Teleological Reasons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas W. Portmore
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Do So

A teleological reason to φ is a reason to φ in virtue of the fact that φ-ing would either itself promote a certain end or is appropriately related to something else that would promote that end. And teleological reasons divide into direct and the indirect kinds, depending on whether the first or second of these two disjuncts applies. Thus, supposing that our end is to maximize utility, the fact that my killing one to save two would maximize utility is a direct teleological reason for me to do so, whereas the fact that my killing one to save two is prohibited by the code of rules whose universal acceptance would maximize utility is an indirect teleological reason for me to refrain from doing so. This chapter discusses various types of reasons, such as epistemic reasons (that is, reasons to believe), and whether all, some, or none of them are teleological. The chapter pays particularly close attention to the issue of whether all practical reasons (that is, reasons for action) are teleological.

scholarly journals Meriting Concern and Meriting Respect

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Garthoff
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
Kantian Theory ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Conscious Animals ◽  
Do So

Recently there has been a somewhat surprising interest among Kantian theorists in the moral standing of animals, coupled with a no less surprising optimism among these theorists about the prospect of incorporating animal moral standing into Kantian theory without contorting its other attractive features. These theorists contend in particular that animal standing can be incorporated into Kantian moral theory without abandoning its logocentrism: the claim that everything that is valuable depends for its value on its relation to rationality. In this essay I raise doubts about the prospects for accommodating animal moral standing within a logocentric Kantianism. I argue instead that the best way to incorporate animal moral standing into Kantian theory is to admit more radical departures from Kant’s position by maintaining that consciousness is a locus of moral standing independent from rationality.I propose that we should attribute moral standing to all conscious animals because the capacity of consciousness is the criterion distinguishing individuals whose well-being generates reasons from individuals whose well-being fails to do so. We need such a criterion because we speak of the well-being of things, such as artifacts and meteorological phenomena, which clearly lack moral standing. Having already argued against the Kantian view that the criterion of moral standing is rationality, I proceed to argue that consciousness is also superior to its other principal rival for the criterion of moral standing: life.On the view that emerges from this discussion, we have obligations to show concern for conscious individuals by treating their well-being as providing us with reasons for action; the view thus endorses the criterion of moral standing typically advanced by utilitarians. On this view we also have a distinct class of obligations to show respect for conscious rational individuals; the view thus endorses the Kantian claim that persons have a distinctive (and a higher) moral status in virtue of their possession of rational capacities. In this essay thus begin to show how a principal insight of each leading approach to modern moral theory may be captured in a unified theory.

The Unity of Reasons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Special Case

This chapter is concerned with the question of what unifies reasons for action and reasons for belief, sometimes called practical and epistemic reasons. According to some views, reasons for belief are a special case of reasons to do something, and so epistemic reasons are a special case, very broadly speaking, of practical reasons. According to other views, reasons for action are a special case of reasons to draw some conclusion, and so practical reasons are a special case of epistemic reasons. This chapter considers some of the evidence that bears on whether either of these claims is correct, or whether instead practical and epistemic reasons have something else in common.

The Range of Reasons

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Whiting
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
First Order ◽  
Underlying Principle ◽  
Comprehensive Framework ◽  
Order Commitment

This book contributes to two debates and it does so by bringing them together. The first is a debate in metaethics concerning normative reasons, the considerations that serve to justify a person’s actions and attitudes. The second is a debate in epistemology concerning the norms for belief, the standards that govern a person’s beliefs and by reference to which they are assessed. The book starts by developing and defending a new theory of reasons for action, that is, of practical reasons. The theory belongs to a family that analyses reasons by appeal to the normative notion of rightness (fittingness, correctness); it is distinctive in making central appeal to modal notions, specifically, that of a nearby possible world. The result is a comprehensive framework that captures what is common to and distinctive of reasons of various kinds: justifying and demanding; for and against, possessed and unpossessed; objective and subjective. The framework is then generalized to reasons for belief, that is, to epistemic reasons, and combined with a substantive, first-order commitment, namely, that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. The upshot is an account of the various norms governing belief, including knowledge and rationality, and the relations among them. According to it, the standards to which belief is subject are various, but they are unified by an underlying principle.

The Anti-Inflammatory Basis of Equality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grant J. Rozeboom
Keyword(s):  
Social Practice ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Anti Inflammatory ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Do So

We are moral equals, but in virtue of what? The most plausible answers to this question have pointed to our higher agential capacities, but we vary in the degrees to which we possess those capacities. How could they ground our equal moral standing, then? This chapter argues that they do so only indirectly. Our moral equality is most directly grounded in a social practice of equality, a practice that serves the purpose of mitigating our tendencies toward control and domination that interpreters of Rousseau call “inflamed amour-propre.” We qualify as participants in this practice of equality by possessing certain agential capacities, but it is our participation in the practice, and not the capacities themselves, that makes us moral equals. Thus, in contrast with recent accounts that simply posit a threshold above which capacity-variations are ignored, this chapter proposes moving from a capacity-based to a practice-based view of moral equality.

