The Global Recession of 2007–2009: The Moral Factor and Jewish Law

Author(s):  
Aaron Levine

This article focuses on the recent global recession that raged the world and in particular the United States with special reference to Jewish law. In December 2007, the United States economy plunged into the longest and deepest downturn since the Great Depression. The driving force behind the recession was the widespread failure of the subprime mortgage market, the segment of the home mortgage market extending loans to households with impaired credit histories and with little or no documentation of income. The collapse of that sector occurred in a rapid succession of events beginning with the fall of Countrywide Financial in January 2008. This article further moves to explain the moral factor pervading the recession and analyses the situation as per Jewish law. The central relevant moral dictum of Jewish law is the Imitatio Dei principle, which says that, in our interpersonal conduct, we should emulate the various attributes of mercy.

Ekonomika ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 85-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vaidotas Pajarskas ◽  
Aldona Jočienė

The main purpose of this article is to determine which factors and how contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States in 2007–2008, what their causal links and effects on the markets and the whole economy were, and to assess what actions could have been taken by the Federal Reserve and the Government in order to mitigate or prevent the consequences of subprime mortgage crisis and housing bubble. In order to obtain the research results, the authors performed a qualitative analysis of the scientific literature on the course of events and their development that led to the subprime mortgage crisis, and focused on the insufficiently regulated home mortgage market expansion, the impact on the subprime mortgage crisis of financial innovations and financial engineering, poorly evaluated systemic risks and policy undertaken by both the U.S. Government and the Federal Reserve before and after the crisis. The quantitative research focused on two main parts: firstly, analysis of the dependence between the causes of subprime mortgage crisis and the consequences, using a statistical and regression analysis, and secondly, an alternative path the Government and the Federal Reserve could have taken in their policy actions and the results they could have produced. The authors believe that the results of the research could give useful guidelines to the central bankers and government officials on how to make long-term decisions that can help in preparing for the financial distress, mitigating the consequences when the crisis strikes, accelerating the recovery and even preventing the crisis it in the future. The second part of the qualitative research will appear in the next issue of the journal.


1994 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 850-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. R. Vernon

The United States economy completed its recovery from the Great Depression in 1942, restoring full-employment output in that year after 12 years of below-full-employment performance. Fiscal policies were not the most important factor in the 1933 through 1940 phase of the recovery, but they became the most important factor after 1940, when the recovery was less than half-complete. World War II fiscal policies were, then, instrumental in the overall restoration of full-employment performance.


2020 ◽  
pp. 149-159
Author(s):  
Raffaele Fiume ◽  
Tiziano Onesti ◽  
Stefano Bianchi

The COVID-19 outbreak has impacted significantly on the movements of goods and people through the world causing interruptions at many levels in the financial and industrial environment with a significant impact on financial reporting. The purpose of the following review is to analyse some of the main accounting implications of the outbreak in the IFRS financial statements and the first responses at international level by the standard-setters. In the first part, the analysis will be focused first on the main implications for periods ended on 31 December 2019 and then on the effects for the 2020 reporting periods onward. As per 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), that began in 2007 with a depreciation in the subprime mortgage market in the United States, the main international standard-setters (IASB and FASB) has proposed amendments of the standards to react to some implications of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the second part of this review will be summarised the main responses, including the documents and proposed amendments issued by the IASB regard-ing IFRS 16 Leases accounting for lease concessions related to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.


2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Floriana Ferro

The Western world is presently afflicted by a huge economic crisis, started in 2007 in the United States, with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market, and exploded in 2008 with the breakdown of Lehman Brothers[1]. Even if its most critical stage seems to be finished, capitalist countries find it difficult to recover. Globalization exported the effects of the crisis everywhere, but those that suffered the greatest damages are Europe and North America. The collapse of some financial companies is only the top of a huge iceberg. The crisis has roots in something deeper, in the principles and mechanisms of capitalism itself. The Western part of the world is still paying not for the mistakes of a few executives, but for a general lack of ethics in the whole system.


Ekonomika ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vaidotas Pajarskas ◽  
Aldona Jočienė

This is the second part of the qualitative and quantitative research on the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States in 2007–2008. The main purpose of this research is to determine the factors and how they contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis, what their causal links and effects on the markets and the whole economy were, and to assess what actions could have been taken by the Federal Reserve and the Government in order to mitigate or prevent the consequences of the subprime mortgage crisis and the housing bubble. In order to obtain the results, the authors performed a qualitative analysis of the scientific literature on the course of events and their development that led to the subprime mortgage crisis and focused on insufficiently regulated home mortgage market expansion, the impact on subprime mortgage crisis of financial innovations and financial engineering, poorly evaluated systemic risks and policy undertaken by both the U.S. Government and the Federal Reserve before and after the crisis. The quantitative research focused on two main parts: firstly, the analysis of dependencies between the causes of subprime mortgage crisis and the consequences using the statistical and regression analysis; secondly, an alternative path the Government and the Federal Reserve could have taken in their policy actions, and the results they could have produced have been explored. The authors believe that the results of the research could give useful guidelines to the central bankers and government officials on how to make long-term decisions that can help in preparing for the financial distress, mitigating the consequences when the crisis strikes, accelerating the recovery and even preventing the crisis in the future.


