Myanmar speech will not mollify Suu Kyi's critics

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Services ◽  
International Community ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
International Funding ◽  
International Sanctions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

Significance This follows intense criticism from the international community, which argues that she has done little to address the crisis or alleged abuses by Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw, against the Rohingya. Impacts The military will not be offended by yesterday’s speech. Fresh international sanctions on Myanmar are unlikely, but the government will face more criticism in global fora. The government will seek international funding aid to develop Rakhine infrastructure and social services. Islamic State could use the Rohingya situation to increase recruitment and terrorist activities in Myanmar.

Myanmar peace effort could falter after March

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Peace Negotiations ◽  
Aung San Suu Kyi ◽  
National League ◽  
The Government ◽  
State Group ◽  
The Military

Subject Prospects for the peace process with ethnic groups under the incoming National League for Democracy government. Significance Peace negotiations between the government, ethnic armed groups (EAGs) and the military (Tatmadaw) were discussed when National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi met Tatmadaw chief Min Aung Hlaing on January 25. This followed the Union Peace Conference (UPC) round held oon January 12-16, which also involved outgoing President Thein Sein, and which marked Suu Kyi's official debut in the peace process. Impacts Progressing peace in Rakhine State could help Myanmar reduce Islamic State group threats. To protect its interests, the military could stymie peace talks by restarting conflict in ethnic areas. The NLD may soften its stance on federalism to keep the military aboard, but likely thus alienating ethnic groups.

Turkey's economy and security are Erdogan's key risks

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Late Summer ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
New Man ◽  
National Life ◽  
The Government ◽  
Kurdistan Workers Party ◽  
State Group ◽  
The Military

Significance There are no declared candidates and the new man will be in effect the personal appointee of President Recep Tayyib Erdogan, whose dominance over the country seems greater than ever, despite his failure to subdue Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism or stem the growth of attacks by the Islamic State group (ISG) on Turkey's southern frontier. Most striking of all, the president is taking a hard line in Turkey's dealings with the EU. Impacts The late summer will see pressures grow on the exchange rate because of low earnings from tourism. The threat from ISG will increase. Despite its desire to do so, the government is unlikely to order a major incursion into Syria. The role of the military is rising once again in national life because of the Kurdish and ISG conflicts.

Well funded and dangerous: assessing the Islamic State’s financing operations

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Tierney
Keyword(s):  
Local Population ◽  
Community Support ◽  
International Community ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Terrorist Financing ◽  
Funding Sources ◽  
The Future ◽  
Transnational Network ◽  
Base Of Support

Purpose The existing literature on Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has thus far focused on the group’s contemporary or previous financing activities. However, there has not been an analysis of the ways in which ISIS’ funding is likely to change moving forward now that it has come under international scrutiny. The purpose of this paper is to assess the ways in which ISIS’ funding is likely to evolve in the future and to also suggest methods for combating its financing activities. Design/methodology/approach The paper is theoretical in nature. By assessing the existing literature on terrorist financing, it is apparent that terrorist organizations alter their funding sources and methods after coming under intense international scrutiny. Therefore, two hypotheses are put forth for the future of ISIS’ funding activities: the group will become more effective at building social support among its local population, thereby consolidating is funding sources and methods within Syria and Iraq; and the group will increasingly branch out, searching for sources from a transnational network, as its base in Syria and Iraq begins to deteriorate. Findings Community support is essential for sustaining a terrorist network. As a result, it is likely that ISIS will increasingly seek funding from a transnational network as its base of support in Iraq and Syria begins to deteriorate. There is also a distinct third possibility that the group will be able to consolidate its base while also moving abroad for financial support. This third option presents the most complicated outcome for the international community in its fight against ISIS. Originality/value This study fills a gap in the literature on terrorist financing, particularly with regards to ISIS, to assist the international community in its fight against the group both now and moving into the future.

Jihadist violence in Sahel will persist in 2021

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Military Leadership ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Joint Force ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Strong Commitment ◽  
G5 Sahel Joint Force ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Military

Significance The deployment of the UK troops comes at a time when jihadists attacks are intensifying across the Sahel amid an escalating internecine conflict between the al-Qaida-affiliated Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Impacts Mali’s coup is likely to distract the military leadership away from its core mandate to improve national security. The G5 Sahel Joint Force may continue to struggle to curb jihadist cross-border operations. The deployment of UK troops underscores the still strong commitment of Western governments to improving the security situation in the Sahel.

Sudan stand-off will persist beyond Hamdok’s exit

2022 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Military Leaders ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Limited Impact ◽  
International Sanctions ◽  
The Military

Significance His departure is ostensibly a blow for Sudan’s military leaders and a symbolic victory for Sudanese calling for the military to leave power. However, the stand-off between the two groups remains fundamentally unchanged. Impacts If leaders cannot find enough civilians to form a cabinet, they may offer some posts to serving or retired military. Protests and possible strike action will continue but may have only limited impact, unless rising casualties trigger a new flashpoint. Significant new international sanctions are unlikely to materialise.

