Managerial power, agency cost and executive compensation – an empirical study from China

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohong Zhang ◽  
Gaowen Tang ◽  
Zhaohong Lin
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Senior Executives ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Optimal Contracting ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose Based on the theory of “optimal contracting approach” and “the managerial power approach”, this paper aims to investigate whether senior executives of listed companies in China make use of their power to gain their own private benefits. The paper also compares compensation contracts between state- and private-owned enterprises to test whether there is a significant difference between senior executives from different ownership types of enterprises in terms of compensation contracts. Design/methodology/approach The paper raises four hypotheses based on the theories of “company agency”, “optimal contracting approach” and “managerial power approach”. After that, 5,680 A-share-listed companies of stock market in Shanghai and in Shenzhen Stock Market from 2008 to 2012 were taken as research samples to conduct a series of research analysis, including t-test, reliability analysis and regression analysis, with the help of SPSS 18.0. Findings The senior executives of listed companies in China could make use of their power to increase their own salary to gain power pay and, at the same time, company performance, company size and other factors that are important to influence the executive compensation. This paper further argues that senior executives of private-owned listed companies are more likely to use their power to obtain power pay and increase their own compensation. Additionally, the agency costs of Chinese listed companies are negatively related to the performance pay of senior executives, whereas there is no obvious negative correlation with the power pay of senior executives. Practical implications This paper takes multiple, in-depth approaches to study the relationship among managerial power, agency cost and executive compensation and to find out the differences in compensation contracts of senior executives between private-owned listed companies and state-owned companies. It also provides necessary suggestions to ensure the interests of stockholders, such as: optimizing the management structure of listed companies; improving the transparence of information disclosure of listed companies; establishing effective mechanism of incentive and constraint; and improving and standardizing the market of professional managers. Social implications The compensation contract of senior executives in China is critical to enhance enterprises’ performance, and it will become an important factor that will facilitate the interests of stockholders and management. However, this paper argues that some phenomena of over-payment of senior executives in listed companies cannot be explained by the theory of “optimal contracting approach”, but it is necessary and important to compare the differences of compensation contract of senior executives between private-owned listed companies and state-owned companies. A series of findings are proposed in this paper. Originality/value This paper made use of a principal analysis to extract the main factors that could represent the managerial power from different angles. In addition, this paper also compared the differences between compensation contracts of senior executives between private-owned listed companies and state-owned companies. Additionally, in this paper, the compensation of senior executives was divided into “power compensation” and “performance compensation”, which were used to test the relationship with the management cost of companies.

scholarly journals Effect of Agency Costs on Executive Compensation in South African Commercial Banks

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Odunayo Magret Olarewaju ◽  
Stephen Oseko Migiro ◽  
Mabutho Sibanda
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
South African ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Direct Effects ◽  
The South ◽  
Optimal Contracting ◽  
Managerial Power

This study examines the roles of agency cost (monitoring and bonding cost) on compensation of managers with a view from the managerial-power approach to agency cost. We modelled managers’ compensation and agency cost of banks to emphasise the potential influence of agency cost on managers’ compensation. A Panel Generalised Least Square model was estimated on four largely-controlled commercial banks in South Africa over the period 2010-2015. The result shows that shareholders’ fund, management share option, monitoring and bonding cost were strongly significant in explaining the managers’ compensation in the banks. Therefore, in the South African banking sector, compensation of managers should be based on their managerial power and not only on the principle of optimal-contracting. It is recommended, among others, that monitoring and bonding costs in the South African banks should be re-emphasised and strictly committed to. This should be so because there are direct effects of these costs on managers’ compensation which might be the reason for the persistent agency problem in the banks.

A financial restatement, media attention and stock idiosyncratic risk in the Chinese stock market

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiyuan Yin ◽  
Meng Sun
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Idiosyncratic Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Restatement ◽  
Media Attention ◽  
Media Reports ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Accounting Errors

