scholarly journals The world's biomes and primary production as a triple tragedy of the commons foraging game played among plants

2016 ◽  
Vol 283 (1842) ◽  
pp. 20161993 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon G. McNickle ◽  
Miquel A. Gonzalez-Meler ◽  
Douglas J. Lynch ◽  
Jennifer L. Baltzer ◽  
Joel S. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Primary Production ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Plant Production ◽  
Root Production ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Tissue Production

Plants appear to produce an excess of leaves, stems and roots beyond what would provide the most efficient harvest of available resources. One way to understand this overproduction of tissues is that excess tissue production provides a competitive advantage. Game theoretic models predict overproduction of all tissues compared with non-game theoretic models because they explicitly account for this indirect competitive benefit. Here, we present a simple game theoretic model of plants simultaneously competing to harvest carbon and nitrogen. In the model, a plant's fitness is influenced by its own leaf, stem and root production, and the tissue production of others, which produces a triple tragedy of the commons. Our model predicts (i) absolute net primary production when compared with two independent global datasets; (ii) the allocation relationships to leaf, stem and root tissues in one dataset; (iii) the global distribution of biome types and the plant functional types found within each biome; and (iv) ecosystem responses to nitrogen or carbon fertilization. Our game theoretic approach removes the need to define allocation or vegetation type a priori but instead lets these emerge from the model as evolutionarily stable strategies. We believe this to be the simplest possible model that can describe plant production.

Managing Congestion in Matching Markets

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Arnosti ◽  
Ramesh Johari ◽  
Yash Kanoria
Keyword(s):  
Problem Definition ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Contact Potential ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Face Search ◽  
Uniqueness Of Equilibrium ◽  
Never Screened

Problem definition: Participants in matching markets face search and screening costs when seeking a match. We study how platform design can reduce the effort required to find a suitable partner. Practical/academic relevance: The success of matching platforms requires designs that minimize search effort and facilitate efficient market clearing. Methodology: We study a game-theoretic model in which “applicants” and “employers” pay costs to search and screen. An important feature of our model is that both sides may waste effort: Some applications are never screened, and employers screen applicants who may have already matched. We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and characterize welfare for participants on both sides of the market. Results: We identify that the market operates in one of two regimes: It is either screening-limited or application-limited. In screening-limited markets, employer welfare is low, and some employers choose not to participate. This occurs when application costs are low and there are enough employers that most applicants match, implying that many screened applicants are unavailable. In application-limited markets, applicants face a “tragedy of the commons” and send many applications that are never read. The resulting inefficiency is worst when there is a shortage of employers. We show that simple interventions—such as limiting the number of applications that an individual can send, making it more costly to apply, or setting an appropriate market-wide wage—can significantly improve the welfare of agents on one or both sides of the market. Managerial implications: Our results suggest that platforms cannot focus exclusively on attracting participants and making it easy to contact potential match partners. A good user experience requires that participants not waste effort considering possibilities that are unlikely to be available. The operational interventions we study alleviate congestion by ensuring that potential match partners are likely to be available.

Scheduling Multi-Workflows Over Heterogeneous Virtual Machines With a Multi-Stage Dynamic Game-Theoretic Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 82-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wu ◽  
Yuandou Wang
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Machines ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Scientific Workflow ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Heterogeneous Cloud ◽  
Cloud Infrastructures

Cloud computing, with dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to geographically distributed computational capabilities, is becoming an increasingly popular platform for the execution of scientific applications such as scientific workflows. Scheduling multiple workflows over cloud infrastructures and resources is well recognized to be NP-hard and thus critical to meeting various types of Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements. In this work, the authors consider a multi-objective scientific workflow scheduling framework based on the dynamic game-theoretic model. It aims at reducing make-spans, cloud cost, while maximizing system fairness in terms of workload distribution among heterogeneous cloud virtual machines (VMs). The authors consider randomly-generated scientific workflow templates as test cases and carry out extensive real-world tests based on third-party commercial clouds. Experimental results show that their proposed framework outperforms traditional ones by achieving lower make-spans, lower cost, and better system fairness.

A game-theoretic model for roadway performance management

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hesham Osman ◽  
Mazdak Nikbakht
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Political Decision ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Road Users ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Asset Managers

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present a socio-technical approach to modeling the behavior of roadway users, asset managers, and politicians toward roadway performance and asset management. This approach models the complex interactions that occur between these agents in a complex system. Most modeling approaches in the domain of infrastructure asset management take a purely asset-centric approach and fail to address these socio-technical interactions. Design/methodology/approach – Interactions among political decision makers, asset management strategy developers, and road users are modeled using a game-theoretic approach. The interactions are modeled as a non-cooperative game in which politicians, asset managers, and road users are the main players. Each player is autonomous and aims to come up with the set of moves to maximize their respective level of satisfaction in response to other players’ moves. Multi-attribute utility theory is used to deal with multitude of players’ goals, and the Nash equilibria of the game are south out to develop appropriate strategies for different players. Findings – An illustrative example for a road network of a Canadian city is used to demonstrate the developed methodology. The developed methodology demonstrates how behaviors of various agents involved in the sphere of asset management impacts their collective decision-making behavior. Originality/value – The developed framework provides asset managers and political decision makers with a valuable tool to evaluate the impact of public policy decisions related to asset managers on road performance and the overall satisfaction of road users.