The concept of trust in disasters: the Slovenian experience

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 603-615
Author(s):  
Marjan Malesic
Keyword(s):  
Disaster Response ◽  
Simple Random Sampling ◽  
Computer Assisted ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Small Areas ◽  
Face To Face ◽  
Survey Results ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to identify the level of public trust in disaster response actors, i.e. the government, civilian disaster response institutions, the military, NGOs and the media. Design/methodology/approach The data source is the 2015–2016 Slovenian Public Opinion Survey, which used face-to-face interviews (computer-assisted personal interviewing software), and a standardised instrument (questionnaire). A two-stage probability sampling design with stratification at the first stage was applied. The first stage involved a probability proportional to size selection of 150 small areas (statistical areas), where the size measurement was a the number of adult persons in the Central Population Register. The second stage involved the simple random sampling of 12 persons from each of the 150 primary sampling units. A total of 1,024 adult residents participated in the survey. Findings The findings suggest that trust in the government under normal situations is low; however, it becomes slightly higher during disaster conditions. Civilian disaster response institutions (especially firemen and civil protection), the military and NGOs (humanitarian and other volunteer organisations) are highly trusted before and during disasters. Trust in the authorities and media to inform the public in a timely and comprehensive manner about the disaster is also relatively high. Research limitations/implications Perhaps in another period of research, disaster-related experiences of the population might be different, which could certainly change the survey results about trust. Nevertheless, the main finding that low pre-disaster trust can be recovered during a disaster by adequate performance of the institution is not jeopardised. Originality/value The survey results are original.

Turkey's Kurds will be angry if HDP is not re-elected

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Guerrilla Warfare ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
South Eastern ◽  
Self Confidence ◽  
The Government ◽  
State Group ◽  
Religious Elements

Significance The process looks in danger. Serious local conflicts in south-eastern Turkey are straining tensions between Kurds and the government, even though guerrilla warfare has not resumed. Kurdish self-confidence is rising because of its fighters' success in expelling Islamic State group (ISG) from Kobani. However, dialogue between the government and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan continues, and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu seems more sensitive to Kurdish aspirations than his predecessors. Impacts Ocalan's leadership of the PKK is unshakable, but his ability to persuade his followers to avoid clashes on the streets is weakening. The conflict between the Kurds and Islamists inside Turkey will grow. Public opinion, including conservative religious elements, will block significant concessions to the Kurds, limiting the government's scope. The Kurds are emerging as a key regional opponent of Islamist politics.

Uganda former PM aspirant will provoke backlash

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Content Type ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Internal Disruption ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Ruling Party ◽  
Police Forces

Subject Pre-election politics in Uganda. Significance The long-expected announcement on June 15 by sacked Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi that he will run for president will bring bitter tensions between him and President Yoweri Museveni out into the open. It is highly unlikely to threaten the latter's 30-year rule but may provoke internal disruption within the ruling party as Museveni makes an example of internal dissent. Impacts Loyalty among the military and police forces will remain central to Museveni's power. Museveni effectively distances himself from graft scandals, while Mbabazi's reputation remains tarnished by several high-profile cases. Oil firms could see some benefits, if Museveni decides to assure them of his solid hold on power. The government was already likely to unleash inflation-inducing spending during the election, but Mbabazi's campaign increases this risk.

Kuwait faces rising threat from Islamic State group

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Security Threat ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Syrian Civil War ◽  
Political Freedoms ◽  
The Government ◽  
State Group

Significance The June 26 suicide attack inside the Imam al-Sadiq Mosque killed 27 people and was Kuwait's worst terrorist attack in over three decades. The attack, claimed by Islamic State group (ISG) and carried out by a Saudi citizen, was intended to inflame sectarian tensions that have spiralled in recent years. US officials have long identified Kuwait as an epicentre of funding and other forms of materiel assistance for participants in the Syrian civil war. However, unlike Qatar and Saudi Arabia, where support largely has flowed in one direction toward Sunni rebel groups, Kuwaitis have provided high-profile support to both the opposition and the Assad regime. Impacts The government will use the attack to reinforce its narrative that the bidun constitute a security threat rather than a human rights issue. Initial solidarity among Kuwait Sunni and Shia could dissipate quickly into political wrangling over the government's response. Kuwaiti salafi aid will boost hardline Islamist rebel groups in Syria. Key commercial and business interests, and oil installations are unlikely to be affected seriously by the rising terrorist threat. Reinforced security measures will further restrict political freedoms in the GCC's most open state.

Iran's military set for more aggressive stance in Gulf

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
General Staff ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Defence Budget ◽  
Intelligence Collection ◽  
Gulf States ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Major General

Significance Tensions between the Gulf states and Iran have escalated significantly in 2016, in the wake of Iran's signing of a landmark deal in 2015 that brought to an end the decade-long dispute over its nuclear programme. The response of Iran's military to the heightened tensions will be partly influenced by the new chairman of the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), the country's top military body, Major General Mohamad Hossein Bagheri. Impacts A more assertive and non-compromising IRGC will increase pressure on President Hassan Rouhani as he seeks re-election in 2017. Improvements in intelligence collection and dissemination are likely in Syria, aimed at reducing Iranian casualties. The military and government are likely to clash soon over the defence budget and its allocation. The government will try to keep the IRGC in check by tipping the media off about alleged financial wrongdoings. With the next US president expected to adopt a harder-line stance on Iran, the diplomatic rapprochement may be reversed partially.

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