Panama

Author(s):  
Michael E. Donoghue

Since declaring independence from Spain in 1821, Panama struggled for nearly two centuries to forge a true sovereignty. Free from Madrid’s control, the province found itself subordinated first by Gran Colombia, later New Granada, and after gaining a measure of independence in a 1903 secessionist revolution, by the United States which built a canal and attached zone through which Washington dominated the nation. Domestically, Panama also wrestled with the complexities of a multiracial, class-divided society ruled by a European-descended elite and political infighting among populists and the military that impeded liberal democracy. Gradually, a nationalist movement that sought greater state formation and control over the canal coalesced around mid-century. But the importance of the waterway to Washington imposed constraints on this movement’s success until the 1978 ratification of the Carter-Torrijos treaties which ensured the transfer of the canal to Panama by century’s end. In 1989, concerns over political tyranny, drug trafficking, and the integrity of the upcoming canal transfer compelled the United States to invade Panama and end the military dictatorship (1968–1989) while restoring a form of elite-dominated democracy. After nearly a hundred years of resistance and diplomacy, Panama finally won full independence on December 31, 1999, taking possession of the canal and the remnants of the US-run enclave. Problems of how to reorganize the republic’s economy and political structure, as well as persistent corruption and poverty, complicated the post-US era. Still, with its unique geostrategic position in the world economy, opportunities as well as obstacles confront Panama today finally freed from a century of neocolonialism.

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda J. Bilmes

AbstractThe United States has traditionally defined national security in the context of military threats and addressed them through military spending. This article considers whether the United States will rethink this mindset following the disruption of the Covid19 pandemic, during which a non-military actor has inflicted widespread harm. The author argues that the US will not redefine national security explicitly due to the importance of the military in the US economy and the bipartisan trend toward growing the military budget since 2001. However, the pandemic has opened the floodgates with respect to federal spending. This shift will enable the next administration to allocate greater resources to non-military threats such as climate change and emerging diseases, even as it continues to increase defense spending to address traditionally defined military threats such as hypersonics and cyberterrorism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 12-47
Author(s):  
Yinan Li

The development of the PRC’s armed forces included three phases when their modernization was carried out through an active introduction of foreign weapons and technologies. The first and the last of these phases (from 1949 to 1961, and from 1992 till present) received wide attention in both Chinese and Western academic literature, whereas the second one — from 1978 to 1989 —when the PRC actively purchased weapons and technologies from the Western countries remains somewhat understudied. This paper is intended to partially fill this gap. The author examines the logic of the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States in the context of complex interactions within the United States — the USSR — China strategic triangle in the last years of the Cold War. The first section covers early contacts between the PRC and the United States in the security field — from the visit of R. Nixon to China till the inauguration of R. Reagan. The author shows that during this period Washington clearly subordinated the US-Chinese cooperation to the development of the US-Soviet relations out of fear to damage the fragile process of detente. The second section focuses on the evolution of the R. Reagan administration’s approaches regarding arms sales to China in the context of a new round of the Cold War. The Soviet factor significantly influenced the development of the US-Chinese military-technical cooperation during that period, which for both parties acquired not only practical, but, most importantly, political importance. It was their mutual desire to undermine strategic positions of the USSR that allowed these two countries to overcome successfully tensions over the US arms sales to Taiwan. However, this dependence of the US-China military-technical cooperation on the Soviet factor had its downside. As the third section shows, with the Soviet threat fading away, the main incentives for the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States also disappeared. As a result, after the Tiananmen Square protests, this cooperation completely ceased. Thus, the author concludes that the US arms sales to China from the very beginning were conditioned by the dynamics of the Soviet-American relations and Beijing’s willingness to play an active role in the policy of containment. In that regard, the very fact of the US arms sales to China was more important than its practical effect, i.e. this cooperation was of political nature, rather than military one.


2018 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 402-419
Author(s):  
Krishnakumar S.

