Moving from intention to behaviour: a randomised controlled trial protocol for an app-based physical activity intervention (i2be)

IntroductionEfficacy tests of physical activity interventions indicate that many have limited or short-term efficacy, principally because they do not sufficiently build on theory-based processes that determine behaviour. The current study aims to address this limitation.Methods and analysisThe efficacy of the 8-week intervention will be tested using a three-condition randomised controlled trial delivered through an app, in women with a prior hypertensive pregnancy disorder. The intervention is based on the integrated behaviour change model, which outlines the motivational, volitional and automatic processes that lead to physical activity. The mechanisms by which the behaviour change techniques lead to physical activity will be tested.Following stratification on baseline factors, participants will be randomly allocated in-app to one of three conditions (1:1:1). The information condition will receive information, replicating usual care. Additionally to what the information condition receives, the motivation condition will receive content targeting motivational processes. Additionally to what the motivation condition receives, the action condition will receive content targeting volitional and automatic processes.The primary outcome is weekly minutes of moderate-to-vigorous physical activity, as measured by an activity tracker (Fitbit Inspire 2). Secondary outcomes include weekly average of Fitbit-measured daily resting heart rate, and self-reported body mass index, waist-hip ratio, cardiorespiratory fitness and subjective well-being. Tertiary outcomes include self-reported variables representing motivational, volitional, and automatic processes. Outcome measures will be assessed at baseline, immediately post-intervention, and at 3 and 12 months post-intervention. Physical activity will also be investigated at intervention midpoint. Efficacy will be determined by available case analysis. A process evaluation will be performed based on programme fidelity and acceptability measures.Ethics and disseminationThe Medical Ethics Committee of the Erasmus MC has approved this study (MEC-2020-0981). Results will be published in peer reviewed scientific journals and presented at scientific conferences.Trial registration numberNetherlands trial register, NL9329.

The Consistency of Repeated Witness Testimony Leads Triers-of-Fact to Over-Rely on the Power of a Single Voice

<p>Are claims more credible when made by multiple people, or is it the repetition of claims that matters? Some research suggests that claims have more credibility when independent sources make them. Yet, other research suggests that simply repeating information makes it more accessible and encourages reliance on automatic processes—factors known to change people’s judgments. In Experiment 1, subjects took part in a “misinformation” study: Subjects first watched a video of a crime and later read witness reports attributed to one or three different witnesses who made misleading claims in either one report or repeated the same misleading claims across all three reports. In Experiment 2, subjects who had not seen any videos read those same reports and indicated how confident they were that each claim happened in the original event. Subjects were more misled by—and more confident about—claims that were repeated, regardless of how many witnesses made them. These findings led us to hypothesize that the repeated claims of a single witness are seen as consistent, while the claims of multiple witnesses are seen as having consensus. We tested this hypothesis in Experiments 3 and 4 by asking subjects who had not seen the video to read the reports that repeated the claims. In Experiment 3, half of the subjects read reports that contained some peripheral inconsistencies. In Experiment 4 all subjects read reports that contained inconsistencies, but half of the subjects were warned about the accuracy of the inconsistent reports. Later, everyone indicated how confident they were that each claim really happened. Warning subjects about the inconsistent reports (Experiment 4) led them to rate the repeated claims of a single witness—but not multiple witnesses—as less credible; A finding consistent with our hypothesis. In Experiment 5, we tested an alternative explanation that a failure to attend to the source of the information may explain our findings by asking half of the subjects to complete a source monitoring component with their confidence test. We failed to find evidence for this explanation. We conclude that subjects interpreted both the consistency of a single witness's repeated claims, and the consensus among multiple witnesses' converging claims, as markers of accuracy. Importantly, warning subjects about the accuracy of the inconsistent reports reduced subjects’ confidence in the claims made by a single witness, but not multiple witnesses. These findings fit with research showing that repeating information makes it seem more true, and highlight the power of a single repeated voice.</p>

The Consistency of Repeated Witness Testimony Leads Triers-of-Fact to Over-Rely on the Power of a Single Voice

<p>Are claims more credible when made by multiple people, or is it the repetition of claims that matters? Some research suggests that claims have more credibility when independent sources make them. Yet, other research suggests that simply repeating information makes it more accessible and encourages reliance on automatic processes—factors known to change people’s judgments. In Experiment 1, subjects took part in a “misinformation” study: Subjects first watched a video of a crime and later read witness reports attributed to one or three different witnesses who made misleading claims in either one report or repeated the same misleading claims across all three reports. In Experiment 2, subjects who had not seen any videos read those same reports and indicated how confident they were that each claim happened in the original event. Subjects were more misled by—and more confident about—claims that were repeated, regardless of how many witnesses made them. These findings led us to hypothesize that the repeated claims of a single witness are seen as consistent, while the claims of multiple witnesses are seen as having consensus. We tested this hypothesis in Experiments 3 and 4 by asking subjects who had not seen the video to read the reports that repeated the claims. In Experiment 3, half of the subjects read reports that contained some peripheral inconsistencies. In Experiment 4 all subjects read reports that contained inconsistencies, but half of the subjects were warned about the accuracy of the inconsistent reports. Later, everyone indicated how confident they were that each claim really happened. Warning subjects about the inconsistent reports (Experiment 4) led them to rate the repeated claims of a single witness—but not multiple witnesses—as less credible; A finding consistent with our hypothesis. In Experiment 5, we tested an alternative explanation that a failure to attend to the source of the information may explain our findings by asking half of the subjects to complete a source monitoring component with their confidence test. We failed to find evidence for this explanation. We conclude that subjects interpreted both the consistency of a single witness's repeated claims, and the consensus among multiple witnesses' converging claims, as markers of accuracy. Importantly, warning subjects about the accuracy of the inconsistent reports reduced subjects’ confidence in the claims made by a single witness, but not multiple witnesses. These findings fit with research showing that repeating information makes it seem more true, and highlight the power of a single repeated voice.</p>

