Iranian dissent will slow promised Caspian Sea accord

Subject Talks to decide the Caspian Sea's status. Significance A working group representing the five states around the Caspian Sea meets this month to prepare for a summit promised before July. The littoral states are said to be close to agreeing the legal position of the sea, but Iran's assent is far from certain. Impacts A Caspian convention will not solve contested claims to mid-sea oil reserves. Environmental protection could end up being sacrificed to the exploration and development of untapped hydrocarbon reserves. Trans-Caspian shipping will be boosted by its role in the Eurasian transport networks of China's Belt and Road initiative.

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Enderwick

Purpose The continuation of China’s belt and road initiative (BRI) is assumed in most analyses. Yet, recent events have created significant reputational damage for China and Chinese businesses. With a trade war evolving into a hegemonic struggle, there are a number of potential developments that could derail the BRI. This paper aims to provide a contemporary review of the factors that could negatively impact its continuation, and what China has done to mitigate the risks. Design/methodology/approach A descriptive paper that groups possible disruptive factors into three groups: internal weaknesses of the BRI and its design; those related to China’s implementation of the BRI and external concerns and pressures. Findings China has actively reviewed and refined the BRI to reduce its perceived weaknesses and increase its attractiveness to potential participants, focussing on debt dependency, transparency and governance. However, this has occurred at the same time as growing concerns regarding China’s international assertiveness, the hegemonic challenge and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Research limitations/implications These changes are occurring within an extremely dynamic environment and any analysis at one point in time is subject to considerable limitations. However, the paper brings together a range of disparate perspectives in a structured manner. Originality/value The classification of possible threats to the BRI is original and provides insights into the relative significance of the diverse challenges that China faces. The paper concludes that while China’s operational focus on the mechanics of the BRI process is necessary, it may not be sufficient to ensure its continuing development. The paper identifies the next step which is conceptualisation of these ideas and of the BRI. Some guidance as to how this might be done is provided.


Significance The bill comes as the federal government is increasingly concerned about Chinese political and economic influence in Australia; Beijing has criticised Canberra in recent months and introduced economic strictures. Impacts Universities could lose research partnerships, especially with China, and some foreign academics. Infrastructure investment could suffer, including the Victoria government’s deal to partake in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The federal government seems to have a secondary agenda for the reforms, to weaken the powers of the eight states and territories.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shen Kunrong ◽  
Jin Gang

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to comprehensively examine the influence of formal and informal institutional differences on enterprise investment margin, mode and result. Design/methodology/approach This paper is based on 2,440 micro samples of large-scale outbound investment from 609 Chinese enterprises from the years 2005 to 2016. Findings The study has found that formal institutional differences have little impact on investment scale, but significantly affect investment diversification. In order to avoid the management risks brought by formal institutional differences, enterprises tend to a full ownership structure. However, the choice between greenfield investment and cross-border mergers and acquisitions is not affected by formal institutional differences. In contrast, the impact of informal institutional differences is more extensive. Both formal and informal institutional differences significantly increase the probability of investment failure. Further research found that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) bridges the formal institutional differences. Originality/value The study concludes that developing the BRI, especially cultural exchanges with countries alongside the Belt and Road, will help enterprises to “go global” faster and better.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 268-276
Author(s):  
Jean A. Berlie

PurposeThis article looks at the differences and similarities between globalization and the role of China on globalization, in particular for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China (HKSAR).Design/methodology/approachThis article is based on research, reading, and interviews on globalization.FindingsChina is promoting the new globalization of the century called Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which is a unique way to boost again the economy of China.Originality/valueStudies of the New Maritime and Land Silk Road of China are rare; in particular, the role of the HKSAR is ignored. Macau also plays a role because it was the first point of globalization in the seventeenth century. China is really a global country, and the Chinese are numerous in all continents. Chinese Internet role is also mentioned. Globalization is a key concept not only for China and Asia but also for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), Africa, and countries in Latin America such as Bolivia and Venezuela. This article looks at the differences and similarities between globalization and the role of China on globalization. The HKSAR and the Greater Bay Area are part of the same country. China is developing the new globalization of the century called, in 2017, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The current definition of Chinese globalization includes land and maritime Silk Road, now the BRI.


Subject Chinese and Indian interest in Nepal. Significance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is dominating Nepal’s agenda. Until a decade ago, Nepal was clearly within India’s sphere of influence. Nepali Prime Minister KP Oli in April made a three-day state visit to Delhi and in June made a six-day state visit to Beijing. Impacts The governing Nepal Communist Party will be at risk of a split, especially during negotiations over a new chair in two years’ time. Campaigning in nearby Bhutan’s elections later this year is likely to be dominated by debate over the country's ties with India and China. India and China may seek mutual easing of trade barriers as part of efforts to improve bilateral economic ties.


