Evolutionary multiplayer games

Social Evolution ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Mendelian Inheritance ◽

Multiplayer Games ◽

Cell Dynamics ◽

Natural Systems ◽

Applied Ecology

AbstractEvolutionary game theory has become one of the most diverse and far reaching theories in biology. Applications of this theory range from cell dynamics to social evolution. However, many applications make it clear that inherent non-linearities of natural systems need to be taken into account. One way of introducing such non-linearities into evolutionary games is by the inclusion of multiple players. An example is of social dilemmas, where group benefits could e.g. increase less than linear with the number of cooperators. Such multiplayer games can be introduced in all the fields where evolutionary game theory is already well established. However, the inclusion of non-linearities can help to advance the analysis of systems which are known to be complex, e.g. in the case of non-Mendelian inheritance. We review the diachronic theory and applications of multiplayer evolutionary games and present the current state of the field. Our aim is a summary of the theoretical results from well-mixed populations in infinite as well as finite populations. We also discuss examples from three fields where the theory has been successfully applied, ecology, social sciences and population genetics. In closing, we probe certain future directions which can be explored using the complexity of multiplayer games while preserving the promise of simplicity of evolutionary games.

Insights into the Impact of Social Networks on Evolutionary Games

Applications of Complex Adaptive Systems ◽

10.4018/978-1-59904-962-5.ch012 ◽

2008 ◽

pp. 306-323

Author(s):

Katia Sycara ◽

Paul Scerri ◽

Anton Chechetka

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Social Networks ◽

Information Diffusion ◽

Large Population ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Agent Based ◽

The Social ◽

In this chapter, we explore the use of evolutionary game theory (EGT) (Weibull, 1995; Taylor & Jonker, 1978; Nowak & May, 1993) to model the dynamics of adaptive opponent strategies for large population of players. In particular, we explore effects of information propagation through social networks in Evolutionary Games. The key underlying phenomenon that the information diffusion aims to capture is that reasoning about the experiences of acquaintances can dramatically impact the dynamics of a society. We present experimental results from agent-based simulations that show the impact of diffusion through social networks on the player strategies of an evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the dynamics to features of the social network.

Social evolution and genetic interactions in the short and long term

10.1101/010371 ◽

2014 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Jeremy Van Cleve

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Social Evolution ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Genetic Interactions ◽

Short Term ◽

Hamilton’S Rule ◽

Analytical Approaches ◽

Hamilton's Rule

The evolution of social traits remains one of the most fascinating and feisty topics in evolutionary biology even after half a century of theoretical research. W. D. Hamilton shaped much of the field initially with his 1964 papers that laid out the foundation for understanding the effect of genetic relatedness on the evolution of social behavior. Early theoretical investigations revealed two critical assumptions required for Hamilton's rule to hold in dynamical models: weak selection and additive genetic interactions. However, only recently have analytical approaches from population genetics and evolutionary game theory developed sufficiently so that social evolution can be studied under the joint action of selection, mutation, and genetic drift. We review how these approaches suggest two timescales for evolution under weak mutation: (i) a short-term timescale where evolution occurs between a finite set of alleles, and (ii) a long-term timescale where a continuum of alleles are possible and populations evolve continuously from one monomorphic trait to another. We show how Hamilton's rule emerges from the short-term analysis under additivity and how non-additive genetic interactions can be accounted for more generally. This short-term approach reproduces, synthesizes, and generalizes many previous results including the one-third law from evolutionary game theory and risk dominance from economic game theory. Using the long-term approach, we illustrate how trait evolution can be described with a diffusion equation that is a stochastic analogue of the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics. Peaks in the stationary distribution of the diffusion capture classic notions of convergence stability from evolutionary game theory and generally depend on the additive genetic interactions inherent in Hamilton's rule. Surprisingly, the peaks of the long-term stationary distribution can predict the effects of simple kinds of non-additive interactions. Additionally, the peaks capture both weak and strong effects of social payoffs in a manner difficult to replicate with the short-term approach. Together, the results from the short and long-term approaches suggest both how Hamilton's insight may be robust in unexpected ways and how current analytical approaches can expand our understanding of social evolution far beyond Hamilton's original work.

Insights into the Impact of Social Networks on Evolutionary Games

Advances in Semantic Web and Information Systems - Social Web Evolution ◽

10.4018/978-1-60566-272-5.ch012 ◽

2010 ◽

pp. 150-159

Author(s):

Katia Sycara ◽

Paul Scerri ◽

Anton Chechetka

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Social Networks ◽

Information Diffusion ◽

Large Population ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Agent Based ◽

The Social ◽

The chapter explores the use of evolutionary game theory (EGT) to model the dynamics of adaptive opponent strategies for a large population of players. In particular, it explores effects of information propagation through social networks in evolutionary games. The key underlying phenomenon that the information diffusion aims to capture is that reasoning about the experiences of acquaintances can dramatically impact the dynamics of a society. The chapter presents experimental results from agent-based simulations that show the impact of diffusion through social networks on the player strategies of an evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the dynamics to features of the social network.

