Technology Lecture

The Central Electricity Generating Board propose to build a pressurized water reactor at Sizewell in Suffolk. The PWR Task Force was set up in June 1981 to provide a communications centre for developing firm design proposals for this reactor. These were to follow the Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant System designed by Bechtel for the Westinghouse nuclear steam supply system for reactors built in the United States. Changes were required to the design to accommodate, for example, the use of two turbine generators and to satisfy British safety requirements. Differences exist between the British and American licensing procedures. In the U.K. the statutory responsibility for the safety of a nuclear power station rests unambiguously with the Generating Boards. In the U.S.A. the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issues detailed written instructions, which must be followed precisely. Much of the debate on the safety of nuclear powrer focuses on the risks of big nuclear accidents. It is necessary to explain to the public what, in a balanced perspective, the risks of accidents actually are. The vocabulary used in the nuclear power industry contributes to the misunderstanding and fear felt by the general public. The long-term consequences of big nuclear accidents can be presented in terms of reduction in life expectancy, increased chance of cancer or the equivalent pattern of compulsory cigarette smoking.

Author(s):  
Grenville Harrop

The AP1000® pressurized water reactor (PWR) is the first and only Generation III+ nuclear power plant to be granted design certification by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The initial deployment of this technology has been the construction of dual AP1000 units in each of two coastal sites in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), at Sanmen (Zhejiang Province) and Haiyang (Shandong Province). The contracts for these units were framed to support the PRC’s intention to achieve self reliance in its nuclear supply infrastructure. Westinghouse is implementing its innovative supply chain strategy, “We Buy Where We Build”™, to promote the technology transfer and increasing levels of localization needed as each unit is constructed. Since the initial contract award in 2007, the Westinghouse Consortium and the purchasers, State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation of China (SNPTC), the Shandong Nuclear Power Company (SDNPC), and the Sanmen Nuclear Power Company (SMNPC) have worked in harmony to build the units using advanced modular construction techniques that reduce construction timescales and associated risks. First-of-a-kind (FOAK) plant components have been manufactured and delivered, including reactor vessels, steam generators, and other safety equipment. With construction and equipment installation in the final stages, the planning and implementation of the pre-operational testing, system turnover, and commissioning are now underway to prepare for fuel load and future commercial operation.


Author(s):  
Amir Ali ◽  
Edward D. Blandford

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) initiated a generic safety issue (GSI-191) assessing debris accumulation and resultant chemical effects on pressurized water reactor (PWR) sump performance. GSI-191 has been investigated using reduced-scale separate-effects testing and integral-effects testing facilities. These experiments focused on developing a procedure to generate prototypical debris beds that provide stable and reproducible conventional head loss (CHL). These beds also have the ability to filter out chemical precipitates resulting in chemical head loss. The newly developed procedure presented in this paper is used to generate debris beds with different particulate to fiber ratios (η). Results from this experimental investigation show that the prepared beds can provide reproducible CHL for different η in a single and multivertical loops facility within ±7% under the same flow conditions. The measured CHL values are consistent with the predicted values using the NUREG-6224 correlation. Also, the results showed that the prepared debris beds following the proposed procedure are capable of detecting standard aluminum and calcium precipitates, and the head loss increase (chemical head loss) was measured and reported in this paper.


