The Mind Is a DJ: Rhythmic Entrainment in Beatmatching and Embodied Temporal Processing

2021 ◽  
pp. 234-252
Author(s):  
Maria A. G. Witek
Keyword(s):  
Error Correction ◽  
Temporal Processing ◽  
Body Movements ◽  
Embodied Mind ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Conscious Control

In music, rhythmic entrainment occurs when the attention and body movements of listeners, dancers and musicians become synchronized with the beat. This synchronization occurs due to the mechanisms of phase and period correction. Here, I describe what happens to these mechanisms during beatmatching—a central skill in DJing that involves synchronizing the beats of two records on a set of turntables. Via the enactivist approach to the embodied mind, I argue that beatmatching affords a different form of entrainment that requires more conscious control of and embodied operationalization of temporal error correction, and thus provides a vivid model of the embodied distribution of rhythmic entrainment.

Magical Movement (ʾPhrul ʾKhor): Ancient Tibetan Yogic Practices from the Bon Religion and their Migration into Contemporary Medical Settings

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.A. Chaoul
Keyword(s):  
Pilot Study ◽  
Cancer Patients ◽  
Stress Reduction ◽  
Tenth Century ◽  
Body Movements ◽  
Medical Settings ◽  
Spiritual Training ◽  
Yogic Practice ◽  
The Mind

Magical movement is a distinctive Tibetan yogic practice in which breath and concentration of the mind are integrated as crucial components in conjunction with particular body movements. Present in all five spiritual traditions of Tibet—though more prevalent in some than in others–it has been part of Tibetan spiritual training since at least the tenth century CE. This report describes some varieties of magical movement, and goes on to examine their application within conventional biomedical settings. In particular, a pilot study of the method's utility in stress-reduction among cancer patients is considered.

Descartes’s Conception of Mind Through the Prism of Imagination: Cartesian Substance Dualism Questioned

2018 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-171
Author(s):  
Lynda Gaudemard
Keyword(s):  
General Property ◽  
The Body ◽  
Close Reading ◽  
Cartesian Dualism ◽  
Substance Dualism ◽  
Embodied Mind ◽  
The Mind

Abstract: The aim of this article is to clarify an aspect of Descartes’s conception of mind that seriously impacts on the standard objections against Cartesian Dualism. By a close reading of Descartes’s writings on imagination, I argue that the capacity to imagine does not inhere as a mode in the mind itself, but only in the embodied mind, that is, a mind that is not united to the body does not possess the faculty to imagine. As a mode considered as a general property, and not as an instance of it, belongs to the essence of the substance, and as imagination (like sensation) arises from the mind-body union, then the problem arises of knowing to what extent a Cartesian embodied mind is separable from the body.

The Embodied Mind of God

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-96
Author(s):  
Miłosz Hołda
Keyword(s):  
Jesus Christ ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Son Of God ◽  
Embodied Mind ◽  
The Mind

In this article I propose a new concept: The Embodied Mind of God. I also point out the benefits that can flow from using it. This concept is combination of two concepts broadly discussed in contemporary philosophy: „The Mind of God” and „The Embodied Mind”. In my opinion this new concept can be very useful in the area of Philosophical Christology, because one of the most important questions there concerns the mind of Jesus Christ - Incarnate Son of God. I present my own model of Christ’s mind that is able to avoid at least part of the problems faced by christology and sheds the new light on some of epistemological issues.

scholarly journals Elsa Morante’s Aracoeli: A portrait of the mind as embodied

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-169
Author(s):  
Marzia Beltrami
Keyword(s):  
Sensory Perception ◽  
Interesting Case ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Cognitive Approach ◽  
Embodied Mind ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Embodied Memory

This article focuses on Elsa Morante’s last novel, Aracoeli (1982), as an interesting case study of representation of the mind as embodied. The argument begins by considering the ambiguous status of Manuele as narrator and suggests that his inability to distinguish between true and apocryphal memories should be regarded as a cognitive issue rather than a rhetorical one. The next stage of the argument explores the consequences of adopting a cognitive approach, thus foregrounding the embodied mind as one of the main foci of the narrative, both thematically and stylistically. Assuming a cognitive interpretive key, the central part of the article illustrates Morante’s complex portrayal of the dependence of the mind on the body and in particular on sensory perception, providing also a closer examination of the number of ways in which Morante articulates the body-mind nexus. For descriptive and heuristic purposes, these instances have been gathered into three main clusters: Embodied nature of emotions or feelings; Specificities of embodiment; and Embodied memory. Finally, I shall offer some suggestions as to how a cognitive reading of Aracoeli corroborates a non-nihilistic interpretation of the novel as expression of existential or literary defeat.

Needs, Feelings, and Emotions of Embodied Mind

2021 ◽  
pp. 175-202
Keyword(s):  
Learning Process ◽  
Unmet Needs ◽  
Brain Structures ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Embodied Mind ◽  
Intelligent Machines ◽  
Critical Elements ◽  
Artificial Brain ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Mind