With Donald Trump as President of United States, multilateralism in the world economy is facing an unprecedented challenge. The international economic institutions that have evolved since the fifties are increasingly under the risk of being undermined. With the growing assertion of the emerging and developing economies in the international fora, United States is increasingly sceptical of its ability to maneuvre such institutions to suit its own purpose. This is particularly true with respect to WTO, based on “one country one vote” system. The tariff rate hikes initiated by the leader country in the recent past pose a serious challenge to the multilateral trading system. The paper tries to undertake a critical overview of the US pre-occupation of targeting economies on the basis of the bilateral merchandise trade surpluses of countries, through the trade legislations like Omnibus Act and Trade Facilitation Act. These legislations not only ignore the growing share of the United States in the growing invisibles trade in the world economy, but also read too much into the bilateral trade surpluses of economies with United States and the intervention done by them in the foreign exchange market.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Nir Gazit ◽  

The murder of George Floyd by a police officer in the United States in May 2020 and the subsequent turmoil, as well as the violence against migrants on the US-Mexican border, have drawn major public and media attention to the phenomenon of police brutality (see, e.g., Levin 2020; Misra 2018; Taub 2020), which is often labeled as ‘militarization of police’. At the same time, in recent years military forces have been increasingly involved in policing missions in civilian environments, both domestically (see, e.g., Kanno-Youngs 2020; Schrader 2020; Shinkman 2020) and abroad. The convergence of military conduct and policing raises intriguing questions regarding the impact of these tendencies on the military and the police, as well as on their legitimacy.


The Drone Age ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 96-130
Author(s):  
Michael J. Boyle

Chapter 4 argues that drones accelerate the trend toward information-rich warfare and place enormous pressure on the military to learn ever more about the battlefields that it faces. Today, for the United States, war is increasingly a contest for information about any future battlespace. This has had an organizational effect as the ability for the United States to know more through drone imagery has turned into a necessity to know more. The US military is becoming so enamored of its ability to know more through drone surveillance that it is overlooking the operational and organizational costs of “collecting the whole haystack.” Using drones for a vast surveillance apparatus, as the United States and now other countries have been doing, has underappreciated implications for the workload, organizational structures, and culture of the military itself.


Author(s):  
L. L. Fituni

The article lays out a hypothesis that the global order slides into a new bipolarity in the context of the escalating geo-economic and geopolitical confrontation between the two poles that currently dominate the world - the United States and China. The neo-bipolar construction cannot yet be regarded as an established new world order, but the general movement of the world economy and international relations in this direction is obvious. The neo-bipolar bipolar confrontation manifest itself with varying intensity in different regions of the world. The author argues that at present the peripheral regions which are strategically important for the prospects of competition are becoming an important testing ground for relatively “safe” elaboration of methods and tactics of geo-economic rivalry and h mutual exchange of systemic attacks. Today, Africa has become practically the leading theater of the new bipolar confrontation. The article analyzes the economic, military and strategic aspects of the rivalry between the United States and China on the African continent. It provides a comparative analysis of the new African strategies of the two superpowers adopted at the end of 2018. The author asserts that in the context of the emerging global bipolarity, the strategies of the USA and China represent antagonistic programs based on fundamentally different initial messages. In the case of the US strategy, this is to deter by denial the spread of the competitor’s influence using tough policies, including forceful (while not necessarily military) confrontational actions. While China seeks to neutralize the opposition of the United States and its allies to Beijing’s expansion on the continent and to win the freedom of interaction with any partners in Africa causing minimal direct confrontation possible. Therefore, despite the seemingly “peripheral” importance of the confrontation on the continent, for the establishment of a neo-bipolar world order, the proclamation of the new US regional geopolitical strategy, which focuses on the containment of China in the name of protecting democracy and independence, can serve not only for Africa, but for the whole planet the same milestone signal as Churchill’s Fulton speech for the final advent of bipolarity in the postwar world.


