Constitutional Economics and the Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Voigt
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Economic Effects ◽  
The Self ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Constitutional Economics ◽  
Established Method ◽  
Self Interest

The economic analysis of constitutions, also known as ‘constitutional economics’ or ‘constitutional political economy’ is a young research program. Standard economics used to focus on the analysis of choices within rules, thus assuming rules to be exogenously given and fixed. Constitutional economics broadens this research program by analyzing the choice of rules, using the established method of economics, i.e. rational choice. This article discusses the two broad research avenues in constitutional economics: the normative branch, which is interested in legitimizing the state and its most basic rules by drawing solely on the self-interest of rational individuals; and the positive branch, which is interested in explaining, firstly, the (economic) effects of alternative constitutional rules and, secondly, the emergence and modification of constitutional rules.

Contractarian Perspectives in Law and Economics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg Vanberg ◽  
Viktor Vanberg
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Social Economic ◽  
Law And Economics ◽  
Nobel Laureate ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Constitutional Economics ◽  
Classical Economics

This article sketches the distinct perspective that a contractarian approach can bring to law and economics. It focuses on a particularly important strand of the contractarian tradition: the constitutional political economy (CPE) research program (also known as constitutional economics), developed most fully in the work of Nobel laureate James Buchanan. Like law and economics, the CPE paradigm is primarily concerned with the comparative analysis of social, economic, and political institutions. But its foundational assumptions offer a distinct contrast to the mainstream neoclassical paradigm that has dominated law and economics as a field. The article first provides a brief overview of contractarian approaches. It then describes the central features of the CPE paradigm. It contrasts the foundations of the CPE approach with those of neo-classical economics; explores the implications of these differences for the research foci at the heart of these two traditions; and discusses how mainstream and constitutional economics approaches may be reconciled.

James M. Buchanan and Edmund Burke: Opposite Sides of the Same Fiscal Constitution Coin

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-257
Author(s):  
John Considine
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Constitutional Economics ◽  
Economic Constitution ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Internal Inconsistency ◽  
Fiscal Constitution ◽  
Polar Opposite

Constitutional economics examines the individual's choice-between-rules rather than their choice-within-rules. It is, according to James M. Buchanan, a restatement of the classical political economy of Adam Smith. One of its primary normative implications is the need for a fiscal constitution. Given the late eighteenth century intellectual basis for such fiscal constitutions it appears, at first glance, a little strange that the research program does not consider Edmund Burke's 1780 economic constitution worthy of consideration. The most obvious reason for Burke's exclusion from constitutional political economy is that the methodological basis of Buchanan's twentieth century constitutional economics seems almost the polar opposite of Burke's eighteenth century legislator's attempt to introduce a fiscal constitution. However, both methodologies suffer from internal inconsistency in their cases for a fiscal constitution. One of the primary reasons for this inconsistency is that each needs to appeal to ideas more at home in the methodology of the other. Buchanan adapts a quasi-Burke approach by the introduction of ethical norms not consistent with the self-interest postulate, while Burke adopts a quasi-Buchanan approach by appealing to the principle of consent to justify his reform of institutions that have been formed by custom and tradition. Ultimately, the methodological difference is not as great as it appears at first. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Burke's work deserves recognition in the broader constitutional economics research program because to exclude him on the grounds of methodology is to fail to understand the logical implications of Buchanan's work.

Evolving Preferences and Welfare Economics: The Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy

2014 ◽  
Vol 234 (2-3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktor J. Vanberg
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Constitutional Economics ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Mind

SummaryThe theoretical consistency and practical applicability of traditional welfare economics has long been subject to controversy. More recently the challenge has been added from evolutionary approaches that the individual preferences on which the welfare calculus is based are themselves subject to change. The purpose of the present paper is twofold. It takes, firstly, a closer look at the discussion on the need and feasibility of an evolutionary welfare economics that accommodates evolving preferences. The particular focus is on proposals advanced by three authors, Carl Christian von Weizsäcker, Ulrich Witt and Robert Sugden. And it seeks, secondly, to show that the paradigm of constitutional economics can deal with the evolving-preferences-issue in a more coherent and consistent way than approaches that remain within the mind-frame of welfare economics.

JANE EYRE'S PURSE: WOMEN'S QUEER ECONOMIC DESIRE IN THE VICTORIAN NOVEL

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 741-759
Author(s):  
Meg Dobbins
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Victorian Novel ◽  
Economic Thought ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Novel ◽  
The Core ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Political Economic

“Young ladies don't understandpolitical economy, you know,” asserts the casually misogynistic uncle of Dorothea Brooke in George Eliot'sMiddlemarch(1871) (17; bk. 1, ch 1). Although Eliot's heroine resents both her uncle's remark and “that never-explained science which was thrust as an extinguisher over all her lights,” her attempt to teach herself political economy in the novel only seems to confirm her uncle's assessment (18; bk. 1, ch. 1): Dorothea gathers a “little heap of books on political economy” and sets forth to learn “the best way of spending money so as not to injure one's neighbors, or – what comes to the same thing – so as to do them the most good” (805; bk. 5, ch. 48). Naively likening “spending money so as not to injure one's neighbors” to “do[ing] them the most good,” Dorothea fails to grasp the self-interest at the core of nineteenth-century political economic thought and so misunderstands the subject matter before her: “Unhappily her mind slipped off [the book] for a whole hour; and at the end she found herself reading sentences twice over with an intense consciousness of many things, but not of any one thing contained in the text. This was hopeless” (805; bk. 5, ch. 48).

