Xi's personality cult creates hostages to fortune

Significance It signals to the Party and the country at large that Xi, his ideas and his leadership approach have the support, or at least the compliance, of the political elite. Impacts The Resolution's omission of previous criticism of 'personality cults' will make intra-Party criticism of Xi's more difficult. Circumspect language on national security suggests a cautious approach to issues involving the potential for military conflict. The Resolution will add impetus to the policies advanced under the 'common prosperity' slogan.

Significance All the signs are that Xi will take a third term, though the secrecy of the political elite means alternatives cannot be ruled out completely.


Significance This is expected to be followed by the first parliamentary election since 2014, at some point in early 2022. It now looks increasingly likely that both elections will be delayed. The electoral process lacks the elements it would need to be truly transformative, but it is prompting shifts in the political elite which will dictate developments for at least the next year. Impacts Khalifa Haftar will keep pushing for his armed group to form the core of Libya’s future army Seif al-Islam Qadhafi’s candidacy in the elections is unlikely to result in him becoming president. Aguileh Saleh looks set to stay on as House of Representatives speaker with no clear date for parliamentary elections.


2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Burak Bilgehan Özpek

Disappearance of the established security paradigm of Kemalist state has not helped to create strong institutions and legal-bureaucratic structures that are supposed to prevent a certain political elite to dominate the political system and criminalize its adversaries by security reasons. Instead, survival concerns and political will of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has become replacement of the established paradigm. This has created a systemic crisis. On the one hand, the AKP has played the role of a regular political party, which is supposed to have equal rights and privileges with other players in the game. On the other hand, the AKP has been the tutelary actor that determines what national security is and who threatens national security. As a result of this picture, the AKP has exploited its monopoly over securitization to eliminate the criticisms of the opposition groups. Therefore, any political party or political group has not been viewed as a national security threat only if it has not threatened the political survival of the AKP. Such a crisis has also affected the AKP’s approach toward the Kurdish question. Unlike the established paradigm’s allergy toward the political demands of Kurds due to its commitment to nation-state principle, the AKP’s fluctuated policy toward the Kurds resembles to a political party’s survival strategy rather than a policy stemming from a consistent national security paradigm.


Significance Rifts within the political elite are deepening, evidenced by the departure of former Prime Minister Jean Ravelonarivo -- and his cabinet -- last month. However, the installation of a new administration does not portend stability. Impacts The central bank's decision to cut its benchmark interest rate to 8.3% from 8.7% will facilitate borrowing by firms and households. This is unlikely to boost GDP growth given the countervailing effects of political volatility and low commodity prices. The UN secretary general's appeal (on an official trip earlier this month) for the government to tackle graft is unlikely to be heeded. If Madagascar experiences another coup, the Southern African Development Community bloc will likely expel it -- again.


Subject The political impact of the 'Panamagate' scandal. Significance A five-member Supreme Court bench on April 20 ordered the constitution of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to probe the legitimacy of the offshore assets (mostly in the United Kingdom and Qatar) of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his family. In coming months, the Court bench will monitor and oversee the investigation in which both civilian law enforcement and military intelligence will participate. Impacts The government will avoid challenging the military’s foreign policy this year. The scandal will increase pressure on the political elite to ensure public probity. A military coup is highly improbable at present.


Significance Kurz has said he wants a coalition agreement by the end of the month -- probably with the far-right populist Freedom Party (FPOe). Impacts Austria is likely to push for EU reforms on migration, border controls and social welfare benefits. The SPOe is struggling to find a niche in the party system and could face a long spell in opposition. The FPOe's rise to a potential government role will attract unwanted international attention. The political elite could be rejuvenated as younger Kurz supporters are promoted to top jobs in ministries and parliament.


Subject Anti-corruption efforts. Significance On September 30, Vice-President Felix Ulloa met a UN mission in San Salvador to discuss possible support for a new anti-corruption mission. Inspired by similar bodies in neighbouring Guatemala and Honduras, the International Commission against Corruption and Impunity in El Salvador (CICIES) is intended to scrutinise political malpractice and address public concerns surrounding the political elite. The announcement of its establishment last month by President Nayib Bukele came within the first 100 days of his term, meeting one of his election campaign pledges. Impacts The CICIES will probably have less autonomy than its Guatemalan and Honduran equivalents. The politicisation of anti-corruption debates threatens to hinder progress on the issue. Reducing corruption could weaken gangs’ influence over public institutions but will do little to ease violent crime.


Headline INTERNATIONAL: Digital taxes will test political elite


1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donley T. Studlar

Relationships between the public and the political elite in Britain are generally thought to be explicable in terms of a ‘strong leadership’ hypothesis, according to which the public responds to initiatives put forward by leading political actors. Reflecting the popular will is not thought to be a highly prized activity among British politicians, who supposedly share the general cultural expectation that the public defers to the wisdom of those more knowledgeable than themselves, the public being content with the opportunity to pronounce electorally on the fitness of the Government at least once every five years. Occasionally voices are heard demanding that more attention be paid to the wishes of the general public, as in recent years in regard to the Common Market and capital punishment, but these demands have so far gone unheeded.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-75
Author(s):  
Milka Malfait

Introduction: Statistics have proven that both the European Union (“EU”) and the Russian Federation (“Russia”) suffer from terrorism in its current form. Intensifying partnerships to combat terrorism would be a good idea. This essay envisages to illustrate a common base for cooperation in the fight against terrorism despite of some general differences in policy and structure between the EU and Russia.Materials and methods: The methodological basis of the research has both an analytical and descriptive nature. As for the analytical nature, sta­tistical, qualitative and comparative analyses were used while researching political phenomena and processes in the sphere of national security and coun­terterrorism. The author also applied the inductive method. The materials observed include the distinct approaches of Russia and the EU in terms of threats to national security including terrorism.Results: The author reveals there are four fundamental issues which ask for more attention in the EU-Russia dialogue on Freedom, Justice and Security and particularly with regard to the fight against terrorism. Firstly, statistics prove that Europe (EU and Russia) are impacted by modern terrorism, yet not by the same cases of terrorism. Secondly, Russia’s experience in counterterrorism is crucial. Thirdly, the scale ‘freedom’ and ‘human rights’ versus ‘security’ has not the same ratio in the EU and in Russia. Fourthly, the concept sovereignty is differently interpreted by the EU, the EU Member States and Russia. Despite all the differences in views, it is clear that the EU could learn a lot from Russia, as one of the key States with considerable experience in the fight against terrorism. Although the EU and Russia face different forms and problems and the roots of Western European terrorism sometimes have a slightly different origin, this does not negate the fact that they could foster cooperation.Discussion and conclusion: The governmental approaches of the EU and Russia on national security were discussed as well as the common grounds for cooperation, namely the threat of terrorism. It is proved that both systems have different features and are not always compatible with each other. The following recommendation of setting up an anti-terrorism working group was provided as well as the advice to eliminate the political distrust.


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