Tort’s Indifference: Conformity, Compliance, and Civil Recourse

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Ahson Azmat
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Internal Point ◽  
Loss Allocation ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Extensional Structure ◽  
Do So

AbstractLeading accounts of tort law split cleanly into two seams. Some trace its foundations to a deontic form of morality; others to an instrumental, policy-oriented system of efficient loss allocation. An increasingly prominent alternative to both seams, Civil Recourse Theory (CRT) resists this binary by arguing that tort comprises a basic legal category, and that its directives constitute reasons for action with robust normative force. Using the familiar question whether tort’s directives are guidance rules or liability rules as a lens, or prism, this essay shows how considerations of practical reasoning undermine one of CRT’s core commitments. If tort directives exert robust normative force, we must account for its grounds—for where it comes from, and why it obtains. CRT tries to do so by co-opting H.L.A. Hart’s notion of the internal point of view, but this leveraging strategy cannot succeed: while the internal point of view sees legal directives as guides to action, tort law merely demands conformity. To be guided by a directive is to comply with it, not conform to it, so tort’s structure blocks the shortcut to normativity CRT attempts to navigate. Given the fine-grained distinctions the theory makes, and with the connection between its claims and tort’s requirements thus severed, CRT faces a dilemma: it’s either unresponsive to tort’s normative grounds, or it’s inattentive to tort’s extensional structure.

Can there Be Epistemic Reasons for Action?

2006 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Robert Booth
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Basing Relation

In this paper I consider whether there can be such things as epistemic reasons for action. I consider three arguments to the contrary and argue that none are successful, being either somewhat question-begging or too strong by ruling out what most epistemologists think is a necessary feature of epistemic justification, namely the epistemic basing relation. I end by suggesting a "non-cognitivist" model of epistemic reasons that makes room for there being epistemic reasons for action and suggest that this model may support moral realism.

The ‘Always Speaking’ Approach to Statutes (and the Significance of Its Misapplication in Aubrey v The Queen)

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Meagher
Keyword(s):  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Modern Approach ◽  
Difficult Question ◽  
Do So ◽  
Legal Meaning

This article clarifies the nature and scope of the ‘always speaking’ approach to statutes in Anglo-Antipodean law. To do so is important. For whilst it is now considered interpretive orthodoxy to treat statutes as ‘always speaking’, what that entails in terms of doctrine and application is not always clear. It is, however, recognised that whether or not a statute attracts the operation of the ‘always speaking’ approach can sometimes be a difficult question to answer. In order to do so judges have at their disposal the interpretive tools (and method) provided by the ‘modern approach’ to statutory interpretation. Indeed, in these cases maybe close attention to the contextualism which lies at the heart of the ‘modern approach’ is a more satisfactory way of determining the legal meaning of a statute than to presume that it is ‘always speaking’.

Women Trafficking Problem in Assam

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 12-40
Author(s):  
Rupamjyoti Nath ◽  
Manjit Das
Keyword(s):  
Secondary Data ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Common People ◽  
Eastern State ◽  
The North ◽  
North Eastern ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
The Government ◽  
Women Trafficking ◽  
Do So

The increasing numbers of newspaper reports on disappearing women from the north eastern state of Assam and especially from the economically backward areas of the state in recent years deserve close attention from both researchers' points of view as well as policy-level intervention of the larger community along with the government. This study makes an attempt to operate upon the menace area through the scalpel of game theory under the light of both primary and secondary data collected from the study area. It is an attempt to outline conscious human behaviour that leads to crimes such as women trafficking and identify the parameters controlling or affecting which types of crimes can be controlled. In order to do so, different distinct entities associated with the problem have been considered as different players leading to the concluding indication of prevailing flaws in the legal system of the country along with lack of employment opportunities and mass ignorance about the problem in hand among common people as the major reasons.

Dimensions of Cultural Variation

2019 ◽  
pp. 67-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter B. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Multilevel Modeling ◽  
Cultural Differences ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Social Contexts ◽  
Measurement Bias ◽  
Cultural Variation ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
The Social ◽  
Do So

To understand cultural differences, we need to find ways to characterize the variations in the social contexts in which people are located. To do so, we must focus on differences between contexts rather than differences between individuals. Most research of this type has examined differences between nations in terms of dimensions. Treating each nation as a unit, contrasts have been identified in terms of values, beliefs, self-descriptions, and social norms. The most influential difference identified concerned the dimension of individualism–collectivism, which has provided the theoretical framework for numerous studies. The validity of this type of investigation rests on close attention to aspects of measurement to ensure that respondents are able to make the necessary judgments and to respond in ways that are not affected by measurement bias. Where many nations are sampled, multilevel modeling can be used to show the ways in which dimensions of culture affect social behaviors.

scholarly journals Soft Law, Authoritative Advice and Non-binding Agreements

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-525
Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Soft Law ◽  
Practical Reasons ◽  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Philosophical Perspective ◽  
Legal Obligations ◽  
The Subject

Abstract One of the most fascinating developments in the domain of international law in the last few decades is the astonishing proliferation of non-binding legal instruments or soft law, namely, norms or directives explicitly avoiding the imposition of legal obligations on the relevant parties. From a philosophical perspective, this is rather puzzling: how can we explain the idea of a non-binding directive or a non-binding contract? In this article I aim to provide an account of the rationale of soft law from the perspective of the practical reasons in play. First, I analyse the idea of authoritative advice, suggesting that when authorities advise their putative subjects, they purport to give the subject presumptive reasons for action. I explain what presumptive reasons are. Secondly, I suggest the possibility that something very similar is at work in cases of non-binding agreements, coupled with special accountability relations that such agreements invariably constitute.

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