PurposeThis paper aims to enrich the scope of the influence of media reports on the stock risk, and it also provides a path to support the research on the relationship between media reports and idiosyncratic risks in the stock market.Design/methodology/approachThe authors select financial restatement samples of listed companies in China from Jan 2015 to Dec 2017 to explore the impact of the financial restatement on the idiosyncratic risk of stocks. Further, the financial restatement that has more media attention may play a more significant role in promoting the idiosyncratic risk.FindingsThe authors found that the financial restatement of listed companies has a significant positive effect on the idiosyncratic risk of stocks. Specifically, the idiosyncratic risk changed five months before the restatement. After the restatement, the idiosyncratic risk increased by 83.47 in five days then decreased slowly, which lasted about one year. The restatement caused by sensitive issues and legal issues has a greater impact on the idiosyncratic risk. Both current restatement and delayed restatements will increase the idiosyncratic risk of stocks, but the impact of the latter is higher than the former.Research limitations/implicationsPossible deficiencies in the paper are that the number of restatements caused by major accounting errors is low. Therefore, no regular conclusions were drawn on the impact of the financial restatement caused by major accounting errors.Practical implicationsThe conclusions provide a basis for targeted supervisory measures on the restatements of listed companies. The increase in financial restatements is closely related to the lack of governance mechanisms in the stock market. For investors, although the mystery of idiosyncratic volatility exists significantly in the market, the company's valuation level will affect the relationship between the idiosyncratic risk and expected return. Investors should pay attention to the intrinsic value of the company and should not blindly pursue stocks with a low idiosyncratic risk.Originality/valueThese conclusions may enrich the scope of the influence of media reports on the stock risk and also provide a path to support the research on the relationship between media reports and idiosyncratic risks in the capital market.

scholarly journals Effect of Agency Costs on Executive Compensation in South African Commercial Banks

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (4(J)) ◽  
pp. 25-37
Author(s):  
Odunayo Magret Olarewaju ◽  
Stephen Oseko Migiro ◽  
Mabutho Sibanda
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
South African ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Direct Effects ◽  
The South ◽  
Optimal Contracting ◽  
Managerial Power

This study examines the roles of agency cost (monitoring and bonding cost) on compensation of managers with a view from the managerial-power approach to agency cost. We modelled managers’ compensation and agency cost of banks to emphasise the potential influence of agency cost on managers’ compensation. A Panel Generalised Least Square model was estimated on four largely-controlled commercial banks in South Africa over the period 2010-2015. The result shows that shareholders’ fund, management share option, monitoring and bonding cost were strongly significant in explaining the managers’ compensation in the banks. Therefore, in the South African banking sector, compensation of managers should be based on their managerial power and not only on the principle of optimal-contracting. It is recommended, among others, that monitoring and bonding costs in the South African banks should be re-emphasised and strictly committed to. This should be so because there are direct effects of these costs on managers’ compensation which might be the reason for the persistent agency problem in the banks.

The determinants of capital structure of Palestine‐listed companies

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 226-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faris M. Abu Mouamer
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Economic Sectors ◽  
Accounting Data ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between capital structure and debt lifetime among listed companies in Palestine stock market.Design/methodology/approachThis study investigates firms that have been listed on the Palestine securities exchange (PSE) over a five‐year period (2000‐2004). In total, 28 companies were listed in PSE since 1999. Only 15 firms working in different economic sectors qualified to be included in the study sample according to the availability and continuity of published financial statements during the period of 2000‐2004. Variables used for the analysis include profitability, leverage ratios (total debt (TD), short‐term debt (STD) and long‐term debt (LTD)), liquidity (LQ), age, asset structure, and firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables. The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross‐section of units over several times.FindingsThe study has shown that the service companies have the highest TD ratio (53.69 percent), followed by industrial companies (50.86 percent), trade companies (34.11 percent) and agriculture companies (24.02 percent). The one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows no significant difference in the use of debt, neither total, LTD or STD among companies in the four sectors. Adding to that, ANOVA indicates insignificant differences among the companies in the sample with respect growth opportunities, size, age, tangibility (TAN), and LQ. The correlation analysis has shown that TD is positively and significantly related to TAN, on the country, no significant relationship between the long debt and STD on the one hand and age, growth, LQ, TAN, and size on the other hand.Originality/valueThis paper is the first that employs a new database containing the market and accounting data (from 2000 to 2004). This study will contribute in examining the relationship between capital structure and debt lifetime among listed companies in the Palestine stock market.

Does family ownership matter in executive pay design?

