Complex dynamics in a repeated game model for Chinese telecommunication duopoly

Author(s):  
Cheng Xiangbo ◽  
Peng Jing
2019 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
pp. 103358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subramanian Balaji ◽  
Eanoch Golden Julie ◽  
Yesudhas Harold Robinson ◽  
Raghvendra Kumar ◽  
Pham Huy Thong ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Liu Guoxin ◽  
Yan Junzhou

University research team, as a special form of organizations in university, is a characteristic feature of contemporaneity science.it has a rapid development in recent years. But the trust is playing a very important role in research team’s development. The paper analyzes the trust construction of research team by establish one-shot and repeated trust game models, and based on this, establishes the trust game model with university intervention. The conclusion shows that the trust mechanism will not be constructed by one-shot game. While it can be constructed by repeated game, but its trust mechanism is not stable. With the university intervation, the team members will change their behavior and increase the trust probability, and it will be easily construct trust in university research team. According to the above analysis, the paper presents some countermeasures and suggestions to promote trust construction in university research team.


Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyungwon Kang ◽  
Hesham A. Rakha

Lane changes are complex safety- and throughput-critical driver actions. Most lane-changing models deal with lane-changing maneuvers solely from the merging driver’s standpoint and thus ignore driver interaction. To overcome this shortcoming, we develop a game-theoretical decision-making model and validate the model using empirical merging maneuver data at a freeway on-ramp. Specifically, this paper advances our repeated game model by using updated payoff functions. Validation results using the Next Generation SIMulation (NGSIM) empirical data show that the developed game-theoretical model provides better prediction accuracy compared to previous work, giving correct predictions approximately 86% of the time. In addition, a sensitivity analysis demonstrates the rationality of the model and its sensitivity to variations in various factors. To provide evidence of the benefits of the repeated game approach, which takes into account previous decision-making results, a case study is conducted using an agent-based simulation model. The proposed repeated game model produces superior performance to a one-shot game model when simulating actual freeway merging behaviors. Finally, this lane change model, which captures the collective decision-making between human drivers, can be used to develop automated vehicle driving strategies.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Hongliang Tu

According to a triopoly game model in the electricity market with bounded rational players, a new Cournot duopoly game model with delayed bounded rationality is established. The model is closer to the reality of the electricity market and worth spreading in oligopoly. By using the theory of bifurcations of dynamical systems, local stable region of Nash equilibrium point is obtained. Its complex dynamics is demonstrated by means of the largest Lyapunov exponent, bifurcation diagrams, phase portraits, and fractal dimensions. Since the output adjustment speed parameters are varied, the stability of Nash equilibrium gives rise to complex dynamics such as cycles of higher order and chaos. Furthermore, by using the straight-line stabilization method, the chaos can be eliminated. This paper has an important theoretical and practical significance to the electricity market under the background of developing new energy.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1008-1009 ◽  
pp. 1395-1398
Author(s):  
Wei Zhuo Ji

A dynamic repeated model has been established in electric power Triopoly. The chaos and density cycling of the nonlinear dynamic model are investigated in detail. The nonlinear feedback chaos control method is successfully applied to the dynamic repeated game model.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Zhanbing Guo

Considering that the real competitions in service market contain two important factors, price and service, we build a dynamical price and service game model and study the complex dynamics of this bivariate game. Some special properties about the adjustment of service are noted by comparing our innovative bivariate game model with previous univariate game model. Besides, we discuss the stabilities of fixed points and compare the price and service game with price game. What is more, the recursive least-squares (RLS) estimation is introduced to substitute naive estimation; then the impacts of RLS estimation are studied by comparing it with naive estimation.


2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (01) ◽  
pp. 1650008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhanbing Guo ◽  
Junhai Ma

In this paper, we build a dynamical game model with three bounded rational players (firms) to study the influence of information on the complex dynamics of market competition, where useful information is about rival’s real decision. In this dynamical game model, one information-sharing team is composed of two firms, they acquire and share the information about their common competitor, however, they make their own decisions separately, where the amount of information acquired by this information-sharing team will determine the estimation accuracy about the rival’s real decision. Based on this dynamical game model and some creative 3D diagrams, the influence of the amount of information on the complex dynamics of market competition such as local dynamics, global dynamics and profits is studied. These results have significant theoretical and practical values to realize the influence of information.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Xiaosong Pu

A dynamic triopoly game characterized by firms with different expectations is modeled by three-dimensional nonlinear difference equations, where the market has quadratic inverse demand function and the firm possesses cubic total cost function. The local stability of Nash equilibrium is studied. Numerical simulations are presented to show that the triopoly game model behaves chaotically with the variation of the parameters. We obtain the fractal dimension of the strange attractor, bifurcation diagrams, and Lyapunov exponents of the system.


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