Revelation in Phenomenology

Author(s):  
Balázs M. Mezei

This chapter investigates the notion of revelation in the work of the main representatives of the phenomenological movement. This movement has a crucial importance in understanding the philosophical landscape today. Emerging from Austrian and German sources, phenomenology became the leading philosophical school in Europe by the mid-twentieth century. Later developments led to the emergence of French phenomenology, which has defined Continental thought in more than one way. The persistent focus of the phenomenological movement has been the nature and content of religious experience or the religious phenomenon. And while some of the phenomenologists, like Jean-Paul Sartre, proposed a different course for this kind of thinking, the problem of religion has become central to most of the phenomenological authors. This explains the fact that the phenomenological notion of divine disclosure or revelation has always been in the centre of this movement. One can even say that the philosophical problem of revelation is the central subject matter in the history of phenomenology beginning with Franz Brentano through Max Scheler, Paul Ricœur, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Jean-Luc Marion. The work of these and other authors has exerted a tremendous influence on contemporary philosophy. However, the problem of revelation per se is the crucial problem of philosophy, as is demonstrated by the history and problematic of the phenomenological movement. This chapter offers an overview of this history and also an outline of the problem of revelation from the point of view of what can be termed ‘apocalyptic phenomenology’.

2019 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 295-310
Author(s):  
D. Gough

I tell just part of the story of the quest to understand the dynamics of the solar tachocline, from the point of view of my relationship with my good friend Jean-Paul Zahn.


Phainomenon ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-108
Author(s):  
Mafalda Faria Blanc

Summary This paper tries to analyse the historical and present contribution of phenomenology to the hermeneutics of traditions. This attempt is achieved by retracing, in main lines, the history of phenomenological movement, his birth, constitution and evolution. In this proposal, it is showed how, by his both internal and external critics, classic phenomenology is moved to open itself to other contemporary trends of thought, namely hermeneutics and philosophy of language, and, in dialogue with these and with the human sciences, to transform itself in a more fruitful way. This is truth, first of all, in respect of Husserl’s·thought, which evolves from static phenomenology, centered in the analysis of the noetic-noematic intentional correlation from the point of view of a transcendental idealism, to genetic and historical phenomenology, based on the “Ur-Impression” of the living-present, as the founding phenomenon-event of all meaning’s constitution. A decisive point is made by Heidegger in stressing the hermeneutic, discursive and historical character of all ontological understanding. This allows emphasizing the question of the sense formation (Sinnbildung), which precedes and enables all symbolic and signic institution of meaning (Sinnstiftung), therefore providing a guiding line for search on the topic of the historical constitution of language and traditions.


Philosophy ◽  
1929 ◽  
Vol 4 (13) ◽  
pp. 109-116
Author(s):  
E. S. Waterhouse

Summary: In this survey I first consider two introductory books—the one an introduction to the theory of knowledge, the other an introduction to log—by August Messer and Arthur Drews respectively. I then proceed to E. v. Aster's very interesting History of English Philosophy, to a phenomenological study by Arnold Metzger, and to a discussion of pluralism monism, and dualism, by Boris Jakowenko. I conclude with notices o important new editions of Hegel, Franz Brentano, and Cusanus, and with a reference to the death of Max Scheler.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Michael Gubser

This paper discusses the relationship between phenomenology and political activism in the work of two lesser-known second-generation phenomenologists: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Aurel Kolnai. As young philosophers in the 1920s, Hildebrand and Kolnai became staunch adherents of the phenomenological movement. Influenced especially by Max Scheler and Adolf Reinach, they were particularly interested in questions of ethical theory and moral action. In the 1930s, with the rise of Hitler, they joined an important circle of conservative Catholic critics of Nazism based around the journal Der christliche Ständestaat in Vienna. After examining the links between phenomenology and activism in their work, my essay concludes by considering how these two thinkers can revise our understanding of phenomenology’s history of social engagement and its potential relevance to social and political debate today.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-94
Author(s):  
Vladimir V. Seliverstov ◽  

From the moment Franz Brentano formulated his definition of intentionality, it imme­diately began to undergo modifications in the works of his students. Brentano’s original definition included reference to the scholastic tradition, but it differs from the one that was formulated by the scholastics. In his work “Psychology from an Empirical Point of View”, Brentano defines intentionality both as an orientation towards an object and as a relation to some content, but at no later time, neither in this work, nor in other published works, does he clarify the meaning of the concept of «content». In this regard, the stu­dents and interpreters of Brentano’s works had a question: does the scheme of inten­tionality consist exclusively of an intentional act and an object, or does it also include the content of a representation? Brentano’s disciples did not view this definition as clear and unambiguous. In order to clarify this concept, they often studied other similar philo­sophical conceptions in search of a more precise definition. In particular, they looked for a similar concept in the theory of Bernard Bolzano. The first version of the schema of in­tentionality, including the content of representation, appeared in the works of Hoeffler and Twardowski. For this reason, for a long time they were considered by historians to be the discoverers of the distinction between object and content. However, after the notes of Brentano’s lectures, which he also read to his students, were recovered, it became clear that Brentano himself made this distinction. In this regard, it seems extremely important to interpret the history of the relationships in the Brentano school through the prism of the discussions devoted to the definition of intentionality and the structure of an inten­tional act, as well as to understand the origins of each individual interpretation of this concept proposed by Brentano’s students