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Subba Reddy Yarram ◽  
Sujana Adapa
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Family Businesses ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Outcomes ◽  
Optimal Contracting ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
And Performance

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to analyse the level and structure of executive compensation of family and non-family businesses and if minority shareholders are expropriated by family businesses in the Australian context using excessive pay. Studies on compensation practices of family businesses are limited to the European and North American contexts. This study, for the first time, considers the Australian context, which is unique with its transparent compensation disclosures, and a principle-based corporate governance framework to examine the level of compensation as well as the association between pay and performance.Design/methodology/approachA set of family and matched non-family firms for the period 2004–2014 are examined in a panel data setting. Robust models are estimated to examine the association between compensation and a set of economic, governance and ownership factors.FindingsThis study finds evidence that family businesses in general pay lower levels of compensation than non-family businesses. An investigation of the role of economic factors on compensation of family and non-family businesses shows evidence that supports the optimal contracting theory. Further examination of governance factors on compensation levels and pay–performance sensitivities shows there is a limited role for managerial power approach in explaining the executive compensation practices of family businesses in Australia. These findings infer that family businesses, given their interest in non-financial goals, do not pay excessive compensation to their executives to expropriate minority shareholders.Research limitations/implicationsThese findings have implications for theory relating to executive compensation and human resource management in all types of businesses, including family firms. These findings offer support for the theory of optimal contracting. Empirical analysis shows no evidence of entrenchment effect or managerial power in family businesses in Australia. In terms of theory-building, there is role for socioemotional wealth model in addition to optimal contracting theory and managerial power approach.Practical implicationsThe findings of this study also have implications for practice. Compensation practices may be designed in such a way that executives and firms pursue broader social goals such as the sustainable development goals or more generally non-financial objectives. Businesses may not necessarily use only financial outcomes when assessing appropriate level of pay of executives. Often, the financial outcomes may involve wealth transfers between different stakeholders and may not necessarily lead to improving the societal well-being. In terms of human resource management, the findings of this study emphasise the need for explicit consideration of socioemotional wealth of all family-related and non-related employees when designing recruitment, training, reward and recognition policies.Originality/valueThis study highlights the role non-financial factors play in executive pay setting processes in family businesses in a highly transparent and principle-based governance framework. Family businesses in Australia are not motivated by monetary considerations, and that their interest in non-financial objectives leads to less emphasis on the link between compensation and performance.

Simultaneous relationship between performance and executive compensation of Thai non-financial firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 404-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wonlop Buachoom
Keyword(s):  
Human Capital ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Subsequent Performance ◽  
Financial Firms ◽  
Performance System ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to determine the two-direction relationship between financial firm performance and executive compensation in Thai listed companies; that is, effect of firm performance on executive compensation and the effect of executive compensation on subsequent firm performance. In investigating the relationship, governance, firm-specific and human capital characteristics, which should influence on the pay-performance system, are also considered. This study helps to shape an understanding of the effectiveness of the incentive system in the Thai context. Design/methodology/approach The System GMM, with concern about the endogeneity problem of the simultaneous relationship, is applied to examine the relationship between firm performance and executive compensation. The samples to investigate this relationship composed of 5,139 firm-years observations for 15 years from the years 2000 to 2014 of 432 non-financial firms in the Thai stock market. Findings The empirical evidence reveals simultaneous relationship between performance and executive compensation in Thai stock market. It shows that compensation of executives in Thai firms corresponds to firm performance, and compensation of executives leads to an improvement in subsequent performance of Thai listed firms. Moreover, some corporate governance mechanisms and human capital of executives also revealed their particular effects on setting of the pay for performance system in Thailand. Originality/value This study confirms that the pay for performance system is applicable in Thailand. Furthermore, the empirical results of this study highlight effects of some governance and human capital characteristics on setting of the pay-performance system. Thus, this study should be a part of the growing body of literature in this area.

Are federal single audit reports of internal control weaknesses a useful tool for evaluating management? The case of charter schools

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Ryberg Bradley ◽  
Dana A. Forgione ◽  
Joel E. Michalek
Keyword(s):  
Charter Schools ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Content Type ◽  
External Stakeholder ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Single Audit ◽  
The Relationship