Subject BRI’s evolving nature. Significance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is establishing ‘anchor’ investments and creating BRI clusters, particularly in transport connectivity and energy. Such anchor investments as Cosco’s in Piraeus or Belgrade’s Friendship Bridge serve as catalysts, attracting more Chinese companies and setting the stage for expansion. Impacts Continued concessional lending by Chinese policy banks for infrastructure projects in Balkan countries will increase the risk of debt traps. Mitigating the currency risks of such lending arrangements by switching to local currency lending will gain pace. A second wave of BRI-related activities is starting with Huawei, Tencent, Alibaba and WeChat making inroads in local economies.


Significance Senior US officials see Communist-led China as the foremost threat to the United States. The Trump administration’s campaign against it spans the spectrum of government actions: criticism; tariffs; sanctions; regulatory crackdowns; military intimidation; support for Taiwan; and restrictions on imports, exports, investment and visas. Impacts Beijing will have little success in driving a wedge between Washington and its major Western allies. The West is unlikely to produce a convincing alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Negative public views of China incentivise China-bashing by politicians, which in turn feeds negative public opinion in a downward spiral. Beijing will persist in its efforts to encourage a more positive view of China among Western publics.


Subject Anti-corruption efforts. Significance 'Fighting corruption' has become a staple of political debate across most low- and high-income countries. However, the prospects for the success of national and international efforts are modest. Impacts A second term for US President Donald Trump term would advance Washington's retreat from promoting anti-corruption overseas. China's Belt and Road Initiative is plagued by opaque deals. Western corporates are likely to strengthen anti-corruption efforts for legal, financial and reputational reasons.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 212-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Tae-Woo Lee ◽  
Sung-Woo Lee ◽  
Zhi-Hua Hu ◽  
Kyoung-Suk Choi ◽  
Na Young Hwan Choi ◽  
...  

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze maritime logistics connectivity of ports and shipping networks in the East Sea Economic Rim (ESER) to promote international trade in the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), considering centrality, primary flow and clustering interaction. Design/methodology/approach The paper applies a complex network model, using a big data system consisting of an automated identification system, electronic data interchange and distributive and complex data. Three perspectives, including connectivity in trading ports and regions, centralities in the realm of complex network and potential marketing and regional impacts, and sixteen criteria are considered for this analysis. A visual approach has been also applied to highlight port connectivity and ship flows for the reader’s convenience. Findings The paper shows that port connectivity and maritime logistics are enablers to promote Korean international trade in Northeast China through the ESER, and 25 major ports are well connected to promote international trade in the region with visual data of ship flows by ship type and by flag. Research limitations/implications Owing to the lack of port management information systems among the countries in the ESER except Korea and Japan, this paper could not capture cargo types and amounts on board. Port connectivity analysis shows links of the ports in the ESER to major ports in southeast Asia along the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). These results contribute to drawing policy implications to promote the ESER and provide suggestions for promoting Korean international trade by enhancing maritime logistics connectivity. Originality/value Unlike the existing literature showing descriptive and policy-oriented research related to ESER, this paper applied a vigorous method with a big amount of data to analyze port connectivity and ship flows in the ESER, considering China’s BRI affecting the global supply chain system, maritime transportation, and logistics. In addition, the paper shows how the seaports in the ESER are connected along the MSR.


2021 ◽  
Vol 06 (02) ◽  
pp. 23-27
Author(s):  
Gulshan Zeynalova Gulshan Zeynalova

The Caspian Sea is the largest body of water in Eurasia: After the collapse of the USSR, the water area of this region is a zone of interest for many states. [1] The Caspian region rightfully serves as one of the most significant regions for most countries interested in the mineral resources that the Caspian is rich in. The Caspian Sea has a significant hydrocarbon reserves. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian basin have the following values: oil - 48 billion barrels of oil, natural gas - 292 trillion. cubic feet (found and probable reserves), of which 75% and 67%, respectively, are produced or may be produced offshore. The northern part of the Caspian Sea contains most of the oil reserves, while the southern sector of the Caspian Sea is rich in natural gas.[2] It should be emphasized that the list of states that have the rights to use the resources of the Caspian Sea is as follows: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan. It is impossible to correlate the importance of the oil and gas resources of the Caspian reservoir for each of the above countries, for the following reasons: Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are countries for which the hydrocarbon potential of the Caspian is the most important predictor of the formation and development of the economy, while for Kazakhstan, the use of oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea plays an important , but not the most decisive role, since oil and gas deposits in this country are not limited to the Caspian region, but its economy is developing in other directions. Iran and Russia, however, are interested in influencing the direction of flows of oil and gas raw materials, including their transit through the territory of the countries. [3] The last years for the Caspian region have become the years of a shift in the development of the oil and gas industry of the Caspian "five", which account for 17.6% of oil reserves and 46.4% of gas reserves in terms of global reserves. It is assumed that on the territory of the Caspian shelf, which belongs to Russia, oil reserves amount to 270 million tons, natural gas reserves - 0.5 trillion cubic meters. m of gas. [4] Of course, it is worth noting that the potential of the Russian sector of the Caspian Sea is significantly lower than the oil and gas potential of Yamal or Western Siberia, but the development of this region is important for the strategic development of the oil and gas sector, in particular offshore drilling.


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