Stability risks mar Southern Africa customs reform

Subject Outlook for the Southern Africa Customs Union. Significance Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) are highly dependent on income from the Southern African Customs Union revenue sharing formula (RSF). This distributes customs duties among members (BLNS and South Africa), resulting in substantial fiscal transfers from South Africa to its smaller neighbours. The latter's deteriorating economic situation is creating fresh pressures for reform. Impacts South Africa could plausibly replace SACU transfers with aid linked to governance reforms in BLNS states. However, the disruption caused by adapting to a new system would probably destabilise Lesotho and Swaziland's finances. SACU could also pursue limited expansion by including only Mozambique and Angola, reducing the burden on South Africa. This is unlikely in the short term since both states face their own fiscal problems; moreover, Angola is disengaged from regional matters.

Significance President Jacob Zuma cancelled a state visit to Indonesia to lead government efforts against the violence. However, popular perceptions of uncontrollable inflows linked state incapacity, a porous asylum system and continued weak economic growth mean that anti-immigrant sentiment will persist. Impacts In the short term, South Africa is likely to refrain from reforming the regional customs union out of fear of antagonising its neighbours. Reputational damage from the attacks is likely to undermine Zuma's efforts to create a 'rapid response' regional peace-keeping force. This reputational damage may encourage international firms to base their SSA headquarters in non-South African 'gateway' cities.


2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 145
Author(s):  
Harold P. E. Ngalawa

This paper studies the evolution of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), tracing it from its inception in 1889 as the Customs Union Convention, the worlds first customs union, to its current status. While the union has operated under different agreements, which have been negotiated and renegotiated with changing circumstances, the study identifies the agreements of 1889, 1910, 1969 and 2002 as key to the unions transformation. It is observed that SACU has evolved from a geopolitical organisation with a repressive colonial foundation to a well-integrated regional trading bloc that is perceived as a possible springboard for larger regional trading blocs in Africa. The study further explores evidence of declining SACU revenue and investigates its implications on government expenditures in the small members of the union; namely, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS countries). It is found that among the members of the union, Lesotho and Swaziland are the most dependent on SACU transfers and, consequently, the most vulnerable to the current downward trend in SACU revenue. While Namibia has traditionally relied on diamond exports, it has also been receiving large SACU transfers relative to its GDP. In addition, the study observes that the present SACU revenue sharing formula adopted in 2002 exposes the BLNS countries to instabilities arising from global business cycles more than it does South Africa.


Subject Africa's oil price winners. Significance Despite traditionally being winners during periods of oil price decline, the medium-term outlook is mixed for sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) oil importing countries -- reflected in the IMF's recent downgrade of its SSA outlook from 5.75% to 4.9%. Short-term gains reduce the fuel import bill, but uncertainty looms over energy investments in eastern African, while idiosyncratic risks cloud the outlook for southern Africa. While oil exporters may also reap some benefits, much will depend on the degree of oil dependency, political space to make the necessary policy retrenchments, and the extent of government financial buffers. Impacts If sustained, low oil prices could provoke civil unrest, rather than reforms, in oil exporting countries. Most oil exporters will struggle to maintain macroeconomic stability if oil remains low for more than a year. However, economic diversification to some degree helps to shield the region from sharp global slowdowns.


Significance Turkey's faltering EU accession process looks more at risk than ever, following Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn's warning that Ankara had "clearly chosen to move away from Europe, not closer to it". Hahn was presenting the European Commission's 2016 Enlargement Package, which is much more critical of Turkey than of the six Western Balkans countries that are either accession candidates like Turkey or potential candidates. Yet when it comes to terminating Turkey's candidacy, both the Turkish and EU authorities want the other to make the move. In the short term, some EU capitals fear a wave of migrants should Ankara stop cooperating in policing the Aegean; in the longer term, Turkey's economy could suffer. Impacts The EU's interest in Western Balkan security, stability and prosperity will keep enlargement to these countries on track, at least formally. However, the Dutch referendum vote against Ukraine's association agreement shows popular feeling spreading in the EU against enlargement. Turkey's customs union with the EU underpins its recent economic upturn; it is hard to see it continuing without the prospect of membership. Resumed use of the East Mediterranean route depends on Turkey but also on migrants' hopes of being able to cross borders further north.


Subject Prospects for Africa's economies to end-2016. Significance The IMF's most recent forecast of 3% GDP growth for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in 2016 represents a significant cut from the 4.25% it expected in October 2015. This is a consequence of sharp slowdowns in the region's two largest economies, Nigeria and South Africa, droughts in previously buoyant economies (notably in eastern and southern Africa), a variety of idiosyncratic shocks and a prolonged commodity price downturn.


Significance However, negotiations will go ahead, notwithstanding Fund staff's recent misgivings on Greece's debt sustainability. Broader issues are whether the IMF's role as lender of last resort can survive this crisis and the Fund can undertake internal governance reforms necessary to handle future crises. Impacts In the short term, recovery in investment, consumption and growth in Greece, and in local bank deposits, is unlikely. The development of regional institutions, as alternatives to the IMF, will weaken global risk-sharing and risk-management. The Fund would come under the greatest pressure to reorganise if its backing from the United States were dislodged.


Subject African oil and gas exploration. Significance Stakeholders in the African oil industry met in Cape Town in early November, for the annual Africa Oil Week conference, amid speculation of new prospects in South Africa and Namibia. While several countries in West and Central Africa are offering acreage in licensing rounds, oil and gas companies are focused on upcoming wells in Southern Africa, which will dictate decisions on companies’ future exploration focus. Impacts Exploration success for Southern Africa’s most watched wells could bring an investment boost to new areas, such as South Africa. Angola and Nigeria will try pushing reforms and new licensing to revive a largely moribund exploration sector to renew reserves and growth. IOCs will need more reassurance before committing to new Nigerian investment after Buhari's failure in 2018 to sign a key industry bill.


Significance The fifth consecutive year of revenue shortfalls follows years of mismanagement and institutional turmoil at SARS under former Commissioner Tom Moyane, an ally of former President Jacob Zuma (2009-18). On March 27, President Cyril Ramaphosa appointed the respected Edward Kieswetter as the new SARS commissioner to help turn around the once-lauded agency. Impacts Kieswetter’s appointment should help improve relations between SARS and the National Treasury, and SARS and law enforcement agencies. Rebuilding SARS's depleted skills pool will be a significant challenge for Kieswetter. Internal divisions within SARS could persist over the short term, driven by Moyane loyalists.


Significance Minister of State Security David Mahlobo was quick to dismiss the alert, saying "there was no immediate danger", emphasising that South Africa is a "stable democracy". His defensive tone has come to characterise Pretoria's difficult relations with the West. Impacts Nigeria's role in representing Africa in global fora will grow, as indicated by its leader's prominent role in the UK's anti-graft summit. Zuma's unsuccessful attempt to energise the Burundi peace process could undermine his standing as a leading mediator in SSA. Trade with Iran could expand given the lifting of Western sanctions and growing bilateral diplomatic ties. Pretoria's criticism of Israel will persist, with rebukes claiming similarities between it and South Africa's previous apartheid system. The next AU head is unlikely to come from Southern Africa; a figure from a Francophone state is probable.


Significance A ‘no deal’ outcome from the negotiations would have massively disruptive effects on both sides of the Channel. Impacts A ‘no deal’ outcome would create political bad will which would impede cooperation with remaining EU states across a range of issues. The short-term costs of adjustment and trade disruption will be additional to the costs of leaving the single market and customs union. The UK government could lose its reputation for competence.


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