PurposeThe authors examine whether reports of internal control weaknesses (ICWs) under federal single audit (FSA) guidelines are a useful tool for evaluating non-profit (NP) management, using a unique nationwide sample of NP charter schools. While prior research focuses on external stakeholder reactions to reported ICWs, little if any research addresses the utility of these reports for internal users. The authors fill this gap in the literature, finding evidence suggesting that NP charter school decision-makers use internal control (IC) reports when setting executive compensation – awarding lower pay increases when deficiencies are reported.Design/methodology/approachThe authors regress executive compensation changes on reported ICWs and likely determinants of NP compensation, including organization size, growth, liquidity and management performance, using a sample of 173 school/year observations representing 113 unique schools for the years 2012–2015.FindingsThe authors find a negative relationship with executive pay increases subsequent to reports of initial and repeated IC deficiencies, indicating that lower than average pay increases are awarded subsequent to reports of ICWs.Research limitations/implicationsInterpretation of the authors' results is subject to several limitations, including the possibility of omitted variable bias and the authors' sample, though it comprises all available data for the sample period, and is relatively small and may be considered exploratory in nature. Further, charter schools represent a unique public/private partnership in the educational sector, and the results may not be generalizable to other NPs. Future research could explore the relationship between reported IC deficiencies and governance in other, broader NP sectors.Practical implicationsThe authors' findings are useful to NP organization boards of directors as they consider what factors to evaluate in their chief executive officer (CEO) compensation decisions. In addition to other criteria, inclusion of IC effectiveness in the CEO reward system is prudent, especially in today's environment of increasingly important information security and IC matters. The results suggest such information is being included. This previously undocumented use is also of particular value to regulators when weighing the costs and benefits of mandating single audits for smaller NPs, who are otherwise unlikely to obtain information on the organization's IC environment.Social implicationsThese findings may help inform the debate regarding NP charter schools, a fast-growing, economically significant and highly controversial sector in public education. Charters are predominantly funded by state and local taxes. As such, the quality of governance in NP charter schools is of interest to a wide range of stakeholders including parents, regulators and the public at large.Originality/valueWhile prior research on ICWs and NPs focuses on external stakeholder reactions to reported ICWs, little if any research addresses the utility of these reports for internal users, especially in relatively smaller organizations. The research leverages the existence of charter schools, which are independent but present nationwide, providing a suitable sample of like organizations. Further, no extant research to the authors' knowledge examines the relationship of NP executive compensation and reported ICWs – a topic previously addressed in the for-profit (FP) literature.

Intellectual capital and performance of listed companies: empirical evidence from Italy

2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domenico Celenza ◽  
Fabrizio Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The One ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate performance and Value Added Intellectual Coefficient (VAICTM) on the one hand, and the relationship between the variations in market value and the variations in VAIC on the other hand. Design/methodology/approach – Starting from the VAIC model, 23 Italian listed companies were examined with the aim of investigating the relationship between VAIC and the performance of the firms in the sample. The analysis was divided into two stages. In the first stage, eight models of linear regression were estimated to verify the presence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between M/BV and VAIC and between accounting performance indicators (ROE, ROI, ROS) and the VAIC. In the second stage, six other models were tested, considering as an independent variable the variations in VAIC and the variations in profitability indicators. Findings – The outcomes of the application stress the importance of VAIC in the explanation of the variations in MV and its role as “additional coefficient” in the analysis of equity performance. Originality/value – This methodology highlights some very interesting aspects. In particular, whereas the relationship between M/BV and VAIC and between profitability indicators (ROI, ROE, ROS) and VAIC is statistically insignificant, the subsequent analysis highlights the importance of VAIC as a variable capable of increasing the explanatory power of the regression in a cross-sectional perspective.

Corporate political connections, agency costs and audit quality

2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 357-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arifur Khan ◽  
Dessalegn Getie Mihret ◽  
Mohammad Badrul Muttakin
Keyword(s):  
Agency Costs ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Research Attention ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The effect of political connections of agency costs has attracted considerable research attention due to the increasing recognition of the fact that political connection influences corporate decisions and outcomes. This paper aims to explore the association between corporate political connections and agency cost and examine whether audit quality moderates this association. Design/methodology/approach A data set of Bangladeshi listed non-financial companies is used. A usable sample of 968 firm-year observations was drawn for the period from 2005 to 2013. Asset utilisation ratio, the interaction of Tobin’s Q and free cash flow and expense ratio are used as alternative proxies for agency costs; membership to Big 4 audit firms or local associates of Big 4 firms is used as a proxy for audit quality. Findings Results show that politically connected firms exhibit higher agency costs than their unconnected counterparts, and audit quality moderates the relationship between political connection and agency costs. The results of this paper suggest the importance of audit quality to mitigate agency problem in an emerging economic setting. Research limitations/implications The findings of this paper could be of interest to regulators wishing to focus regulatory effort on significant issues influencing stock market efficiency. The findings could also inform auditors in directing audit effort through a more complete assessment of risk and determining reasonable levels of audit fees. Finally, results could inform financial statement users to direct investments to firms with lower agency costs. Originality/value To the knowledge of the authors, this study is one of the first to explore the relationship between political connection and agency costs, and the moderating effect of audit quality of this relationship.

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