D) argument. In this essay, I will argue that we have good reason to suspect that the S&D argument given by David Chalmers rests on a limited conception of S&D properties, what in this essay I’m calling extrinsic structure and dynamics. I argue that if we take recent insights from the complexity sciences and from recent developments in Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Consciousness, that we get a more nuanced picture of S&D, specifically, a class of properties I’m calling intrinsic structure and dynamics. This I think opens the door to a broader class of properties with which we might naturally and scientifically explain phenomenal experience, as well as the relationship between syntactic, semantic, and intrinsic notions of information. I argue that Chalmers’ characterization of structure and dynamics in his S&D argument paints them with too broad a brush and fails to account for important nuances, especially when considering accounting for a system’s intrinsic properties. Ultimately, my hope is to vindicate a certain species of explanation from the S&D argument, and by extension dissolve the hard problem of consciousness at its core, by showing that not all structure and dynamics are equal.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-232
Author(s):  
Pietro Terzi

Abstract In Specters of Marx, Derrida suggests that the most fundamental condition of phenomenality lies in the ambiguous status of the noema, defined as an intentional and non-real component of Erlebnis, neither “in” the world nor “in” consciousness. This “irreality” of the noematic correlate is conceived by Derrida as the origin of sense and experience. Already in his Of Grammatology, Derrida maintained that the difference between the appearing and the appearance, between the world and the lived experience, is the condition of all other differences. Unfortunately, Derrida limits himself to a few self-evident remarks, without further elaborating. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, to contextualize Derrida’s interpretation of the noema from a theoretical and historical perspective; on the other hand, to show its effects on the early moments of Derrida’s philosophy. The result will shed light on a neglected issue in the relationship between deconstruction and phenomenology.


Author(s):  
Joseph Walsh

Psychotic symptoms, which are significant features of several mental disorders, can severely compromise a client’s ability to engage successfully in interpersonal relationships. All psychosocial interventions depend on a practitioner’s ability to establish a positive relationship with a client, but this can be especially difficult with psychotic persons due to their irrational perceptions of the world. Still, it is important to realize that these clients want to experience interpersonal connections even as they are often fearful of risking them. Only by developing an appreciation for the lived experience of psychotic clients can social workers maximize their potential to develop a relationship of trust. The purposes of this chapter are to examine the relationship capacities of clients who are psychotic and to present strategies for social workers to engage with them.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Huskinson

Jung's metaphor of house as psyche is often regarded as little more than an arbitrary and reductive ‘diagram’ that imposes structure onto his conception of psyche with its various parts and underpinning libidinal processes. And yet, as this paper argues, the impact and relevance of the architectural metaphor extends beyond a conceptual consideration of psyche into a lived experience of it. It is thus also Jung's phenomenological description of the way human beings dwell and experience their placement or non-placement within the world in which they find themselves. This paper elucidates these different interpretations. First, through Jung's accounts of his ‘dream-house’ in connection with the likely architectural influences of those houses in which he had lived or had designs to live; and second, through an examination of a curious mistranslation of one of Jung's overlooked descriptions of the architectural metaphor found in the celebrated work, La poetique de l'espace (1957)/The poetics of space (1958) by the renowned French philosopher Gaston Bachelard. The metaphorical description under scrutiny is the relationship between cellar and attic rooms, which Jung uses in his essay ‘Allgemeines zur komplextheorie’ (1934)/‘A review of the complex theory’ (1948a) to expound his understanding of the effects of the complex on ego-consciousness. Bachelard's misreading inadvertently reverts the placement of the two rooms, thereby proffering something akin to a ‘topsy-turvy’ house of psyche. The implications of Bachelard's misreading for an understanding of Jungian complex theory is explored, and the wider conceptual and phenomenological implications for the possible redesign or renovation of Jung's metaphor of house as psyche are ascertained.


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