Model of artificial mind discussed in this and the following two chapters considers critical elements of the mind operation. The question is whether we can propose artificial brain structures in machines that will be able to create the basis of intelligence and consciousness. Wanting to build an artificial brain, we propose what properties it should have, and how it should be organized. The chapter begins with presenting embodiment of the mind as the part of the environment that is under control of the mind. Perceiving and identifying with one's own body depends on observing the body's actions in the environment. The embodiment must communicate with the brain through channels that ensure the perception of the environment. The use of body dynamics facilitates control, planning, and decision making. Conditions that exist in the real world create a framework for proper action and reflect the compatibility of agent's competencies with the environment. In a conscious embodied mind, representations are created and used for actions. Higher level consciousness can be treated as an abstract version of the coordination of perception and action. Conscious states are triggered by externally supplied signals from the environment and by internally generated mental states. Self-consciousness requires distinguishing oneself from the environment. The definition of embodied intelligence adopted in this book is aimed at building an intelligent and conscious machine. The authors have recognized the ability to learn as the most important feature of intelligence, which is why they consider beings that do not learn anything as not intelligent. Machines will not have the same needs as people but must have needs whose fulfillment is a measure of success. Meeting these needs will require physical and mental effort, and the development of useful skills will be associated with the development of intelligence. The agent treats unmet needs as a signal to act. Using the analogy to pain, these signals representing unmet needs will be called the pain signals. Strength of these signals can be measured and compared with each other. Various pain signals not only provide motivation for action but also control the learning process. Finally, they discuss the role of feelings and emotions and their importance in the agent's learning process. In particular, they discuss their role in creation of conscious sensations. They explain the source of feelings as associated with but different than reward or punishment signals. The signals provided by the senses to anticipate reward or punishment are related to the physical properties of the observed objects, which are directly related to feelings. Pleasure is the promise of meeting a real need. Feelings will fuel emotions. They relate emotions to subconscious reactions to what happened. They also discuss why we may need to build emotional machines and how artificial emotions can be created in machines.

The Embodied Mind and the Mind-Suffused Body

2019 ◽  
pp. 54-77
Author(s):  
James W. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Embodied Mind ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Mind

This chapter reviews current empirical findings relevant to traditional and virtually universal religious teachings about human nature, especially the claim that there is more to human nature than what can be easily described by contemporary natural science. It argues that any purely physicalist account is necessarily incomplete and inadequate and not as compelling as is often assumed in popular discussions of neuroscience. The many ways embodiment impacts our theorizing about our bodies and their sensory capabilities lays the basis for the possibility of a spiritual sense. It also opens up another approach to the “mind-body” dilemma and the issue of dualism.

scholarly journals O que é Behaviorismo sobre a mente?

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-277
Author(s):  
Filipe Lazzeri
Keyword(s):  
Borderline Cases ◽  
Embodied Mind ◽  
Alternative Characterization ◽  
Psychological Events ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Mental Events

It is common to find depictions of behaviorist approaches to the mind as approaches according to which mental (or psychological) events are “dispositions for behavior.” Moreover, it is sometimes said that for these approaches the dispositions are for publicly observable (external) behaviors, or even “purely physical movements,” thereby excluding from being constitutive of mental events any internal (e.g., physiological) bodily happening, besides any movement not taken as “purely physical.” In this paper I aim to (i) pinpoint problems in such widespread depictions of behaviorism about the mind, by arguing that they turn out to be too restrictive or too broad, as the case may be. In addition, (ii) I put forward an alternative, more balanced characterization, which wards off such problems. Based upon this alternative characterization, I attempt to (iii) classify some of the embodied mind theories as behavioral, non-behavioral, or borderline cases between behavioral and non-behavioral perspectives.

Proust's Genies: In Search of Lost Time and Population Biology

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-501
Author(s):  
Hannah Walser
Keyword(s):  
Population Biology ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Social Classes ◽  
Large Populations ◽  
Lost Time ◽  
To Come ◽  
Extinction Events ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Conscious Control ◽  
Biological Selection

Abstract Whether identified as “genies,” “little men,” or simply “les moi,” a vast horde of personified mental faculties populates In Search of Lost Time, responsible for behaviors too instantaneous or too ingrained to come under conscious control. Representing automatic neural subroutines as self-interested beings allows Proust to apply the principles of biological selection to these psychological entities, imagining the mind as an ecosystem in which great personal upheavals—for instance, Marcel's loss of Albertine—figure as extinction events that wipe out large populations of narrowly specialized, slow-to-adapt “genies.” Since genies are optimized for highly specific micro-environments, the same “species” of genie may form in any two individuals who share such a micro-environment, with this indifference to the boundaries of the person making it possible for a shared genie-type to define an ad hoc social category: homosexuals, snobs, members of the Guermantes set. In this essay, I unpack Search's model of the mind as a population of simple homunculi and explore its effect on Proust's understanding of interpersonal collectives, from intellectual coteries to social classes. The construct of the genie, I suggest, not only allows Proust to suture together sub-individual and supra-individual scales of analysis but also enables a model of change—both psychological and historical—that is neither simply agentic nor simply deterministic. Rather, the shifting demographics of mental homunculi constitute a quantitative, probabilistic, and nonsychronous form of change, creating new adaptive niches while permitting the partial survival of prior forms of life.

How Homo economicus lost her mind and how we can revive her

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter DeScioli
Keyword(s):  
Economic Thought ◽  
History Of Economic Thought ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Economic Theories ◽  
Target Article ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind ◽  
And Behavior

AbstractThe target article by Boyer & Petersen (B&P) contributes a vital message: that people have folk economic theories that shape their thoughts and behavior in the marketplace. This message is all the more important because, in the history of economic thought, Homo economicus was increasingly stripped of mental capacities. Intuitive theories can help restore the mind of Homo economicus.

Pspan: A New Tool for Assessing Pitch Temporal Processing and Patterning Capacity

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 322-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aurora J. Weaver ◽  
Jeffrey J. DiGiovanni ◽  
Dennis T. Ries
Keyword(s):  
Temporal Processing
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