The commons problem in the presence of negative externalities

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nahid Masoudi ◽  
Donique Bowie
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Negative Externalities ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Markov Perfect ◽  
Scale Down ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Harvest Decisions

PurposeWhile the commons problem and the issues related to the negative externalities of harvesting have been studied extensively, there remains a need to bridge these two streams of studies to comprehensively investigate the implications of the strategic interactions among resource harvesters in the presence of such negative externalities. This paper aims to fill this gap.Design/methodology/approachThe authors study a common-pool harvest problem when the extractive activities leave behind negative externalities which affect the resource growth rate and reduce the stock beyond the extracted levels. Markov perfect noncooperative and optimal solutions are presented under different scenarios regarding considerations of negative externalities into harvest decisions.FindingsResults of the study suggest that, in the presence of such externalities, all parties must scale down their extraction in accordance with their externalities. The resource can be preserved by implementation of such harvest rule. However, failure to incorporate the externalities exacerbates the commons problem and can even lead to exhaustion of the biomass even if countries manage to cooperate and coordinate their harvest. Suggesting that if such externalities are large enough – which empirical literature suggests they are – then recognition and consideration of these externalities in the harvest decisions is as crucial as cooperation.Originality/valueThis paper provides a framework that is capable of incorporating the negative externalities of harvest activities into a bioeconomic game theoretic model and thereby providing a more real-world representation of the state of the common-pool resource management. While, the authors extend a well-known simple model, the model of this research study has the capacity to explain the widespread incidences of resource collapses. Therefore, the important policy implication is that agents should rigorously work together to understand the extent of the negative externalities of their harvests on the resources.

Coordination mechanisms for digital and sustainable textile supply chain

2022 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patanjal Kumar ◽  
Dheeraj Sharma ◽  
Peeyush Pandey
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Deterministic Model ◽  
Virtual Organization ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Sustainable Supply Chain ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Game Theoretic

PurposeSupply chain network is complicated to manage due to the involvement of a number of agents. Formation of virtual organization using Industry 4.0 (I4.0) is an approach to improve the efficiency and effectiveness and to overcome the complexities of the channel. However, the task of managing the channel further becomes complicated after incorporating sustainability into the supply chain. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on designing of mechanism and demonstration of I4.0-based virtual organization to coordinate sustainable supply chain.Design/methodology/approachIn this paper, we model and compare I4.0-based virtual organization models using four other traditional contracts with centralized supply chain. The non-cooperative game theoretic approach has been used for the analysis of models.FindingsOur game-theoretic analysis shows that investment in I4.0 and sustainable innovation are beneficial for the overall supply chain. Our results show that linear two-part tariff contract and I4.0-based virtual organization model can perfectly coordinated with the supply chain.Research limitations/implicationsThis study consider deterministic model settings with full information game. Therefore researchers are encouraged to study I4.0-based coordination models under information asymmetry and uncertain situations.Practical implicationsThe paper includes implications for the development of I4.0-based coordination model to tackle the problems of channel coordination.Originality/valueThis study proposes I4.0-based game-theoretic model for the sustainable supply chain coordination.

scholarly journals An oscillating tragedy of the commons in replicator dynamics with game-environment feedback

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (47) ◽  
pp. E7518-E7525 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua S. Weitz ◽  
Ceyhun Eksin ◽  
Keith Paarporn ◽  
Sam P. Brown ◽  
William C. Ratcliff
Keyword(s):  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Individual Behavior ◽  
Global Maximum ◽  
Rational Choices ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Individual Actions ◽  
Game Environment

A tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals take actions to maximize their payoffs even as their combined payoff is less than the global maximum had the players coordinated. The originating example is that of overgrazing of common pasture lands. In game-theoretic treatments of this example, there is rarely consideration of how individual behavior subsequently modifies the commons and associated payoffs. Here, we generalize evolutionary game theory by proposing a class of replicator dynamics with feedback-evolving games in which environment-dependent payoffs and strategies coevolve. We initially apply our formulation to a system in which the payoffs favor unilateral defection and cooperation, given replete and depleted environments, respectively. Using this approach, we identify and characterize a class of dynamics: an oscillatory tragedy of the commons in which the system cycles between deplete and replete environmental states and cooperation and defection behavior states. We generalize the approach to consider outcomes given all possible rational choices of individual behavior in the depleted state when defection is favored in the replete state. In so doing, we find that incentivizing cooperation when others defect in the depleted state is necessary to avert the tragedy of the commons. In closing, we propose directions for the study of control and influence in games in which individual actions exert a substantive effect on the environmental state.