Insights into the Impact of Social Networks on Evolutionary Games

Handbook of Research on Effective Electronic Gaming in Education ◽

10.4018/978-1-59904-808-6.ch086 ◽

2009 ◽

pp. 1477-1488

Author(s):

Katia Sycara ◽

Paul Scerri ◽

Anton Chechetka

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Social Networks ◽

Information Diffusion ◽

Large Population ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Agent Based ◽

The Social ◽

In this chapter, we explore the use of evolutionary game theory (EGT) (Nowak & May, 1993; Taylor & Jonker, 1978; Weibull, 1995) to model the dynamics of adaptive opponent strategies for a large population of players. In particular, we explore effects of information propagation through social networks in evolutionary games. The key underlying phenomenon that the information diffusion aims to capture is that reasoning about the experiences of acquaintances can dramatically impact the dynamics of a society. We present experimental results from agent-based simulations that show the impact of diffusion through social networks on the player strategies of an evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the dynamics to features of the social network.

Evolutionary Game Theory

International Journal of Circular Economy and Waste Management ◽

10.4018/ijcewm.2021070103 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 1 (2) ◽

pp. 20-28

Author(s):

Arij Michel

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Institutional Change ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Future Research ◽

Theory Analysis ◽

Game Analysis ◽

Advantages And Disadvantages ◽

Development Direction

The article uses evolutionary game theory analysis as the research object, which is the most commonly used research method of institutional change, and summarizes some methods in the research of institutional change, and points out the advantages and disadvantages of evolutionary game analysis in the research of institutional change and through the comparison of cutting-edge methods and evolutionary games to see the development direction of future research institutional changes.

Social evolution leads to persistent corruption

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences ◽

10.1073/pnas.1900078116 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 116 (27) ◽

pp. 13276-13281 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Joung-Hun Lee ◽

Yoh Iwasa ◽

Ulf Dieckmann ◽

Karl Sigmund

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Numerical Simulations ◽

Analytical Methods ◽

Social Evolution ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Free Riders ◽

Damped Oscillations

Cooperation can be sustained by institutions that punish free-riders. Such institutions, however, tend to be subverted by corruption if they are not closely watched. Monitoring can uphold the enforcement of binding agreements ensuring cooperation, but this usually comes at a price. The temptation to skip monitoring and take the institution’s integrity for granted leads to outbreaks of corruption and the breakdown of cooperation. We model the corresponding mechanism by means of evolutionary game theory, using analytical methods and numerical simulations, and find that it leads to sustained or damped oscillations. The results confirm the view that corruption is endemic and transparency a major factor in reducing it.

Evolutionary Games and Local Dynamics

International Game Theory Review ◽

10.1142/s0219198915400162 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 17 (02) ◽

pp. 1540016 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Philippe Uyttendaele ◽

Frank Thuijsman

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Population Dynamics ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Global Dynamics ◽

Local Interactions ◽

Local Dynamics

In this paper, we examine several options for modeling local interactions within the framework of evolutionary game theory. Several examples show that there is a major difference between population dynamics using local dynamics versus global dynamics. Moreover, different modeling choices may lead to very diverse results.

Evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games for Sanitation Boards

CLEI electronic journal ◽

10.19153/cleiej.17.2.6 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 17 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Rocío Botta ◽

Gerardo Blanco ◽

Christian E. Schaerer

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Public Good ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Evolution Of Cooperation ◽

Cost Models ◽

Policy Makers ◽

Community Projects ◽

The Cost

In a group of individuals that come together to produce a good or provide a service, the cooperators (who pay to produce the good) are often exploited by those who receive the benefit without paying the cost. Models were developed over time using incentives (reward or punishment) and the option of abandoning the initiative to promote and stabilize the cooperation. In this paper we analyze several models based on the evolutionary game theory and public good games. We compare and organize them in a taxonomic table following their main characteristics to select the most suitable for a specific problem. The analyzed models are compared by using a public good problem in community projects for water supply. We have reasonable assurance that phenomena that appear on mod- els also occurs in these community projects. Therefore, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be a useful tool for policy-makers in order to improve cooperation and discourage defection in sanitation boards.

Insights into the Impact of Social Networks on Evolutionary Games

Selected Readings on the Human Side of Information Technology ◽

10.4018/978-1-60566-088-2.ch018 ◽

2009 ◽

pp. 317-331

Author(s):

Katia Sycara ◽

Paul Scerri ◽

Anton Chechetka

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Social Networks ◽

Information Diffusion ◽

Large Population ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Agent Based ◽

The Social ◽

In this chapter, we explore the use of evolutionary game theory (EGT) (Nowak & May, 1993; Taylor & Jonker, 1978; Weibull, 1995) to model the dynamics of adaptive opponent strategies for a large population of pl ion propagation through social networks in evolutionary games. The key underlying phenomenon that the information diffusion aims to capture is that reasoning about the experiences of acquaintances can dramatically impact the dynamics of a society. We present experimental results from agent-based simulations that show the impact of diffusion through social networks on the player strategies of an evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the dynamics to features of the social network.

Game Theory

The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199215362.013.26 ◽

2011 ◽

Author(s):

Iris Bohnet

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Analytical Investigation ◽

System Level ◽

Behavioral Game Theory ◽

Interacting Agents ◽

Behavioral Game ◽

The Relationship

This article considers how game theory can be simultaneously deployed as a tool for framing questions and for formal analytical investigation of the relationship between micro-level decisions and macro-level outcomes. It first provides an overview of some basic concepts of game theory before turning to evolutionary game theory and its most salient features, including the concept of equilibrium. It then examines behavioral game theory and presents examples of how game theory has been used in the field of sociology for the purposes of thinking and for the derivation of system-level outcomes. It also reviews studies that have used game theory in a more formal way in order to derive aggregate distributions from a social system comprising interacting agents and to explain aggregate outcomes. Finally, it describes various applications of evolutionary games and suggests that evolutionary game theory may provide an especially fecund tool for sociologists.