Virtue as a Trait

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Miller
Keyword(s):  
Character Traits ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Empirical Issue ◽  
Mixed Traits

One of the most common assumptions about the moral virtues is that they are traits, or more specifically, traits of character. But what are character traits, and what character traits do individuals actually possess today? This chapter takes up each of these questions in turn. First it considers the metaphysics of character traits, distinguishing between three competing views: the summary view, the conditional view, and the dispositional view. Then it turns to the empirical issue of whether most people actually have character traits, and if so, what they tend to look like. Different options include the possession of traditional virtues, traditional vices, local traits, and mixed traits.

scholarly journals Education for Loneliness as a Consequence of Moral Decision-Making: An Issue of Moral Virtues

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 591-605
Author(s):  
Jarosław Horowski
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Evil ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Cardinal Virtues ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Point Of Interest ◽  
Moral Decisions

Abstract The direct reference point for these analyses is the process of making moral decisions, but a particular point of interest is the difficulty associated with making decisions when acting subjects are aware that their choice of moral good can lead to the breakdown of relationships with those close to them (family members or friends) or to their exclusion from the group(s) that have been most important to them so far in their lives, consequently causing them to experience loneliness. This difficulty is a challenge for education, which in supporting the moral development of a maturing person should prepare her/him for choosing moral good even if this requires personal sacrifices. In these analyses, assuming that knowledge of moral good is not sufficient for morally good actions, I refer mainly to the virtues of character that facilitate making morally good decisions and I seek the answer to the question: what character traits (moral virtues) should be shaped in maturing persons, so that as adults they can resist moral evil, even when this will clearly lead to the experience of loneliness? I propose these character traits as expressing moral virtues—especially the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude (neo-Thomistic approach). In this way, I join in the discussion relating to the teleology of education. I do not touch on the methodology of education, however. The argument is presented in two parts. In the first, I introduce the problem of decision-making implying consent to loneliness. In the second, I reflect on the characteristics of a person who is capable of making such a decision.

scholarly journals Problems with “Friendly AI”

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Li
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Moral Development ◽  
Indirect Effects ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
General Intelligence ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Artificial General Intelligence ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Martin Peterson ◽  
Near Future

AbstractOn virtue ethical grounds, Barbro Fröding and Martin Peterson recently recommended that near-future AIs should be developed as ‘Friendly AI’. AI in social interaction with humans should be programmed such that they mimic aspects of human friendship. While it is a reasonable goal to implement AI systems interacting with humans as Friendly AI, I identify four issues that need to be addressed concerning Friendly AI with Fröding’s and Peterson’s understanding of Friendly AI as a starting point. In a first step, I briefly recapitulate Fröding’s and Peterson’s arguments for Friendly AI. I then highlight some issues with Fröding’s and Peterson’s approach and line of reasoning and identify four problems related to the notion of Friendly AI, which all pertain to the role and need for humans’ moral development. These are that (1) one should consider the moral tendencies and preferences of the humans interacting with a friendly AI, (2) it needs to be considered whether the humans interacting with a Friendly AI are still developing their virtues and character traits, (3) the indirect effects of replacing humans with Friendly AI should be considered with respect to the possibilities for humans to develop their moral virtues and that (4) the question whether the AI is perceived as some form of Artificial General Intelligence cannot be neglected. In conclusion, I argue that all of these four problems are related to humans moral development and that this observation strongly emphasizes the role and need for humans moral development in correlation to the accelerating development of AI-systems.

From Natural Character to Moral Virtue in Aristotle

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariska Leunissen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Comprehensive Account ◽  
Body And Soul ◽  
Aristotle's Ethics

This book discusses Aristotle’s biological views about character and the importance of what he calls “natural character traits” for the development of moral virtue as presented in his ethical treatises. It provides a new, comprehensive account of the physiological underpinnings of moral development and thereby shows, first, that Aristotle’s ethical theories do not exhaust his views about character, as has traditionally been assumed, and, second, that his treatment of natural character in the biological treatises provides the conceptual and ideological foundation for his views about habituation as developed in his ethics. This manuscript thus takes seriously Aristotle’s claim—often ignored—that nature is one of the factors through which men become “good and capable of fine deeds.” Part I (“The Physiology and Science of Natural Character”) analyzes, in three chapters, Aristotle’s notion of natural character as it is developed in the biological treatises and its role in moral development, especially as it affects women and certain “barbarians”—groups who are typically left out of accounts of Aristotle’s ethics. I also discuss its relevance for our understanding of physiognomical ideas in Aristotle. Part II (“The Physiology of Moral Development”) explores the psychophysical changes in body and soul that one is required to undergo in the process of acquiring moral virtues. It includes a discussion of Aristotle’s eugenic views, his identification of habituation as a form of human perfection, and his claims about the moral deficiencies of women that link them to his beliefs about their biological imperfections.