Author(s):  
Joseph S. Miller

The United States utilities started preparing for external events that could lead to a loss of all ac power in the 1980’s, when the Station Blackout (SBO) rulemaking was first introduced by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). Following the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant on March 11, 2011, the USNRC established a senior-level agency task force referred to as the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF was tasked with conducting a systematic, methodical review of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations and processes to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to these programs in light of the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a result of this review, the NTTF developed a comprehensive set of recommendations, documented in SECY-11-0093, “Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan,” dated July 12, 2011. Documentation of the staff’s efforts is contained in SECY-11-0124, “Recommended Actions to be Taken without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report,” dated September 9, 2011, and SECY-11-0137, “Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,” dated October 3, 2011. To satisfy some of the NRC’s recommendations, the industry described its proposal for a Diverse and Flexible Mitigation Capability (FLEX), as documented in Nuclear Energy Institute’s (NEI) letter, dated December 16, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11353A008). FLEX was proposed as a strategy to fulfill the key safety functions of core cooling, containment integrity, and spent fuel cooling. The events at Fukushima Dai-ichi highlight the possibility that extreme natural phenomena could challenge the prevention, mitigation and emergency preparedness defense-in-depth layers. At Fukushima, limitations in time and unpredictable conditions associated with the accident significantly challenged attempts by the responders to preclude core damage and containment failure. During the events in Fukushima, the challenges faced by the operators were beyond any faced previously at a commercial nuclear reactor. NRC Order 12-049 (Ref. 1) and NRC Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2012-01 (Ref. 6) provided additional requirements to mitigate beyond-design-basis external events. These additional requirements impose guidance and strategies to be available if the loss of power, motive force and normal access to the ultimate heat sink to prevent fuel damage in the reactor and spent fuel pool affected all units at a site simultaneously. The NEI submitted document NEI 12-06, “Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide” in August 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12242A378) to provide specifications for the nuclear power industry in the development, implementation, and maintenance of guidance and strategies in response to NRC Order EA-12-049. The US utilities are currently proposing modifications to their plants that will follow specifications provided in NEI 12-06. This paper presents some of the NEI 12-06 requirements and some of the proposed modifications proposed by the US utilities.


2013 ◽  
Vol 284-287 ◽  
pp. 1151-1155
Author(s):  
Che Hao Chen ◽  
Jong Rong Wang ◽  
Hao Tzu Lin ◽  
Chun Kuan Shih

The objective of this study is to utilize TRACE (TRAC/RELAP Advanced Computational Engine) code to analyze the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure transients under ATWS (Anticipated Transient Without Scram) for Maanshan PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) in various MTC (Moderator Temperature Coefficient) conditions. TRACE is an advanced thermal hydraulic code for nuclear power plant safety analysis, which is currently under development by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). A graphic user interface program named SNAP (Symbolic Nuclear Analysis Package), which processes inputs and outputs for TRACE is also under development. Maanshan nuclear power plant (NPP) is the only Westinghouse PWR in Taiwan. The rated core thermal power of Maanshan with MUR (Measurement Uncertainty Recapture) is 2822 MWt. In document SECY-83-293, all initializing events were classified as either turbine trip or non-turbine trip events and their ATWS risks were also evaluated according to these two events. Loss of condenser vacuum (LOCV) and Loss of normal feedwater (LONF) ATWS were identified as limiting transients of turbine trip and non-turbine trip events in this study. According to ASME Code Level C service limit criteria, the RCS pressure for Maanshan NPP must be under 22.06 MPa. Furthermore, we select the LOCV transient to analyze various MTC effects on RCS pressure variations.


Author(s):  
Michael F. Hessheimer ◽  
Satoru Shibata ◽  
James F. Costello

The Nuclear Power Engineering Corporation (NUPEC) of Japan and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have been co-sponsoring and jointly funding a Cooperative Containment Research Program at Sandia National Laboratories. The purpose of the program is to investigate the response of representative models of nuclear containment structures to pressure loading beyond the design basis accident and to compare analytical predictions with measured behavior. This is accomplished by conducting static, pneumatic overpressurization tests of scale models at ambient temperature. The first project in this program was a test of a mixed scale steel containment vessel (SCV). Next, a 1:4-scale model of a prestressed concrete containment vessel (PCCV), representative of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) plant in Japan, was constructed by NUPEC at Sandia National Laboratories from January 1997 through June, 2000. Concurrently, Sandia instrumented the model with over 1500 transducers to measure strain, displacement and forces in the model from prestressing through the pressure testing. The limit state test of the PCCV model was conducted in September, 2000 at Sandia National Laboratories. This paper describes the conduct and some of the results of this test.