The Detector Control System of the New Small Wheel for the ATLAS experiment

The ATLAS Muon Spectrometer is going through an extensive Phase I upgrade to cope up with the future LHC runs of high luminosity of up to instantaneous luminosity of 7.5 × 1034cm−2s−1. The luminosity increase drastically impacts the ATLAS trigger and readout data rates. The present ATLAS Small Wheel Muon detector will be replaced with a New Small Wheel (NSW) detector which is expected to be installed in the ATLAS underground cavern by the end of the Long Shutdown 2 of the LHC. Due to its complexity and long-term operation, the NSW requires the development of a sophisticated Detector Control System (DCS). The use of such a system is necessary to allow the detector to function consistently and safely as well as to function as a seamless interface to all sub-detectors and the technical infrastructure of the experiment. The central system handles the transition between the probe’s possible operating states while ensuring continuous monitoring and archiving of the system’s operating parameters. Any abnormality in any subsystem of the detector triggers a signal or alert (alarm), which alerts the user and either adapts to automatic processes or allows manual actions to reset the system to function properly.

The Importance of Parents for Childhood and Adolescent Obesity Prevention: Should We Pay More Attention to Automatic Processes and Parental Stress?

This Special Issue concerns the theme of how parents may influence child and adolescent weight-related and obesity developments [...]

Investigating racing thoughts via ocular temporal windows: deficits in the control of automatic perceptual processes

Background Racing thoughts have been found in several states of bipolar disorder (BD), but also in healthy populations with subclinical mood alterations. The evaluation of racing thoughts relies on subjective reports, and objective measures are sparse. The current study aims at finding an objective neuropsychological equivalent of racing thoughts in a mixed group of BD patients and healthy controls by using a bistable perception paradigm. Method Eighty-three included participants formed three groups based on participants' levels of racing thoughts reported via the Racing and Crowded Thoughts Questionnaire. Participants reported reversals in their perception during viewing of the bistable Necker cube either spontaneously, while asked to focus on one interpretation of the cube, or while asked to accelerate perceptual reversals. The dynamics of perceptual alternations were studied both at a conscious level (with manual temporal windows reflecting perceptual reversals) and at a more automatic level (with ocular temporal windows derived from ocular fixations). Results The rate of windows was less modulated by attentional conditions in participants with racing thoughts, and most clearly so for ocular windows. The rate of ocular windows was especially high when participants with racing thoughts were asked to focus on one interpretation of the Necker cube and when they received these instructions for the first time. Conclusions Our results indicate that in subjects with racing thoughts automatic perceptual processes escape cognitive control mechanisms. Racing thoughts may involve not only conscious thought mechanisms but also more automatic processes.

Superior Performance in Skilled Golfers Characterized by Dynamic Neuromotor Processes Related to Attentional Focus

The meshed control theory assumes that cognitive control and automatic processes work together in the natural attention of experts for superior performance. However, the methods adopted by previous studies limit their capacity to provide in-depth information on the neuromotor processes. This experiment tested the theory with an alternative approach. Twelve skilled golfers were recruited to perform a putting task under three conditions: (1) normal condition, with no focus instruction (NC), (2) external focus of attention condition (EC), and (3) internal focus of attention condition (IC). Four blocks of 10 putts each were performed under each condition. The putting success rate and accuracy were measured and electroencephalographies (EEGs) were recorded. The behavioral results showed that the NC produced a higher putting success rate and accuracy than the EC and IC. The EEG data showed that the skilled golfers’ attentional processes in the NC initially resembled those in the EC and then moved toward those in the IC just before putting. This indicates a switch from more automatic processes to cognitive control processes while preparing to putt. The findings offer support for the meshed control theory and indicate the dynamic nature of neuromotor processes for the superior performance of athletes in challenging situations.

Judging fast and slow: The truth effect does not increase under time-pressure conditions

Dual-process theories propose that information can be processed in two different ways: fast and intuitively or slow and deliberatively. Based on this idea, we tested whether time pressure increases the repetition-based truth effect—the tendency to judge repeatedly encountered statements more likely as “true” than novel statements. We expected that time pressure would boost the truth effect by increasing reliance on processing fluency as a presumably intuitive cue for truth, and by decreasing knowledge retrieval as a presumably slow and analytic process that determines truth judgments. Contrary to these predictions, however, a series of three experiments did not provide any empirical evidence that the truth effect is moderated by time pressure. We interpret our results in terms of the referential theory of the truth effect which assumes that truth judgments depend on the coherence of localized networks in people’s semantic memory that a statement activates. Building on this account we conclude that truth judgments largely depend on automatic processes, at least when people evaluate isolated statements.