The Perception of Virtue

2020 ◽  
pp. 256-272
Author(s):  
Jennifer Matey
Keyword(s):  
Emotional Responses ◽  
Cognitive Appraisals ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Perceptual Representations ◽  
Epistemic Role

It is not uncommon for people to like what they take as morally good. And often these feelings of esteem for virtue come prior to conscious cognitive appraisals about character. This chapter outlines a framework for understanding some emotional responses of esteem to perceived good character as representing the character traits as valuable, and hence, as virtues. It is proposed that these esteeming experiences are analogous to perceptual representations in other modalities in their epistemic role as causing, providing content for, and in justifying beliefs regarding the value of the traits they represent. The role of the perceiver’s own character in their ability to recognize and respond appropriately to virtue in others is also discussed. It is shown that moral virtues can also be epistemic virtues when it comes to facilitating knowledge about the character of people we encounter.

The Virtue of Aesthetic Courage

2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-469
Author(s):  
Alan T Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Future Development ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Virtuous Life ◽  
The Aesthetic

Abstract Theorists have recently been exploring the prospects for a virtue-centred approach to aesthetics. Virtue aesthetics encourages a re-focusing of philosophical attention onto the aesthetic character traits of agents, in the same way that virtue ethics and virtue epistemology have encouraged us to focus on moral and intellectual traits. In this paper, I aim to contribute to the development of virtue aesthetics by discussing aesthetic courage, the aesthetic analogue of one of the most widely acknowledged moral virtues. In addition to proposing an account of the nature of this trait, I also argue that aesthetic courage is vital for any sort of aesthetically virtuous life. It is not possible to possess any aesthetic virtue without possessing aesthetic courage. It is important, therefore, for any future development of virtue aesthetics to acknowledge the central importance of aesthetic courage.

Happiness and Human Flourishing in Kant's Ethics

1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill
Keyword(s):  
Character Traits ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Happy Life ◽  
Wise Person ◽  
Subjective Condition ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Ancient moral philosophers, especially Aristotle and his followers, typically shared the assumption that ethics is primarily concerned with how to achieve the final end for human beings, a life of “happiness” or “human flourishing.” This final end was not a subjective condition, such as contentment or the satisfaction of our preferences, but a life that could be objectively determined to be appropriate to our nature as human beings. Character traits were treated as moral virtues because they contributed well toward this ideal life, either as means to it or as constitutive aspects of it. Traits that tended to prevent a “happy” life were considered vices, even if they contributed to a life that was pleasant and what a person most wanted. The idea of “happiness” (or human flourishing) was central, then, in philosophical efforts to specify what we ought to do, what sort of persons we should try to become, and what sort of life a wise person would hope for.

scholarly journals Two Forms of Virtue Epistemology

Epistemology ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 140-156
Author(s):  
Ernest Sosa
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
The Other ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Intellectual Courage ◽  
Virtue Reliabilism

This chapter explains how two quite distinct forms of virtue epistemology are generally recognized. One of these finds in epistemology important correlates of Aristotle's moral virtues. Such responsibilist character epistemology builds its account of epistemic normativity on the subject's responsible manifestation of epistemic character. Meanwhile, the other form of virtue epistemology adheres closer to Aristotelian intellectual virtues while recognizing a broader set of competences still restricted to basic faculties of perception, introspection, and the like. The chapter shows that because of its focus on traditional faculties such as perception, memory, and inference, such virtue reliabilism is said to overlook character traits such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage.

Facial features as character predictors: phenotypic approach testing

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vitalii Shymko
Keyword(s):  
Psychological Characteristics ◽  
Character Traits ◽  
Facial Features ◽  
Direct Use

<p>This paper presents the results of testing the hypotheses concerning the connection between some phenotypic bodily features and such individual psychological characteristics as aggressiveness, impetuosity, pedantry, passivity, etc. In particular, studied the validity of using appropriate representations of phenotypology to predict respective character traits. The results obtained disprove the possibility of a direct use of the phenotypic approach for reliable characterological profiling.</p>

Governance and Corruption

2002 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zafar Iqbal
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Remedial Action ◽  
The West ◽  
Scientific Thought ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Order Preference ◽  
Rational Understanding ◽  
Social Scientific ◽  
Character Building ◽  
The Individual

This paper compares the Islamic and the western social scien­tific perspectives on corruption. Jt is argued that the emerging shift in social scientific thought in viewing corruption from "grease that oils the economic wheel" to a "menace that under­mines economic growth" has brought rational understanding of the phenomenon much closer to [slamic doctrine. Where they differ is with respect to remedial action. The western approach focuses on governance and designing appropriate systems and institutions that gear information and incentives toward minimiz­ing opportunities and enticement for corruption. In short, it emphasizes constraints external to the individual. By comparison, Islam seeks to go beyond such constraints, and also instill in believers a clear "second-order" preference for non­corrupt behavior. lt recommends developing a firm belief in transcendent accountability, stresses character building through practicing moral virtues and shunning vices. In essence, much of the restraint comes from within through a moral renovation. rt is our contention that both emphases are important in eliminating corruption and that the followers oflslam and the West can learn from one another.

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