scholarly journals A game theoretic approach to deciphering the dynamics of amyloid-β aggregation along competing pathways

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Preetam Ghosh ◽  
Pratip Rana ◽  
Vijayaraghavan Rangachari ◽  
Jhinuk Saha ◽  
Edward Steen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Amyloid Β ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mathematical Framework ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Formation Pathway ◽  
Heterotypic Interactions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
On And Off Pathways ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Competing Pathways

AbstractAggregation of amyloidβ(Aβ) peptides is a significant event that underpins Alzheimer disease (AD). Aβaggregates, especially the low-molecular weight oligomers, are the primary toxic agents in AD pathogenesis. Therefore, there is increasing interest in understanding their formation and behavior. In this paper, we use our previously established investigations on heterotypic interactions between Aβand fatty acids (FAs) that adopt off-fibril formation pathway under the control ofFAconcentrations, to develop a mathematical framework in defining this complex mechanism. We bring forth the use of novel game theoretic framework based on the principles of Nash equilibria to define and simulate the competing on- and off-pathways of Aβaggregation. Together with detailed simulations and biophysical experiments, our mathematical models define the dynamics involved in the mechanisms of Aβaggregation in the presence ofFAs to adopt multiple pathways. Specifically, our game theoretic model indicates that the emergence of off- or on-pathway aggregates are tightly controlled by a narrow set of rate constant parameters, and one could alter such parameters to populate a particular oligomeric species. These models agree with the detailed simulations and experimental data on usingFAas a heterotypic partner to modulate temporal parameters. Predicting spatiotemporal landscape along competing pathways for a given heterotypic partner such as biological lipids is a first step towards simulating physiological scenarios in which the generation of specific conformeric strains of Aβcould be predicted. Such an approach could be profoundly significant in deciphering the biophysics of amyloid aggregation and oligomer generation, which is ubiquitously observed in many neurodegenerative diseases.

scholarly journals Human-like Interactive Behavior Generation for Autonomous Vehicles: A Bayesian Game-theoretic Approach with Turing Test

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiran Zhang ◽  
Peng Hang ◽  
Chao Huang ◽  
Chen Lv
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Autonomous Vehicles ◽  
Autonomous Vehicle ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Bayesian Game ◽  
Vehicle Simulation ◽  
Road Users ◽  
Game Theoretic

Interacting with surrounding road users is a key feature of vehicles and is critical for intelligence testing of autonomous vehicles. The Existing interaction modalities in autonomous vehicle simulation and testing are not sufficiently smart and can hardly reflect human-like behaviors in real world driving scenarios. To further improve the technology, in this work we present a novel hierarchical game-theoretical framework to represent naturalistic multi-modal interactions among road users in simulation and testing, which is then validated by the Turing test. Given that human drivers have no access to the complete information of the surrounding road users, the Bayesian game theory is utilized to model the decision-making process. Then, a probing behavior is generated by the proposed game theoretic model, and is further applied to control the vehicle via Markov chain. To validate the feasibility and effectiveness, the proposed method is tested through a series of experiments and compared with existing approaches. In addition, Turing tests are conducted to quantify the human-likeness of the proposed algorithm. The experiment results show that the proposed Bayesian game theoretic framework can effectively generate representative scenes of human-like decision-making during autonomous vehicle interactions, demonstrating its feasibility and effectiveness. Corresponding author(s) Email:   [email protected]  

A game-theoretic approach to evaluating the competitiveness of container carriers in the Northeast Asian shipping market

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 854-869 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byung-In Park ◽  
Hokey Min
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Maritime Logistics ◽  
Actual Case ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Northeast Asian ◽  
Pricing Schemes

Purpose In times of increasing shipping risks and uncertainty, the purpose of this paper is to analyze fiercely competitive shipping markets in the Asia-Pacific region and help the carriers develop the optimal pricing schemes, shipping networks (e.g. routes and shipping frequency), and future investment plans. Design/methodology/approach This paper develops viable maritime logistics strategies based on the non-cooperative game theory which determines the optimal vessel size/type, shipping route, and shipping frequency, while taking into account multiple cost components and unpredictable shipping market dynamics. Findings This study revealed that the container carrier’s optimal shipping strategy was insensitive to changes in freight rates, fuel prices, and loading/unloading fees at the destination ports. However, it tends to be more sensitive to an increase in the shipping volume than the aforementioned parameters. In other words, aggressive pricing schemes and drastic cost-cutting measures alone cannot enhance carrier competitiveness in today’s shipping markets characterized by overcapacity and weak demand. Originality/value This paper is one of a few attempts to identify a host of factors influencing the container carrier’s competitiveness using the game theory and develop an optimal shipping strategy in the presence of conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders (e.g. carriers, shippers, and port authorities). To validate the rigor and usefulness of the proposed game-theoretic model, the authors also experiment it with an actual case study of container carriers serving the Northeast Asian shipping market.

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