Forty Years on, and Counting

2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-7
Author(s):  
James M. Buchanan
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Constitutional Economics

Abstract The Calculus of Consent’s aim was to construct a theory of politics from the foundations of individual rational choice. The Authors’ intention was to fill the gap in social science reflected in the continuing failure to analyze collective action through an individual choice perspective. The research program now called ‘constitutional economics’ was a natural outgrowth of the precautionary analytics of the early efforts.

scholarly journals Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy

2005 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
VIKTOR J. VANBERG
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
Consumer Sovereignty ◽  
Voluntary Exchange ◽  
Economic Constitution ◽  
Rules Of The Game

The paper approaches the ‘market versus state’ issue from the perspective of constitutional political economy, a research program that has been advanced as a principal alternative to traditional welfare economics and its perspective on the relation between market and state. Constitutional political economy looks at market and state as different kinds of social arenas in which people may realize mutual gains from voluntary exchange and cooperation. The working properties of these arenas depend on their respective constitutions, i.e. the rules of the game that define the constraints under which individuals are allowed, in either arena, to pursue their interests. It is argued that ‘improving’ markets means to adopt and to maintain an economic constitution that enhances consumer sovereignty, and that ‘improvement’ in the political arena means to adopt and to maintain constitutional rules that enhance citizen sovereignty.

The Design of Constitutions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Ginsburg
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Optimal Design ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Real World ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
Economic Analysis Of Law ◽  
Positive Theory ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Empirical Question

Constitutions have been a central topic for the economic analysis of law since Buchanan and Tullock (1961) introduced the discipline of constitutional political economy. From the outset economic analysis has been deployed for both positive and normative ends. Their project was normative, but economic analysis provides tools to critique real world constitutions and to analyze their attributes. Optimal design of constitutions in theory is rarely matched in practice, but this is no hindrance to understanding the form, duration, and impact of actual constitutions. This chapter reviews the ends of constitutional design. It offers a positive theory of constitutional bargaining which can be used to inform normative design questions. Whether particular institutions ought to be included in a constitution depends on the extent to which such texts make a difference, which is an empirical question subject to some scrutiny. A review of the empirical literature on constitutional design concludes.

scholarly journals Economia Política Constitucional: Programa de Pesquisa de James Buchanan e as Tecnologias Civis

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei Cesário de Lima Albuquerque ◽  
Heraldo Elias Montarroyos
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Constitutional Political Economy ◽  
James Buchanan ◽  
Institutional Dynamics ◽  
Mancur Olson ◽  
Institutional Benefits ◽  
Legal Technology

ECONOMIA POLÍTICA CONSTITUCIONAL: PROGRAMA DE PESQUISA DE JAMES BUCHANAN E AS TECNOLOGIAS CIVIS CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: JAMES BUCHANAN RESEARCH PROGRAM AND THE CIVIL LAW TECHNOLOGIES RESUMO: O objetivo desse artigo é identificar os custos e os benefícios projetados pelas tecnologias jurídicas do Código Civil, aplicando o programa de pesquisa da Economia Política Constitucional do economista James Buchanan (1975) que funciona como instrumento heurístico decisivo nesse estudo para compreender a dinâmica institucional da Lei a partir da lógica utilitarista-maximizadora do homem racional. Esse programa de pesquisa apresenta uma ontologia, metodologia, axiologia, teoria, práxis e um contexto social das ideias. Com essas categorias, é realizada a releitura instrumental do Código Civil que aponta como resultado a existência de quatro tecnologias contratuais (negociação, centralização, descentralização e coalizão) apresentando seus respectivos custos e benefícios institucionais. Também, procurando maximizar o programa de pesquisa buchaniano, acrescentamos o programa de pesquisa da ação coletiva do economista Mancur Olson, igualmente estruturado em categorias diversas, com o intuito de visualizar a interferência do indivíduo free rider no desempenho das tecnologias jurídicas. Como contribuição, essa pesquisa metodológica mostra que existe uma microeconomia política no Código Civil brasileiro. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Racionalidade Econômica; Tecnologia jurídica; Bem público; James Buchanan. ABSTRACT: This paper seeks to identify the costs and benefits designed by the legal technologies of the Civil Code, applying the research program of Constitutional Political Economy as defined by James Buchanan (1975) which is a fundamental heuristic tool in this study to understand the institutional dynamics of Law from the rational man’s utilitarian-maximizing logic. This research program presents an ontology, a methodology, an axiology, a theory, a praxis, and a social context of ideas. With these categories, it is performed the instrumental reinterpretation of the Civil Code which points as a result to the existence of four contractual technologies (trading, centralization, decentralization, and coalition) and their respective costs and institutional benefits. Also, in order to maximize the Buchanan-esque research program, it was introduced the research program of the collective action as defined by Mancur Olson, equally structured into several categories, in order to see the interference of the free rider individual in legal technologies’ performance. As a contribution, this article shows that there is a political microeconomics in the Brazilian Civil Code. KEYWORDS: Economic Rationality; Legal Technology; Public Good; James Buchanan. 

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