Subject Prospects for the global economy to end-2019. Significance The world economy is likely to grow by around 3% this year. This is the lower end of the 3.0-3.5% range expected six months ago. World trade is weakening amid the US-China conflict and productivity is not picking up. China is expanding fiscal policy and others may follow, perhaps Germany and the United States. Monetary tightening is off the table and some countries may loosen policy. However, this will mainly shore up growth rather than raising it.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanislav Mikhailovich Ivanov

The article analyzes the military operation of the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan, which lasted for 20 years, and the prospects for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from this country. The author states that the new US President D. Biden does not abandon the foreign policy course pursued by his predecessors earlier to reduce the US military presence in Afghanistan. Moreover, the new president reaffirmed his commitment to the peace agreement between the United States and the opposition Taliban, reached in the Qatari capital of Doha in February 2020, which provides for the withdrawal of US troops and their NATO allies from the country. However, the author comes to the conclusion that due to a number of objective and subjective factors, the timing of the final withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan may be postponed indefinitely, and even the deadline recently declared by the White House on September 11, 2021, may be far from final and may be repeatedly subjected to revisions. The main obstacle to the implementation of this important clause of the bilateral agreement is the lack of progress in negotiations between the Taliban representatives and the central government, as well as the lack of security guarantees for the withdrawn contingent of the US Armed Forces, NATO and the remaining staff of Western foreign missions in Afghanistan. Not only the radical Taliban wing, but also a number of current ministers in Kabul are trying to sabotage the conclusion of a second peace agreement and the subsequent integration of the Taliban into power. Without a lasting agreement between the Taliban and the central authorities in Kabul and the formation of a new coalition government, the likelihood of a resumption of civil war in the country will remain. New terrorist attacks and outbursts of violence on the part of the radical wing of the Taliban movement against the central government and foreign troops are not excluded. The penetration of Islamic State gangs into Afghanistan, which can undermine the stability of the military-political situation from within and provoke new armed conflicts, also carries certain risks. Much will also depend on the position of one of the main external players in Afghan affairs — Islamabad. Time will show whether Pakistan will be ready to take on part of the functions of a peaceful settlement within the Afghan conflict. The US administration would like more participation in stabilizing the further situation in Afghanistan from other regional forces (China, Russia, India, Iran, Turkey, Uzbekistan).


Author(s):  
William E. Rapp

Despite the high regard for the US military by the American public, a number of tensions continue to grow in civil-military relations in the United States. These are exacerbated by a lack of clarity, and thus productive debate, in the various relationships inherent in civil and military interaction. By trisecting civil military relations into the relations between the people and the military, the military and the government, and the people and the government on military issues, this chapter examines the potential for crisis in coming years. Doing so allows for greater theoretical and popular understanding and thus action in addressing the tensions, for there is cause for concern and action in each of the legs of this interconnected triangle.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-30
Author(s):  
Grayson Sawyer ◽  

Cybersecurity is very complex, and as such, decisions regarding cybersecurity are highly intertwined with the functionality and application of systems. The threat to cybersecurity is, however, ever-evolving and decisions regarding cybersecurity, therefore, need to be made with this in mind. Cybersecurity systems, therefore, need to be tailored to individual systems, be adaptive, have the ability to evolve with the threat as well as be highly integrated with the system designs and the mission these systems support . In the military, it is critical to develop systems that maintain the expected level of confidentiality, non-repudiation, authentication, integrity, and availability that aids towards the collective goal of cybersecurity. In the military there are several stakeholders that play a key part in cybersecurity with the main ones being; the ones commanding or using the military system, the ones involved in the acquisition, life-cycle management and testing, the authorizing officials, the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the intelligence and the counterintelligence officers. Accountability and control is, therefore spread out throughout the organization. This, however, leads to the blurring of roles and responsibilities. In conclusion, therefore, even though militaries exist for the purpose of combat most of the time, they operate in relatively peaceful conditions. During these peaceful times, they imagine and manufacture wartime conditions to determine their preparedness and the chances of a victory with the current conditions and resources. A communication plan approach will be able to tear down the expected natural resistance since the leaders will support the proposed changes and even devote resources to see that they are successful. The purpose of the communication plan is to, therefore, make the leaders the advocates for change. This is based on the understanding that in this environment, change is not possible without support from the leadership. Keywords: Cybersecurity, Intelligence, Communication & United States Army


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