Comments on two sides of CEO pay injustice

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-116
Author(s):  
Martin J. Conyon
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Power Law ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Quantitative Methods ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Critical Evaluation ◽  
Estimation Methods ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Two Sides

Purpose This is a short commentary on Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle and Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment.” Design/methodology/approach Using insights from prior studies on executive compensation, the author’s commentary presents a critical evaluation of “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: […].” In addition, the author offers potential avenues for further research. Findings The paper “Two sides of CEO pay injustice” is well executed and makes several significant contributions to the management and executive compensation literature. Particularly, noteworthy are the use of advanced quantitative methods, the use of power law distributions to explain chief executive officer (CEO) pay outcomes, the focus on pay-for-performance and the role of justice in CEO outcomes. The author’s commentary in the present paper discusses the measurement of CEO pay and performance, poses alternative estimation methods to explore the pay-for-performance link and offers thoughts on justice theory in the context of CEO pay. Research limitations/implications The authors’ findings may be briefly stated as CEO pay is better described by a power law distribution than a normal distribution, CEO pay is not linked to firm performance and the patterns of CEO pay does not conform to patterns of distributive justice. Overall, the authors provide an important way to evaluate CEO pay outcomes. Thy set the stage for new avenues of research. Practical implications CEO pay is a highly controversial subject in the domain of corporate governance. This paper offers boards of directors and policymakers a method to better understand the success or failure of boardroom pay policies. Social implications CEO pay is an important social measure. Originality/value The authors’ paper is original by offering a method for determining over and underpayment of CEOs. The author in the present paper makes suggestions on how one might extend the research.

The two sides of CEO pay injustice

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herman Aguinis ◽  
Geoffrey P. Martin ◽  
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia ◽  
Ernest H. O’Boyle ◽  
Harry Joo
Keyword(s):  
Normal Distribution ◽  
Power Law ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Return On Assets ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Two Sides

Purpose The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which chief executive officers (CEOs) deserve the pay they receive both in terms of over and underpayment. Design/methodology/approach Rather than using the traditional normal distribution view in which CEO performance clusters around the mean with relatively little variance, the authors adopt a novel power law approach. They studied 22 industries and N = 4,158 CEO-firm combinations for analyses based on Tobin’s Q and N = 5,091 for analyses based on return on assets. Regarding compensation, they measured the CEO distribution based on total compensation and three components of CEO total pay: salary, bonus, and value of options exercised. Findings In total, 86 percent of CEO performance and 91 percent of CEO pay distributions fit a power law better than a normal distribution, indicating that a minority of CEOs are producing top value for their firms (i.e. CEO performance) and a minority of CEOs are appropriating top value for themselves (i.e. CEO pay). But, the authors also found little overlap between CEOs who are the top performers and CEOs who are the top earners. Implications The findings shed new light on CEO pay deservingness by using a novel conceptual and methodological lens that highlights systematic over and underpayment. Results suggest a violation of distributive justice and offer little support for agency theory’s efficient contracting hypothesis, which have important implications for agency theory, equity theory, justice theory, and agent risk sharing and agent risk bearing theories. Practical implications Results highlight erroneous practices when trying to benchmark CEO pay based on average levels of performance in an industry because the typical approach to CEO compensation based on averages significantly underpays stars and overpays average performers. Originality/value Results offer new insights on the extent of over and underpayment. The findings uncover an extremely large non-overlap between the top earning and top performing CEOs and to an extent far greater in magnitude than previously suggested.