Author(s):  
Ronald C. Lippy

The nuclear industry is preparing for the licensing and construction of new nuclear power plants in the United States. Several new designs have been developed and approved, including the “traditional” reactor designs, the passive safe shutdown designs and the small modular reactors (SMRs). The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) provides specific Codes used to perform preservice inspection/testing and inservice inspection/testing for many of the components used in the new reactor designs. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews information provided by applicants related to inservice testing (IST) programs for Design Certifications and Combined Licenses (COLs) under Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 52) (Reference 1). The 2012 Edition of the ASME OM Code defines a post-2000 plant as a nuclear power plant that was issued (or will be issued) its construction permit, or combined license for construction and operation, by the applicable regulatory authority on or following January 1, 2000. The New Reactors OM Code (NROMC) Task Group (TG) of the ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (NROMC TG) is assigned the task of ensuring that the preservice testing (PST) and IST provisions in the ASME OM Code to address pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints (snubbers) in post-2000 nuclear power plants are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the components will operate as needed when called upon. Currently, the NROMC TG is preparing proposed guidance for the treatment of active pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints with high safety significance in non-safety systems in passive post-2000 reactors including SMRs.


2012 ◽  
Vol 134 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Gamble ◽  
William Server ◽  
Bruce Bishop ◽  
Nathan Palm ◽  
Carol Heinecke

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code [1], Section XI, Appendix G provides a deterministic procedure for defining Service Level A and B pressure–temperature limits for ferritic components in the reactor coolant pressure boundary. An alternative risk-informed methodology has been developed for ASME Section XI, Appendix G. This alternative methodology provides easy to use procedures to define risk-informed pressure–temperature limits for Service Level A and B events, including leak testing and reactor start-up and shut-down. Risk-informed pressure–temperature limits provide more operational flexibility, particularly for reactor pressure vessels with relatively high irradiation levels and radiation sensitive materials. This work evaluated selected plants spanning the population of pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors (BWRs). The evaluation included determining appropriate material properties, reviewing operating history and system operational constraints, and performing probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) analyses. The analysis results were used to define risk-informed pressure–temperature relationships that comply with safety goals defined by the United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This alternative methodology will provide greater operational flexibility, especially for Service Level A and B events that may adversely affect efficient and safe plant operation, such as low-temperature-over-pressurization for PWRs and system leak testing for BWRs. Overall, application of this methodology can result in increased plant efficiency and increased plant and personnel safety.


1980 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-123
Author(s):  
Linda O. Hecht

Due to the concern for safety the nuclear power industry in the United States has fostered the use of reliability analysis to assess system performance and the impact of system failure on overall plant safety. The need for system and component failure rate data has been recognized and has spurred such efforts as NPRDS (Nuclear Power Research Data System) and IEEE's Std 500 (The Reliability Data Manual). Reliability modeling techniques have been developed for application to nuclear systems and are presently being considered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for licensing purposes.


Author(s):  
Terry L. Dickson ◽  
Shah N. Malik ◽  
Mark T. Kirk ◽  
Deborah A. Jackson

The current federal regulations to ensure that nuclear reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) maintain their structural integrity when subjected to transients such as pressurized thermal shock (PTS) events were derived from computational models that were developed in the early to mid 1980s. Since that time, there have been advancements in relevant technologies associated with the physics of PTS events that impact RPV integrity assessment. Preliminary studies performed in 1999 suggested that application of the improved technology could reduce the conservatism in the current regulations while continuing to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety. A relaxation of PTS regulations could have profound implications for plant license extension considerations. Based on the above, in 1999, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) initiated a comprehensive project, with the nuclear power industry as a participant, to re-evaluate the current PTS regulations within the framework established by modern probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques. During the last three years, improved computational models have evolved through interactions between experts in the relevant disciplines of thermal hydraulics, PRA, human reliability analysis (HRA), materials embrittlement effects on fracture toughness (crack initiation and arrest), fracture mechanics methodology, and fabrication-induced flaw characterization. These experts were from the NRC staff, their contractors, and representatives from the nuclear industry. These improved models have now been implemented into the FAVOR (Fracture Analysis of Vessels: Oak Ridge) computer code, which is an applications tool for performing risk-informed structural integrity evaluations of embrittled RPVs subjected to transient thermal-hydraulic loading conditions. The baseline version of FAVOR (version 1.0) was released in October 2001. The updated risk-informed computational methodology in the FAVOR code is currently being applied to selected domestic commercial pressurized water reactors to evaluate the adequacy of the current regulations and to determine whether a technical basis can be established to support a relaxation of the current regulations. This paper provides a status report on the application of the updated computational methodology to a commercial pressurized water reactor (PWR) and discusses the results and interpretation of those results. It is anticipated that this re-evaluation effort will be completed in 2002.


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