Author(s):  
Lester Embree

The phenomenological movement is a century-old international movement in philosophy that has penetrated most of the cultural disciplines, especially psychiatry and sociology. It began in Germany with the early work of Edmund Husserl, and spread to the rest of Europe, the Americas and Asia. In contrast with a school, a movement does not have a body of doctrine to which all participants agree; rather, there is a broad approach that tends to be shared. The phenomenological approach has at least four components. First, phenomenologists tend to oppose naturalism. Naturalism includes behaviourism in psychology and positivism in social sciences and philosophy, and is a worldview based on the methods of the natural sciences. In contrast, phenomenologists tend to focus on the socio-historical or cultural lifeworld and to oppose all kinds of reductionism. Second, they tend to oppose speculative thinking and preoccupation with language, urging instead knowledge based on ‘intuiting’ or the ‘seeing’ of the matters themselves that thought is about. Third, they urge a technique of reflecting on processes within conscious life (or human existence) that emphasizes how such processes are directed at (or ‘intentive to’) objects and, correlatively, upon these objects as they present themselves or, in other words, as they are intended to. And fourth, phenomenologists tend to use analysis or explication as well as the seeing of the matters reflected upon to produce descriptions or interpretations both in particular and in universal or ‘eidetic’ terms. In addition, phenomenologists also tend to debate the feasibility of Husserl’s procedure of transcendental epoché or ‘bracketing’ and the project of transcendental first philosophy it serves, most phenomenology not being transcendental. Beyond these widely shared components of method, phenomenologists tend to belong to one or another of four intercommunicating and sometimes overlapping tendencies. These tendencies are ‘realistic phenomenology’, which emphasizes the seeing and describing of universal essences; ‘constitutive phenomenology’, which emphasizes accounting for objects in terms of the consciousness of them; ‘existential phenomenology’, which emphasizes aspects of human existence within the world; and ‘hermeneutical phenomenology’, which emphasizes the role of interpretation in all spheres of life. All tendencies go back to the early work of Husserl, but the existential and hermeneutical tendencies are also deeply influenced by the early work of Martin Heidegger. Other leading figures are Nicolai Hartmann, Roman Ingarden, Adolf Reinach and Max Scheler in realistic phenomenology, Dorion Cairns, Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schutz in constitutive phenomenology, Hannah Arendt, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Simone de Beauvoir in existential phenomenology, and Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur in hermeneutical phenomenology.


Author(s):  
Igor D. Osipov ◽  
◽  
Aleksandr E. Rybas ◽  

The article examines the philosophical discussions at the Faculty of Philosophy of Leningrad State University during the Khrushchev “thaw”, initiated by the need to study the phenomenon of science and resulted in the organization of the Leningrad philosophical school. Having analyzed the issues brought up by the Leningrad philosophers and the research methodology they used, the authors conclude that this school mainly developed problems of science philosophy. Therefore, the definition of the Leningrad school as an ontological one (as op­posed to the Moscow gnoseological school), which is widespread in Russian his­torical and philosophical literature, is far from being correct. Moreover, it makes it difficult to see the relevance of the philosophical achievements of the Lenin­grad thinkers since it provokes to consider their ideas exclusively in the context of the disputes around the definition of matter, which took place among the theo­rists of dialectical materialism in Soviet times. On the contrary, considering the works written by the Leningrad philosophers in the 1950s–1960s from the point of view of the current philosophy of science allows us to better understand the philosophical innovations and original ideas of the Leningrad school. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the views of V.I. Svidersky and V.A. Shtoff, the founders of the Leningrad school of philosophy of science. The authors also consider the works of A.D. Aleksandrov, rector of Leningrad State University (1952–1964), and those of the deans of the Faculty of Philosophy of Leningrad State University V.P. Tugarinov (1951–1960) and V.P. Rozhin (1960–1969), who contributed to the popularization of scientific-philosophical doctrines at the uni­versity and helped to organize candid discussions. The views of some other Leningrad philosophers of science, e.g. A.S. Mamzin, L.O. Reznikov, G.A. Pod­korytov, V.P. Bransky, A.S. Carmin, are mentioned as well to trace back the de­velopment of the Leningrad school.


2015 ◽  
Vol 68 (9-10) ◽  
pp. 353-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Artur Bjelica ◽  
Svetlana Nikolic

History of marital infertility is as long as the history of human civilization. Becoming aware about the importance of procreation, as well as the problems with which people may confront, has been the subject of interest since the moment of the first human community creation. Historically, each stage of social development, hence the development of science, has carried within itself certain findings more or less acceptable from today?s point of view. The development of human awareness and acquisition of findings based on empirical evidence have contributed to understanding and solution of the problem which was considered to be a result of force majeure until that moment and therefore could not be influenced. This paper deals with the previously mentioned issues through the review of historical development of assisted reproductive technology and its importance. The authors? intention was to present the developmental road of assisted reproductive technology through history succinctly with a special emphasis on the moments which have been of the crucial importance and which have marked certain stages of its development.


2006 ◽  
pp. 112-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Nazarov

The attempts to reconstruct the instruments of interbudget relations take place in all federations. In Russia such attempts are especially popular due to the short history of intergovernmental relations. Thus the review of the ¬international experience of managing interbudget relations to provide economic and social welfare can be useful for present-day Russia. The author develops models of intergovernmental relations from the point of view of making decisions about budget authorities’ distribution. The models that can be better applied in the Russian case are demonstrated.


2008 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 769-770
Author(s):  
Csaba Pléh

Danziger, Kurt: Marking the mind. A history of memory . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008Farkas, Katalin: The subject’s point of view. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008MosoninéFriedJudités TolnaiMárton(szerk.): Tudomány és politika. Typotex, Budapest, 2008Iacobini, Marco: Mirroring people. The new science of how we connect with others. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2008Changeux, Jean-Pierre. Du vrai, du beau, du bien.Une nouvelle approche neuronale. Odile Jacob, PárizsGazzaniga_n


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