The two sides of CEO pay injustice: a commentary

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-96
Author(s):  
Albert Cannella ◽  
Valerie Sy
Keyword(s):  
Power Law ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Power Law Distribution ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Compensation Process ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Two Sides ◽  
Theoretical Issues ◽  
Research Domain

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to extend discussions in the CEO compensation research domain. Specifically, this paper provides a critical analysis of the power law conceptualization and pay injustice contribution by Aguinis, Martin, Gomez-Mejia, O’Boyle and Joo. Design/methodology/approach This commentary addresses statistical and theoretical issues of the power law distribution with respect to prior compensation research and offers additional perspectives on the issue of CEO pay deservingness. Findings The power law is worth investigating further, but more attention should be paid to outliers and fit to the distribution. Stronger theory is needed for using the power law to explain CEO compensation phenomena, especially regarding standard firm performance measures and anomalies in the compensation process. Finally, “injustice” and “deservingness” in discussions of CEO pay exist in the eye of the beholder. Originality/value This paper offers additional considerations for scholars to explore when applying the power law distribution to compensation research.

Executive compensation and securitization: pre-and post-crisis

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 437-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Cooper ◽  
Andrew Kish
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Pay Gap ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to study bank executive compensation and securitization, two important strategic developments in finance that are central to the debate on the cause of the crisis. Design/methodology/approach – We study the relationship between securitization and executive pay in a sample of US banks from 2001 to 2010, using a series of multivariate regression models to test our hypotheses. Findings – Bank Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay exhibits a positive pay-for-performance relationship. Since the crisis, this relationship is weakened. For banks that securitize, we find that prior to the crisis, higher securitization activity led to higher CEO compensation levels. While we do not find that securitization is related to bank CEO pay gap (the difference between CEO and the next-highest paid bank executive), we do see that bank ratings are a factor in pay gap and compensation level. Research limitations/implications – Bank regulatory ratings influence the relationship between compensation and securitization. Also, the relationship differs pre- and post-crisis. Originality/value – Our study is unique for several reasons. First, we look at the relationship between compensation and securitization over a time period that includes the recent financial crisis. Second, we include an analysis of pay gap. Third, we include bank regulatory ratings, which are proprietary and therefore not available for use in many banking studies.

Are federal single audit reports of internal control weaknesses a useful tool for evaluating management? The case of charter schools

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Ryberg Bradley ◽  
Dana A. Forgione ◽  
Joel E. Michalek
Keyword(s):  
Charter Schools ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Content Type ◽  
External Stakeholder ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Single Audit ◽  
The Relationship

PurposeThe authors examine whether reports of internal control weaknesses (ICWs) under federal single audit (FSA) guidelines are a useful tool for evaluating non-profit (NP) management, using a unique nationwide sample of NP charter schools. While prior research focuses on external stakeholder reactions to reported ICWs, little if any research addresses the utility of these reports for internal users. The authors fill this gap in the literature, finding evidence suggesting that NP charter school decision-makers use internal control (IC) reports when setting executive compensation – awarding lower pay increases when deficiencies are reported.Design/methodology/approachThe authors regress executive compensation changes on reported ICWs and likely determinants of NP compensation, including organization size, growth, liquidity and management performance, using a sample of 173 school/year observations representing 113 unique schools for the years 2012–2015.FindingsThe authors find a negative relationship with executive pay increases subsequent to reports of initial and repeated IC deficiencies, indicating that lower than average pay increases are awarded subsequent to reports of ICWs.Research limitations/implicationsInterpretation of the authors' results is subject to several limitations, including the possibility of omitted variable bias and the authors' sample, though it comprises all available data for the sample period, and is relatively small and may be considered exploratory in nature. Further, charter schools represent a unique public/private partnership in the educational sector, and the results may not be generalizable to other NPs. Future research could explore the relationship between reported IC deficiencies and governance in other, broader NP sectors.Practical implicationsThe authors' findings are useful to NP organization boards of directors as they consider what factors to evaluate in their chief executive officer (CEO) compensation decisions. In addition to other criteria, inclusion of IC effectiveness in the CEO reward system is prudent, especially in today's environment of increasingly important information security and IC matters. The results suggest such information is being included. This previously undocumented use is also of particular value to regulators when weighing the costs and benefits of mandating single audits for smaller NPs, who are otherwise unlikely to obtain information on the organization's IC environment.Social implicationsThese findings may help inform the debate regarding NP charter schools, a fast-growing, economically significant and highly controversial sector in public education. Charters are predominantly funded by state and local taxes. As such, the quality of governance in NP charter schools is of interest to a wide range of stakeholders including parents, regulators and the public at large.Originality/valueWhile prior research on ICWs and NPs focuses on external stakeholder reactions to reported ICWs, little if any research addresses the utility of these reports for internal users, especially in relatively smaller organizations. The research leverages the existence of charter schools, which are independent but present nationwide, providing a suitable sample of like organizations. Further, no extant research to the authors' knowledge examines the relationship of NP executive compensation and reported ICWs – a topic previously addressed in the for-profit (FP) literature.

