April 1915: Five future Nobel Prize–winners inaugurate weapons of mass destruction and the academic–industrial–military complex

Author(s):  
W. van Der Kloot

Poison gas warfare was initiated in the Great War by a German military unit that included five future Nobel laureates: James Franck, Fritz Haber, Otto Hahn, Gustav Hertz and Walther Nernst. It was Haber's idea to use poison gas. To implement gas warfare he devised an organization that meshed the academy into the military–industrial complex. Later three other Nobel laureates, Emil Fischer, Heinrich Wieland and Richard Willstätter, contributed to the enterprise. Huge quantities of poisons were used by both sides during the war, because they were well adapted to static trench warfare, even though—which is a surprise to many—they were substantially less deadly than explosives.

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-20
Author(s):  
Irina Orlova ◽  
Artem Sukharev ◽  
Maria Sukhareva ◽  
Mikhail Deikun

The main objective of the article is to substantiate a systematic approach to the introduction of all types of innovations in the development of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation. The relevance of the study is due to the fact that in the modern world it is especially important to ensure the national security of the country and the defense industry plays a crucial role in this. At the same time, one cannot but note the importance of the defense industry in the production of high-tech civilian products and dual-use products, which enhances the country's competitiveness in the world market. In addition, the relevance of the topic is due to the presence of rather serious problems in the Russian defense industry, which require immediate resolution. The article uses the methodology of structurally functional analysis, the institutional approach and the method of comparative assessments. The authors conclude that technological innovation alone will not be able to achieve strategic results for ensuring national security, only in conjunction with organizational, product, social and marketing innovations, the domestic defense industry is able to solve its tasks.


Cinema’s Military Industrial Complex examines how the American military has used cinema and related visual, sonic, and mobile technologies to further its varied aims. The essays in this book address the way cinema was put to work for purposes of training, orientation, record keeping, internal and external communication, propaganda, research and development, tactical analysis, surveillance, physical and mental health, recreation, and morale. The contributors examine the technologies and types of films that were produced and used in collaboration among the military, film industry, and technology manufacturers. The essays also explore the goals of the American state, which deployed the military and its unique modes of filmmaking, film exhibition, and film viewing to various ends. Together, the essays reveal the military’s deep investment in cinema, which began around World War I, expanded during World War II, continued during the Cold War (including wars in Korea and Vietnam), and still continues in the ongoing War on Terror.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (12) ◽  
pp. 2363-2380
Author(s):  
S.B. Zainullin ◽  
O.A. Zainullina

Subject. The military-industrial complex is one of the core industries in any economy. It ensures both the economic and global security of the State. However, the economic security of MIC enterprises strongly depends on the State and other stakeholders. Objectives. We examine key factors of corporate culture in terms of theoretical and practical aspects. The article identifies the best implementation of corporate culture that has a positive effect on the corporate security in the MIC of the USA, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Japan ans China. Methods. The study employs dialectical method of research, combines the historical and logic unity, structural analysis, traditional techniques of economic analysis and synthesis. Results. We performed the comparative analysis of corporate culture models and examined how they are used by the MIC corporations with respect to international distinctions. Conclusions and Relevance. The State is the main stakeholder of the MIC corporations, since it acts as the core customer represented by the military department. It regulates and controls operations. The State is often a major shareholder of such corporations. Employees are also important stakeholders. Hence, trying to satisfy stakeholders' needs by developing the corporate culture, corporations mitigate their key risks and enhance their corporate security.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (11) ◽  
pp. 2103-2123
Author(s):  
V.L. Gladyshevskii ◽  
E.V. Gorgola ◽  
D.V. Khudyakov

Subject. In the twentieth century, the most developed countries formed a permanent military economy represented by military-industrial complexes, which began to perform almost a system-forming role in national economies, acting as the basis for ensuring national security, and being an independent military and political force. The United States is pursuing a pronounced militaristic policy, has almost begun to unleash a new "cold war" against Russia and to unwind the arms race, on the one hand, trying to exhaust the enemy's economy, on the other hand, to reindustrialize its own economy, relying on the military-industrial complex. Objectives. We examine the evolution, main features and operational distinctions of the military-industrial complex of the United States and that of the Russian Federation, revealing sources of their military-technological and military-economic advancement in comparison with other countries. Methods. The study uses military-economic analysis, scientific and methodological apparatus of modern institutionalism. Results. Regulating the national economy and constant monitoring of budget financing contribute to the rise of military production, especially in the context of austerity and crisis phenomena, which, in particular, justifies the irrelevance of institutionalists' conclusions about increasing transaction costs and intensifying centralization in the industrial production management with respect to to the military-industrial complex. Conclusions. Proving to be much more efficient, the domestic military-industrial complex, without having such access to finance as the U.S. military monopolies, should certainly evolve and progress, strengthening the coordination, manageability, planning, maximum cost reduction, increasing labor productivity, and implementing an internal quality system with the active involvement of the State and its resources.


2020 ◽  
pp. 136-153
Author(s):  
Elizaveta E. Polianskaia ◽  

This article deals with the problem of recruiting sisters of mercy by the Russian Red Cross Society (also RRCS, Red Cross) in 1908-1914s. In case of war, Red Cross had to send sisters of mercy to its own institutions and to medical institutions of the military Department. The war ministry was developing a mobilization plan, which included a plan for the deployment of medical facilities. The ministry sent this plan to the administration of the Red Cross. In accordance with the request of the ministry, the RRCS strengthened its efforts to attract new staff of sisters of mercy. This activity led to certain results. On the eve of the war, there was a number of sisters of mercy that were required to replenish the medical institutions of the Red Cross and the military Department. That means that according to the pre-war plan, in the matter of creating a cadre of sisters of mercy, the RRCS was ready for the war. However, the Great War took on a wide scale, a situation which the army, the industry, and the medical service were not prepared for. The Russian Red Cross Society was forced to quickly open new medical institutions and to urgently train new personnel. Sometimes the duties of nurses were performed by those who did not have the necessary education.


Author(s):  
Nicholas J. Wheeler

This chapter examines how enemy images are produced and reproduced in relations between two enemies. It identifies four drivers of security competition that block the development of trust. These are: (1) the security dilemma; (2) the problem of offence–defence differentiation; (3) peaceful/defensive self-images; (4) ideological fundamentalism; and (5) uncertainty about future intentions. Using examples such as the military stand-off on the Korean peninsula and the Libyan dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction, the chapter shows how hard it is for face-to-face diplomacy to change enemy images. It also examines the problem of ‘future uncertainty’—the problem of what happens if successor leaders do not share the trust of their predecessors and have malign intent.


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