2011 ◽  
Vol 01 (04) ◽  
pp. 811-822 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard K. Green

In 2007 and 2008, the mortgage market failed. It failed in a number of dimensions: Default rates rose to their highest levels since the great depression, and mortgage liquidity ground to a halt. This failure has produced recriminations: Blame has been laid at the feet of borrowers, brokers, lenders, investment banks, investors and government and quasi-government entities that guaranteed mortgages. These recent events have produced an important debate: Whether the U.S. mortgage market requires a federal guarantee in order to best serve consumers, investors and markets. My view is that such a guarantee is necessary. I will divide my argument into four areas: (1) I will argue that the United States has had a history of providing guarantees, either implicit or explicit, regardless of its professed position on the matter. This phenomenon goes back to the origins of the republic. It is in the best interest of the country to acknowledge the existence of such guarantees, and to price them appropriately before, rather than after, they become necessary. (2) I will argue that in times of economic stress, such as now, the absence of government guarantees would lead to an absence of mortgages. (3) I will argue that a purely "private" market would likely not provide a 30 year fixed rate pre-payable mortgage. I think that this is no longer a particularly controversial statement; what is more controversial is whether such a mortgage is necessary — I will argue that it is. (4) I will argue that in the absence of a federal guarantee, the price and quantity of mortgages will vary across geography. In particular, rural areas will have less access to mortgage credit that urban areas, central cities will have less access than suburbs. Condominiums already are treated less favorably than detached houses, and this difference is likely to get larger in the absence of a guarantee.


2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ines Prodöhl

AbstractThis article traces the complex and shifting organization of soy's production and consumption from Northeast China to Europe and the United States. It focuses on a set of national and transnational actors with differing interests in the global and national spread of soybeans. The combination of these actors in certain spatiotemporal contexts enabled a fundamental change in soy from an Asian to an American cash crop. At the beginning of the twentieth century, soy rapidly became Northeast China's cash crop, owing to steadily increasing Western demand. However, the versatility of soy – and soy oil in particular – offered a highly successful response to the agricultural and industrial challenges that the United States faced during the Great Depression and the Second World War. By the end of the war, American farmers in the Midwest cultivated more soybeans than their Chinese counterparts.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-88
Author(s):  
Amihai Radzyner

AbstractRabbinical courts in Israel serve as official courts of the state, and state law provides that a Jewish couple can obtain a divorce only in these courts, and only strictly according to Jewish law. By contrast, in the Western world, especially the United States, which has the largest concentration of Jews outside of Israel, the Jewish halakha is not a matter of state law, and rabbinical courts have no official status. This article examines critically the common argument that for a Jew committed to the halakha, and in particular for a Jewish woman who wants to divorce her husband, a state-sponsored halakhic system is preferable to a voluntary one. This argument is considered in light of the main tool that has been proven to help American Jewish women who wish to obtain a halakhic divorce from husbands refusing to grant it: the prenuptial agreement. Many Jewish couples in the United States sign such an agreement, but only a few couples in Israel do so, primarily because of the opposition of the rabbinical courts in Israel to these agreements. The article examines the causes of this resistance, and offers reasons for the distinction that exists between the United States and Israel. It turns out that social and legal reality affect halakhic considerations, to the point where rabbis claim that what the halakha allows in the United States it prohibits in Israel. The last part of the article uses examples from the past to examine the possibility that social change in Israel will affect the rulings of rabbinical courts on this issue.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 648-680
Author(s):  
SHANE HAMILTON

A range of private and public institutions emerged in the United States in the years before and after the Great Depression to help farmers confront the inherent uncertainty of agricultural production and marketing. This included a government-owned and operated insurance enterprise offering “all-risk” coverage to American farmers beginning in 1938. Crop insurance, initially developed as a social insurance program, was beset by pervasive problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. As managers and policy makers responded to those problems from the 1940s on, they reshaped federal crop insurance in ways that increasingly made the scheme a lever of financialization, a means of disciplining individual farmers to think of farming in abstract terms of risk management. Crop insurance became intertwined with important changes in the economic context of agriculture by the 1960s, including the emergence of the “technological treadmill,” permanently embedding financialized risk management into the political economy of American agriculture.


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