Pay-performance sensitivity and corporate governance mechanisms: evidence from Tunisia

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Meriem Ghrab ◽  
Marjène Gana ◽  
Mejda Dakhlaoui
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Simultaneous Equation ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Estimation Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Performance Sensitivity ◽  
Ceo Pay

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyze the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, termed as the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the Tunisian context and to test the robustness of this relationship when corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are considered. Design/methodology/approach The consideration of past executive pay as one of the explanatory variables makes this estimation model a dynamic one. Furthermore, to avoid the problem of endogeneity, this study uses the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). For robustness check, this study aims to use a simultaneous equation approach (three-stage least squares [3SLS]) to estimate the link between performance and CEO pay with a set of CG mechanisms to control for possible simultaneous interdependencies. Findings Using a sample of 336 firm-years from Tunisia over the 2009–2015 periods, this study finds strong evidence that the pay-performance relationship is insignificant and negative, and it becomes more negative or remains insignificant after introducing CG mechanisms consistently with the managerial power approach. The findings are robust to the use of alternative performance measures. This study provides new empirical evidence that CEOs of Tunisian firms abuse extracting rents independently of firm performance. Originality/value This study contributes to the unexamined research on PPS in a frontier market. This study also shows the ineffectiveness of the Tunisian CG structure and thus recommends for the legislator to impose a mandatory CG guide.

scholarly journals Pay for performance: Beating "best practices"

2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 36-40
Author(s):  
Marc Hodak
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Value Creation ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Compensation Plans ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Compensation Plan ◽  
Compensation Design

Widespread criticism of CEO pay packages have spurred directors to engage in a diligent search for best practices. This vigilance is transforming the process of executive compensation design, administration and oversight at many major public companies. But have all these process changes improved the compensation plans? We conducted empirical research on the way various compensation structures work for or against shareholder value creation. We looked at S&P 500 executive compensation plan data, supplemented by conversations with hundreds of executives and consultants. Against this standard, the evidence indicates that certain practices prove out favorably; some with plausible rationales have questionable value, at best, and some are clearly counter productive.

scholarly journals The Impact of Firm Financial Efficiency on Executive Compensation of United States Apparel Stores Industry: An Application of Panel Data Envelopment Analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 165
Author(s):  
Herman Sahni ◽  
Christian Nsiah
Keyword(s):  
Data Envelopment Analysis ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Scale Efficiency ◽  
Data Envelopment ◽  
Financial Efficiency ◽  
Performance Framework ◽  
The Us ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
The Impact

This study examines the effect of firm financial efficiency on executive compensation with an emphasis on the US apparel industry. We find that both annual efficiency levels and cumulative efficiency changes obtained from the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) are positively associated with CEO pay. The effect is stronger for technological changes and changes in scale efficiency. Our results seem to support the pay-for-efficiency paradigm, a stricter version of the pay-for-performance framework under the efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay.

The determinants of CEO compensation: new insights from United States

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Bouteska ◽  
Salma Mefteh-Wali
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Ceo Power ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
The Us ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of CEO compensation for sample of the US firms. It emphasizes the presence of executive compensation persistence and the importance of CEO power besides performance while setting CEO pay.Design/methodology/approachThe empirical analysis is conducted on a large sample of US firms during the period 2006–2016. It is based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) models to assess the impact of numerous factors on CEO compensation.FindingsThe main findings reveal that firm performance proxied by accounting-based proxies, as well as market-based proxies, plays a significant role in explaining variations in levels of executive compensation. Moreover, there is a significant persistence in executive compensation among the US sample firms. The authors also document that poor governance conditions (managerial power hypothesis) lead to high compensation levels offered to CEO.Research limitations/implicationsAt the end, without a doubt, the analysis has some limitations that prompt the authors to consider future research directions. One future research avenue that can help better explain the effect of firm performance on the CEO compensation is to study this issue using an international sample to determine whether country-level characteristics (e.g. creditor rights, shareholder rights and the enforcement climate) can influence this relationship. Furthermore, it can be worthwhile to deepen the analysis of CEO power and its impact on CEO compensation. It will be interesting to emphasize how the CEO power interacts with the other governance characteristics and some CEO attributes as CEO gender.Practical implicationsThe paper's findings have implications for practitioners, policymakers and regulatory authorities. First, the findings inform regulators that performance is not the only determinant of CEO pay level. This may warrant increased firm disclosure of the details of the pay structure. Second, the study offers insights to policymakers and members of boards of directors interested in enhancing the design of executive compensation and internal corporate governance, to better align managerial incentives to shareholder interests. Firms should strengthen the board independence and properly constitute the board committees (compensation, risk, nomination…).Originality/valueThis paper presents a comprehensive overview of the CEO compensation determinants. It supplements the classic pay-for-performance sensitivity predictions with insights gained from the dynamics of wage setting theory and managerial power theory. The authors develop a composite index to measure the CEO power in order to test the impact of CEO attributes on CEO pay. Additionally, it verifies whether the determinants of CEO pay depend on firm age and size.

How Much Compensation Can CEOs Permissibly Accept?

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Moriarty
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Excessive Compensation

ABSTRACT:Debates about the ethics of executive compensation are dominated by familiar themes. Many writers consider whether the amount of pay CEOs receive is too large—relative to firm performance, foreign CEO pay, or employee pay. Many others consider whether the process by which CEOs are paid is compromised by weak or self-serving boards of directors. This paper examines the issue from a new perspective. I focus on the duties executives themselves have with respect to their own compensation. I argue that CEOs’ fiduciary duties place a moral limit on how much compensation they can accept, and hence seek in negotiation, from their firms. Accepting excessive compensation leaves the beneficiaries of their duties (e.g., shareholders) worse off, and thus is inconsistent with observing those duties.

The elusive linkage between CEO pay and performance

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-65
Author(s):  
Gerald Edward Ledford ◽  
Edward E. Lawler
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Performance ◽  
Power Law ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Power Law Distribution ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Dependent Variables ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
External Conditions ◽  
And Performance

Purpose The authors comment on the paper by Aguinis et al. (2018). The authors believe that their hypotheses probably are true, but their methodology is flawed and their data do not support their conclusions. Design/Methodology The authors review and comment on the paper by Aguinis et al. (2018). Findings The data do not adequately demonstrate a power law distribution for chief executive officer’s (CEO) performance because the analysis confounded external conditions affecting performance, and the authors use inappropriate dependent variables. The analysis does not demonstrate a power law distribution for CEO pay because the analysis does not take into account changes in pay level and mix over time. The analysis does not show a lack of overlap between the two distributions because it does not take into account the way that the CEOs are paid for performance and because it uses CEO pay averaged over CEO tenure. Research limitations/implications A more convincing analysis of the authors’ hypothesis would require the use of total shareholder return (TSR) as the dependent variable for organizational performance and would require a number of much more specific controls. Practical implications The authors call for greater use of power law thinking by practitioners in setting CEO pay. Their analysis indicates that practitioners already think in power law terms and allocate CEO pay accordingly. Moreover, power law theory and findings could be misused as an excuse for paying average CEOs much more than they are already paid. Social implications The authors add another perspective on CEO pay. Originality/value The authors’ perspective is informed both by research and by consulting experience on CEO pay projects.

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